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In this thesis I argue for a renewed consideration of the climate crisis. In order to do this, I develop the 
formulation ‘earth-world-history,’ which I understand to be the locus of this crisis. Emerging from a 
clarification of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt writings on the temporality of place and the 
‘placedness’ of temporality – understood principally in terms of events occurring in history – earth-
world-history serves as my entry into the environmental thinking of both scholars. Further clarifying 
the ontological implications of earth-world-history, I offer a reading of Arendt’s twofold political 
conditions, natality and plurality, as conditioned by this constellation. By radically extending Arendt’s 
political vocabulary in this way, in part by exposing the ‘earthliness’ of natality and plurality, I 
uncover the latent concern for an ‘earthly politics’ in her writing. Turning to another of Arendt’s 
interlocutors, Walter Benjamin, I ‘operationalise’ this claim via a critical rereading of the climate 
crisis’s history. Recasting Benjamin’s historically oppressed as those ‘exiled’ by history, a 
formulation that captures the ‘placedness’ of temporality, I argue for the recognition of an exilic force 
which exists not only in relation to the history of the climate crisis but increasingly encroaches into 
the future. Finding a politics to overcome this exilic future I return to the notion of natality, recalling 
its emergence from earth-world-history as pivotal to its capacity to redeem a new future in spite of a 
violent past.  
This thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to position Arendt as an environmental scholar. 
And yet, it is not only Arendt or the dialogue she sustains with Heidegger and Benjamin that informs 
my thinking. Reflecting the plurality implicated by the climate crisis, I incorporate a plurality of 
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Introduction: Locating the Climate Crisis 
 
To claim today that the climate crisis is a political crisis does not require extensive argumentation. 
That this crisis precedes, exacerbates and prolongs so many other crises that read as ‘political’ in a 
more immediate sense – amongst the more extreme, war, famine, pandemics, and forced migration – 
ought to provoke engagement with the climate crisis as the crisis of the 21st century.1 Framed in this 
way, as the experience that exerts a conditioning claim on all other experiences and hence on politics 
more generally, the climate crisis can be read as the vantage point from which the human condition 
must now be viewed.2 It was Hannah Arendt who anticipated the need to assume such a vantage 
point, offering the directive in the prologue to The Human Condition that politics cannot be thought 
apart from the historical conditions of its appearance. Her claim then, that ‘our newest experiences 
and most recent fears’ must be claimed as the vantage point for surveying the human condition serves 
as a prescient invocation of how to approach the climate crisis today. The central claim of this project 
is thus that it is this experience of unearthly planetary change and political crisis with which we must 
contend if the human condition is not to become a source of alienation.  
That the experience of the climate crisis can be further determined as belonging to the 
geological epoch of the ‘Anthropocene,’ the declaration of which attempts to specify our historical 
condition while simultaneously rendering it alien, other, and unknown, only further ignites the need to 
assume this moment of living under the climate crisis as our political vantage point – our ‘newest 
experience’ from which to survey the world.3 Taking up this position, in this project I endeavour to 
 
1 On the paralysis of political institutions responding to the climate crisis, see; Johl and Duyck, 2012. On forced 
migration and climate refugees see; Ahmed, 2018; Bayes 2018; Fornalé and Doebbler, 2017; UNHCR, 
Frequently asked questions on climate change and disaster displacement, 2016; Sheller, 2018: 137-158; Vaha 
2015. On the zoonotic origins of pandemics like COVID-19 as linked to the climate crisis, see; United Nations 
Environment Programme and International Livestock Research Institute (2020). Preventing the Next Pandemic: 
Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission. Nairobi, Kenya. On the link between livestock 
and the climate crisis more generally see; Oppenlander, 2013; Malm, 2020. On understanding climate change as 
an ‘emergency’ see; Gilding, 2019. 
2 A similar injunction is explicit in claims such as those made by Naomi Klein that, ‘this changes everything,’ 
(Klein, 2015). A similar declaration can be heard in the cry of child activist Greta Thunberg that ‘the house is 
one fire’ (Thunberg, 2019). On the absent authority to which these movements appeal see; Ricciardone, 2019. 
3 On the origins of the Anthropocene see; Bonneuil and Frezzos, 2017; Davis, 2008; Lewis and Maslin, 2018. 
On the geological status of humans, see; Wood, 2019.   
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expose the climate crisis not simply as crisis but as the crisis condition of life on earth today. While 
much debate still surrounds the exact meaning of the Anthropocene, not least as a geologically 
identifiable epoch, but in terms of its relation to questions of accountability surrounding the climate 
crisis, which might be considered its most apparent ‘symptom,’ in this project I argue that Arendt’s 
work is instrumental to the task of understanding its appearance. Accepting as given then that the 
climate is changing and that these changes are symptomatic of broader shifts in the planet away from 
an epoch of relative stability (the Holocene) to one that is marked by its anthropogenic mutations (the 
Anthropocene), my aim in this project is to think the implications of this experience through an 
Arendtian lens.4  
 Though the Anthropocene and its more acute manifestation in the violence of the climate 
crisis are not exclusively environmental problems, and nor ought they be engaged only within   
the field of earth sciences, questions of the environment cannot be separated from their consideration. 
While the climate crisis is most apparent in terms of extreme weather and climatic instability and 
hence as invoking a clear image of the earth, I endeavour to show throughout this project that all 
questions of political action and crises of the political have a direct relation to the earth insofar as the 
earth is, as Arendt tells us, the ‘quintessence’ of the human condition.5 Continuously recalling what 
might thus be called the ‘earthliness’ of political action and its necessary ‘placedness’ on the earth is 
one of the organising claims of this thesis. And so, while Arendt’s work did not directly theorize the 
environment and though the references to the earth that do occur in her work are largely 
underdeveloped – both by her and others engaging her work – I nevertheless contend that insofar as 
her project responded to the imperative to ‘think what we are doing’ it can be figured as an 
engagement with the earthly placedness of ‘our doing.’6 Complicating the content of this ‘doing’ will 
be a recurrent problem in this project, one that emerges firstly in relation to Martin Heidegger’s 
 
4 On the politics of dating the Anthropocene and distinguishing it from the Holocene, see; Davis, 2008; Davis 
and Todd, 2017.  
5 HC: 2.  
6 On Arendt and the environment, see: Chapman, 2007; Hamilton, 2015; Hargis, 2016; Hyvönen, 2020; Ott, 
2009; Voice, 2013; Whiteside, 1998. For site-specific applications of Arendt’s theory see: Hyvönen, 2017; 
Pang, 2016; Simon, 2020.  
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‘doing’ of dwelling, before turning more closely to Arendt’s writing and the ‘doing’ quality of her 
political condition of human natality.7   
In saying that Arendt’s engagement with the environment constitutes an underdeveloped area 
in her work I do not mean to diminish the explicit references to the earth that do punctuate her 
writings. Indeed, I take her claim in The Life of the Mind, that ‘plurality is the law of the earth’ as a 
pivotal moment in her writing that crystallises her earlier invocations of the earth and marks it as 
central to her considerations of political action.8 Nevertheless, that Arendt did not view herself nor has 
she come to be seen as environmental thinker suggest that even her more explicit invocations of the 
earth are yet to be accorded significance within either Arendt scholarship or environmental theory. In 
spite of this relative neglect each of Arendt’s major political works either begin or end with images of 
the earth; the preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) appeals for a new understanding of 
‘human dignity on earth’; the extended essay ‘Introduction into Politics’ (1954) opens with the claim 
that ‘politics is based on the fact that humans are an earthly product’; The Human Condition (1958) 
begins with a reflection on space travel and ends with a discussion of earth alienation; the second 
essay of Between Past and Future (1961) opens with a discussion on ‘History and Nature’ and 
concludes with an inquiry into human status in the space age; in her account of Adolf Eichmann’s 
trial in 1963 she described the Nazi party as having deemed itself ‘ordained to reorder the conditions 
for earthly appearance;’ and, finally, as already noted, in The Life of the Mind (1978) she directly 
invoked the earth as harbouring the law of plurality.9 With these moments in mind, I argue throughout 
this project that despite the relative absence of Arendtian environmental theory, a rich and sustained 
inquiry into the earthliness of both the human condition and of politics can be traced throughout her 
work. 
Where Arendt’s work is taken up within the context of the climate crisis, these dialogues are 
principally sustained by the growing recognition of its ineliminability and its political implications. In 
other words, she is continually read as a political theorist rather than an environmental theorist. 
 
7 ‘Dwelling’ is a recurrent topic in Heidegger’s writing, in the context of this project I develop an account of 
dwelling from his 1954 essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking,’ see; Harman, 2009; Rose, 2012.  
8 LMT: 19.  
9 OT: xi; PP: 93; HC: 1-6, 257-268; BPF: 41-63, 260-274; EJ: 279; LMT: 19.  
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Following Arendt’s decisive diagnosis of the human condition into its three constitutive parts – 
labour, work, and action – many pursuing Arendtian readings of the environment have built on 
precisely this framework.10 Kerry Whiteside’s argument regarding the failure to judge the world in 
ecological terms is connected to a preceding failure to engage the ‘rise of the social,’ a political trend 
that Arendt identified in the crossover of labour and work, a perversion that saw the meaning of 
political action erode and consumerism rise.11 Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen presents a similar reading, arguing 
here for the hybrid labour-as-action, a locus of activity that unleashes the unpredictability of action 
into the biological web of life which traditionally corresponds to the activity of labour.12 Like 
Whiteside, Hyvönen’s reading cannot be separated from a discussion on labour and consumption, yet 
his argument is distinguished for its critique of the agent of labour. His claim then, that the 
collectively organised labour process ‘has taken the shape of action minus plurality’ is countered with 
an appeal to restructure collective existence and recover the diversity of human plurality.13 Scott 
Hamilton and Anne Chapman share these concerns for action, both claiming that the unpredictable 
force of Arendtian political action is diminished by something like the calculative and capitalistic 
framework of resource extraction.14 This distortion of value as an attribute of nature, namely, of 
applying a profit-engineered framework to the environment reappears in Paul Ott’s discussion of the 
insufficient attention paid to human-nature relationships.15 The destructive consequences of this form 
of largely unconstrained consumption is read through an Arendtian lens by Paul Voice who turns 
towards Arendt’s account of the self and deliberative justice as a potential remedy.16 Jill Hargis 
develops a similar appeal, countering growing sentiments of world alienation with a return to plurality 
where deliberative and democratic judgment might reposition individuals as responsible for the 
world.17    
 
10 Arendt introduced this framework in The Human Condition however, she also provided a concise summary of 
her threefold division of action in the paper ‘Labour, Work, Action’ (see; Arendt, 2018: 291-307).  
11 Whiteside, 1998. On the rise of the social, see; Luttrell, 2015; Pitkin, 1998; Ring, 1989; Zakin, 2015. 
12 Hyvönen, 2020.  
13 ibid: 258.  
14 Chapman: 2007; Hamilton, 2015.  
15 Ott: 2009.  
16 Voice: 2013.  
17 Hargis: 2016. Though not directly connected to questions of ecology, Linda Zerilli’s work pursues a similar 
argument, heralding an Arendtian and democratic form of judgment as a remedy to growing alienation and 
political violence, see Zerilli, 2016.  
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The general themes of these Arendtian interpretations of the climate crisis, while reflective of 
the broad scope of Arendt’s political theory, all share in common their positioning of Arendt after the 
crisis. What thus becomes apparent in these readings is the applicability of Arendt to the climate 
crisis.18 Departing from this trend, this project sits alone in its claim that Arendt is an environmental 
thinker, and thus one for whom politics is always already an environmental concern. Without denying 
the political dimension of the climate crisis then, in this project I develop an account of Arendt’s 
environmental politics that effectively precedes the political violence of the crisis. The scope of 
argumentation to which this position gives rise enables me to pursue avenues unexplored by others. 
Indeed, rather than ‘apply’ Arendt’s political theory to what is already considered a political crisis in 
its own right, my claim regarding Arendt’s latent interrogation of human earthliness gives new texture 
to her writings on human rights (Chapter Three) and the project of politics (Chapter Six). In as much 
as this study thus engages the climate crisis and its political implications through an Arendtian lens, it 
also points to the many instances in Arendt’s writing – like those already noted in reference to the 
earth – that point towards something like the latent environmentalism of her political theory. 
Uncovering this arc in her writing and allowing for her reflections on natality, rights, history and 
politics to be coloured by its force, enables me to position Arendt within a school of environmental 
theorists without the need to continually justify this placement. That being said, as I reflect on the far-
reaching implications of the climate crisis, I move as much outside this canon as I do inside, bringing 
Arendt’s environmentalism into dialogue with critical race theorists and decolonial theory.19   
Coordinating what is initially an environmental exegesis of Arendt’s writing is a 
methodological framework that I establish in relation to two of Arendt’s contemporaries: Martin 
Heidegger and Walter Benjamin. And yet even here, my engagement with Heidegger and Benjamin is 
marked by the guiding presence of others; principally, James Baldwin, Saidiya Hartman, Achille 
 
18 For ‘earth-less’ accounts of topics that intersect the wordliness of politics (but not the earthliness of that 
world) see: worlds in theories of judgement, see for example Biskowski, 1993; Zerilli, 2016; worlds and human 
rights, see; Klein, 2014; Parekh, 2004; phenomenology and the world, see; Borren, 2013; world and education, 
see; Gordon, 2001.  
19 The intersection between the Anthropocene and decolonialism is already well noted and will emerge as a 
central topic of concern in Chapter Five, see also; Chakrabarty, 2012; Davis and Todd, 2017; Lewis and Maslin, 
2018, Weizman and Sheikh, 2015.    
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Mbembe, Christina Sharpe, and Kathryn Yusoff, whose claims to history, politics, and something like 
what I will call ‘appearance-in-place’ give weight to my argument.20 Building on the critical force that 
is garnered in the arguments that I develop by bringing these thinkers together allows me to highlight 
the illuminating potential of Arendt’s environmental thought. Namely, rather than simply ask 
questions regarding the force that specific instances of Arendt’s work on the question of earth and 
placedness might have in responding to the political implications of the climate crisis, I work to 
establish a constellation of ideas in which Arendt’s environmentalism becomes forceful insofar as it 
allows for these ideas to sustain productive and illuminating dialogue.  
Central to the development of Arendt’s thinking in this way is the introduction of my own 
constellation in which to situate an analysis of the climate crisis. Drawn from my reading of the 
common schematic around which Heidegger and Arendt develop accounts of existential and political 
‘placedness,’ I introduce the formulation of ‘earth-world-history,’ a triadic constellation that serves 
both as a methodological tool in approaching the vast and complex secondary literature on the climate 
crisis and as a conceptual tool in which to think the appearance of the climate crisis.21 My entry into 
the climate crisis via this threefold analytic enables me to nuance claims regarding the ‘material’ 
(earthly) and ‘political’ (worldly-historical) consequences of the crisis. And so, rather than perpetuate 
classifications of the climate crisis as either ‘earthly’ or ‘worldly,’ I will use the formulation earth-
world-history as a way of challenging precisely this separation, arguing in line with my earlier 
discussion of the crisis that the climate crisis is simultaneously a crisis of earth, world, and history. 
Highlighting the way in which all political worlds not only appear ‘on’ earth but as conditioned and 
intrinsically related to the earth, and hence marked by an enduring ‘earthliness,’ the significance of 
earth-world-history is that it creates that critical space in which to think the intersecting and 
overlapping forces that coordinate the climate crisis. Establishing the exact meaning of earth-world-
 
20 My project gains immensely from the work of Baldwin, 1963, 1972, 2017; Hartman, 1997, 2007, 2019; 
Mbembe, 2017, 2019; Sharpe, 2016; Yusoff, 2018. In turn, the specific historical zones of Nazi oppression and 
Israeli and Australian statehood reappear as moments of historic violence demanding reconsideration and 
critique.  
21 Although I make this connection between Arendt and Heidegger’s work, namely, as sharing a common 
affinity regarding the placedness of experience, my intention is not to position Arendt’s work as derivative of 
Heidegger’s, but rather to highlight the way her writing clarifies and extends themes from his work. On the 
common affinities in their writing see, Villa, 1996: 113-130.   
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history, both as a methodological tool which draws on Walter Benjamin’s conceptualisation of the 
constellation in his early work and his later reflections on the agonistic ontology of history made 
fraught by fragmentary moments of disruption, and as a conceptual tool in which the climate crisis 
appears, forms Part I of this project.  
The notion of a constellation can be traced throughout Benjamin’s writing, from his 1928 
publication The Origin of German Tragic Drama through to his final essays on the question of history 
(perhaps most importantly for the current project the 1940 essay ‘On the Concept of History’).22  
Though his early engagements with constellations as a form of epistemic critique, an aspect of the 
constellation on which Susan Buck-Morss has offered much clarification, do continue to inform his 
later writings, my approach to the notion of a constellation is largely coordinated in terms of its use as 
a tool for historical critique.23 In light of this, it is accounts of the constellation such as those provided 
by Max Pensky as the ‘radically new method for the conduct of a new mode of critical materialist 
historiography,’ that I rely on throughout this project.24 Though Benjamin’s earlier engagements with 
structures of Kantian epistemology are latent to this discussion of history’s asynchronous appearance 
and the necessity to think knowledge and the state of politics in view of those disruptive moments in 
which ‘the law of dialectics [are] at a standstill,’ I want to emphasise the role constellations play in 
the disclosure of historical beginnings.25 Indeed, it is this intersection of beginnings and place, or 
rather the exposure of beginnings as always occurring in place and of place appearing in time that will 
give weight to the particular constellation of earth-world-history. 
Further clarifying the force of the constellation’s irreducible intersection, Natalia Baeza 
writes that ‘the construction of a constellation requires the capacity not only to recognize non-
representational similarities and draw correspondences, but also mimetically to reproduce the 
experiential content inscribed in the object in a new act of creative repetition.’26 Coinciding with this 
act of ‘creative repetition’ or the opening up of what lay repressed or sedimented in a constellation is 
 
22 See OGTD, SW4: 398-400.  
23 Buck-Morss, 1977; see; Krauß, 2011; Ross, 2020; Tagliacozzo, 2018 
24 Pensky, 2014: 179. For an overview of the way in which ‘constellations’ provided a methodological function 
in Benjamin’s writing see; Krauß, 2011; Ross, 2020; Tagliacozzo, 2018. 
25 AP: 10.  
26 Baeza, 2015: 40.  
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the eliminability of the categorical divisions of history. What is then meant by ‘history’ as contingent 
to the broader constellation earth-world-history is distinct to the categorisation of time into ‘past,’ 
‘present,’ and ‘future.’ What emerges instead is the unified phenomena of temporality in which past, 
present, and future are drawn together in a mutual constitution in considerations of existential 
meaning and experience. Mirroring this rejection of categorical specificity, Pensky escapes the use of 
a hierarchical categorisation system by invoking a Heideggerian language of disclosure. What thus 
appears for Pensky in the context of constellations is the intersecting flows that coordinate appearance 
as such. He writes: 
 
the constellation emerges – discloses itself – only insofar as the concept divests the particulars 
of their status as merely particular, refers them to their hidden arrangement, it also preserves 
their material existence. At that point, a meaningful image jumps forward from the previously 
disparate elements, which from that point onward can never be seen as merely disparate 
again. In this way, the phenomena are resecured from their status as phenomenal or 
fragmentary, without simultaneously sacrificing the phenomena in the name of an abstract 
concept.27 
 
Pensky stresses that what is brought into being in a constellation cannot be undone and yet neither 
does this diminish ontological specificity. In place, phenomena become meaningful at a point of 
intersection, brought into a common affinity that allows the depth of a constellation to come into 
view.   
Rather than identify a set of coordinating conditions then, which may persist as divisible 
entities, Pensky reminds us that a constellation designates that which jumps forward as having a 
coherency of its own. While an empirical account may therefore endeavour to locate the earth as 
material ground, the world as a space of artificial construction, and history as a narrative that develops 
from without, earth-world-history is distinct as that constellation out of which the experience of 
 
27 Pensky, 1993: 70.  
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being’s placedness assumes meaning. Persisting within the empirical division of that space into earth, 
world, and history as distinct existential entities, whilst as plausible as locating in the skies mere 
instances of starry singularity, the constellation both literal and as earth-world-history announces an 
‘irrevocable shift in the perception of phenomena which preserves both their individual integrity and 
their mutuality.’28 That is to say, whilst the individuality of earth, world, and history may endure, the 
force of their meaning as located in the surplus of mere materiality corresponds to their co-belonging 
in the earth-world-history constellation.  
 What I take from Benjamin’s claim that ‘ideas are eternal constellations and in grasping the 
elements in such constellations, the phenomena are divided up [via concepts] and redeemed at the 
same time,’ is an indication of how to think the intersecting forces that constitute the placedness of 
human experience.29 The simultaneity of Benjamin’s constellation, as that which comes into being – 
i.e., is redeemed – as it defies the grips of a totalising essentialism, will be central to overarching 
claim of this project that human placedness can only be thought so long as it is continually enacted. 
The notion of a constellation thus captures two general features that emerge in engagements with the 
climate crisis. The first is the inextricable co-being of earth, world, and history, where invocations of 
the ‘earth’ immediately invoke world and history and vice versa. Where this then leads is not to the 
hierarchical unfolding of earth, then world, then history, but the temporal immediacy of the three, 
hence the co-being and co-production of earth-world-history, the hyphen here signalling the 
ontological fabric knitting each together. Redemption of the singular coincides with redemption of the 
three, and yet, as a constellation, this moment escapes the grip of totality – continually revealing new 
meanings and hence new iterations of what it means to locate existential meaning in earth-world-
history. This resistance to a fixed ontology is put into sharper relief in the language of Heidegger’s 
‘concealment’ and ‘withdrawal’ (Chapter One).  
The second feature of Benjamin’s constellation that coincides with the placedness of earth-
world-history is its dependence on those actions that in drawing meaning from their relation to a 
constellation are also central to its realisation. What appears as an apparent circularity here is clarified 
 
28 Gilloch, 2002: 70-71. 
29 OGTD: 16.  
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throughout this project as the intersection of action in place and the ontological realisation of place in 
action. Recognising that the coherency of earth-world-history can never be redeemed from its fraught 
and antagonistic relationship with the forces that give it meaning and draw meaning from it, part of 
my discussion of earth-world-history is its irreducibility to a singular origin. Indeed, where I draw on 
Benjamin’s discussion of the origin in The Origin of the German Tragic Drama as ‘an eddy in the 
stream of becoming,’ I aim to highlight precisely such a process of becoming and disappearing in the 
co-being of earth-world-history.30  
Unpacking the force of this co-being is the defining project of Part I. Reading Heidegger and 
Arendt’s discussion of place and the constitutive spaces of earth, world, and history through the 
notion of a constellation, I aim to establish a shared depiction of human placedness in their writing.  
Forgoing a purely spatial or physical conception of place, I invoke a historical element of place as 
intrinsic to the way in which place appears for both Heidegger and Arendt in time.31 This notion of a 
temporal space is something that I develop from Heidegger’s thinking on the relationship between 
earth and world. In Chapter 1.1, I offer an interpretation of the ‘strife’ that he describes in his 1936 
essay ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art,’ as the agonistic relationship in which the establishment of 
worlds ‘unconceal’ the earth which, in turn resists this exposure by moving towards ‘concealment.’ 
Highlighting the tension of this movement as intrinsically temporal, this rereading of earth-world 
strife leads to a complication of what it means to position the earth primordial to the world.  
What thus emerges as a guiding claim in Chapter One is that insofar as the earth (noun) earths 
(verb) as the world (noun) worlds (verb) a pivotal function is played by this ‘as.’ Indeed, by 
complicating this ‘as,’ which not only brings together earth and world but exposes that relation as 
fundamentally occurring in time, I expose firstly the fraught ‘origin’ of earth-world which can assume 
meaning only insofar as it is inextricably bound up with movement and, going on from this point, the 
impossibility of assigning fixed meaning to either earth, world, or history. What Heidegger refers to 
 
30 OGTD: 45. 
31 On the historical status of Dasein, Heidegger’s central existential analytic, see: BT: 130-135; see; O’Byrne, 
2010: 23-30; Withy, 2011. Rather than contribute further to the well-established terrain on the historical 
dimension of Dasein, in Chapter One I bring Heidegger into dialogue with James Baldwin regarding the 
historicity of experience and what it means to appear historically.  
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as a form of ‘strife,’ namely, the ongoing and agonistic movement of earth and world, is the 
impossibility of ‘fixing’ or totalising earth, world, or history. It is precisely the impossibility of this 
claim to an original organising earth-world origin that leads me towards the constellation earth-world-
history, where the hyphen assumes a critical function as the ineliminable yet irreducible link between 
the three.  
In gesturing towards this risk of ‘fixing’ or ‘totalising’ the earth I am led to the question of 
Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party. It is precisely this sort of reduction of the earth that 
Heidegger realised in his turn towards Nazism, one that is made explicit in his language of ‘blood’ 
and ‘soil’ and his disavowal of rootlessness as a political experience. Drawing on his work I neither 
attempt to nor endorse absolving him of his actions in this regard. Where I incorporate themes from 
his writing on the earthliness of being, I do so in recognition of the fraught position into which this 
leads me. Indeed, in turning to Heidegger, have I allowed the image of his blood-soaked earth to 
diminish the emancipatory force that I locate in my own rendering of the earth in earth-world-history? 
As I continue to advance this project my answer, of course, is no. I want to actively resist the 
resurrection of those ideals in my account of the earth and earthly dwelling. While implicit here is the 
view that Heidegger’s writing can be read without simultaneously validating that ideology – a 
position at odds with those like Emmanuel Faye who read Heidegger’s work as ‘impregnated with 
Hitlerism’ – I am nevertheless aware of the violent history of earthly ontologies.32 And yet, it is 
precisely that necessary tension, the need to maintain a reflexivity both with those texts we read and 
those we write – and I use the pronoun ‘we’ here both as a recognition of reflection already underway 
by those engaged in the sort of political project I undertake and as an imperative to join in reflection – 
that I argue is made possible by reading Heidegger. And here I am not heralding Heidegger as, in 
himself, a provocation to think, a form of appellation that would not simply absolve his immorality 
but somehow fetishize it, rather I am recognising precisely that immorality alongside his ontological 
inquiry into the meaning of being in order to stay with it and think in its presence.  
 
32 Faye, 2006: 58. 
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Exposing the initial contours of earth-world-history in Chapter One, firstly in relation to 
Heidegger’s discussion of earth and world in his 1936 ‘Artwork’ essay and later in relation to his idea 
of the ‘fourfold’ (das Geviert), in Chapter Two I turn to Arendt’s writing.33 While I see Heidegger’s 
writing on place as providing a schematic that will serve as influential to Arendt’s writing and hence 
as allowing for earth-world-history to be excised from both of their writings, Arendt’s work assumes a 
far more political tone insofar as her reflections on place develop in tandem with her considerations of 
totalitarianism’s ‘unearthliness’ and the placedness of political action. Arendt’s thesis that ‘plurality is 
the law of the earth’ serves as an organising point of entry into her considerations of place and the 
placedness of the human condition.34 At the same time as I provide an extensive rereading of her 
work, uncovering its full potential in relation to earth-world-history, I do so in anticipation of the 
more immediate dialogue that I set up in Part III between her environmentalism and the politics of the 
climate crisis.  
 In Part II the force of the formulation earth-world-history is brought into view via a 
reconsideration of Arendt’s political condition of human natality.35 Following a twofold reading of 
natality as, on the one hand, a condition for political action and, on the other, the faculty for action, I 
develop a nuanced reading of what it means for natality to be conditioned by its appearance from 
within earth-world-history and, in turn, to renew this constellation via action. Extending the earlier 
development of earth-world-history, my aim in Part II is to make stark how the constellation informs 
the conditions for political action and how it appears as the locus of political. In the first half of Part 
II, I follow a parallel inquiry into natality as a political condition undertaken by Adriana Cavarero.36 
One of the most prominent feminist interpreters of Arendt, Cavarero’s project hinges on a 
reconsideration of the role played by the maternal figure. In part, redress to a tradition of masculine 
hegemony, Cavarero moves beyond Arendt’s original celebration of the miraculous child at natality’s 
 
33 My interpretation of the fourfold is drawn largely from Heidegger’s essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ 
(PLT: 141-160). For a discussion of the fourfold as it pertains to Heidegger’s later writing, see: Mitchell, 2015; 
Oliver, 2015: 140-149; Young, 1993.  
34 LMT: 19.  
35 For an extended overview of natality’s status in Arendt’s writing see, Bowen-Moore, 1989; Champlin, 2013; 
Totsching, 2017. 
36 See ICR; see; Cavarero, 1997; 2011; 2014.  
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inaugural scene, in order to recentre the maternal figure. 37 Building on this reframing of birth, 
Cavarero goes on to provide a ‘geometrical’ reading of birth and develops what she calls a ‘postural 
ethics.’38  
Privileging relations of ‘inclination’ in which states of dependence, vulnerability and 
exposure are central, Cavarero exposes the ethical underbelly of natality, bringing the lived conditions 
of the birth scene into renewed consideration in such a way that natality’s own ethics come into view. 
Following on from Cavarero’s project, my own rereading of natality recentres the role of place as that 
which might yield a similarly fecund reframing of natality’s ethical paradigm. Indeed, it is via a 
recentring of natality’s placedness (of being born-in-place rather than Cavarero’s born-from-another) 
that provides the grounds on which I review Arendt’s somewhat opaque notion of the ‘right to have 
rights.’39 Exploring the resonance of being born-in-place in connection to the question of rights, 
Chapter Three demonstrates how earth-world-history – as the place into which ‘we’ are born – is 
central to a consideration of rights. The force of this point becomes clearer still once the violence of 
the climate crisis over earth-world-history is exposed, such that what the climate crisis is shown to 
threaten is not only rights in themselves but the very logic on which they depend.  
 In the second half of Part II (Chapter Four), I move from a discussion of the condition of 
natality to one regarding the natal faculty. Here my emphasis shifts from a concern with being born-
in-place, and the structure of rights to which this gives rise, to the question of being-in-place. What 
thus emerges as a central point of contention is the way in which earth-world-history is renewed via 
action. Recalling my discussion from Chapter One on the way in which the origin serves as an 
irreducible point in Heidegger’s discussion of earth and world, which appear in the agonistic space set 
up by the ‘as’ that unites them (earth earths as worlds world), this chapter presents a similar inquiry 
into the temporality of natality. Yet rather than return to Heidegger, my reading of natality advances 
 
37 For similar ‘maternal’ readings of natality, see; Guenther, 2008; Söderbäck; 2008; Willard, 2005.  
38 ICR; see; Cavarero, 2011.  
39 This phrase is introduced at the end of a section on ‘Imperialism’ in The Origins of Totalitarianism, a section 
which begins with a reflection on the inhumanity of colonialism before arguing that it is European 
Totalitarianism that has demonstrated the impotence of human rights (OT: 388). That the book was written after 
Arendt had endured 18 years of statelessness is an indication of the centrality place – and the right-to-placedness 
– will have to her conception of rights. On the question of place and the right to have rights, see: Kesby, 2012; 
Parekh, 2004.  
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in dialogue with Benjamin, the second of Arendt’s interlocutors in this project. Turning to Benjamin’s 
discussion of what he calls ‘weak messianism,’ the human faculty, which, in the service of critical 
historiography is capable of renewing the world by responding to the past, in this chapter I develop a 
messianic reading of natality.40 Benjamin’s messianism brings the asynchronous appearance of earth-
world-history, as that which both precedes natality yet depends on natality for its ongoing renewal, 
into sharp relief. Positioning the faculty of natality in this way, as exerting a form of messianism in 
relation to earth-world-history, serves as a way of resisting claims regarding the ontological fixity of 
earth-world-history. What instead comes to the fore in this consideration of natality is the continual 
recreation and reconditioning of that original constellation via acts of natality.  
Taken together, Parts I and II provide the framework in which to think the appearance of the 
climate crisis in Part III. Part I makes explicit the ‘earthliness’ of Heidegger’s writing before moving 
to demonstrate how the Heideggerian themes of strife and unconcealment reappear in an Arendtian 
iteration of earth-world-history. In turn, Part II seeks to connect Arendt’s central political category of 
human natality to this triadic constellation, showing firstly the way in which the intersection of 
natality and earth-world-history gives rise to a structure of rights, before showing how natality works 
against the fossilisation of this constellation (and those rights) by acting as a force of messianic 
renewal. Returning to the original blurring together of place and time as evinced by the constellation 
earth-world-history, in Part III I engage the climate crisis directly, via the motif of ‘exile.’  
My central claim here is that the climate crisis imposes an ‘exilic condition’ under which the 
realisation natality, and hence the renewal of earth-world-history, is diminished.41 Insofar as the exilic 
condition threatens the earlier reading of natality as giving rise firstly to a structure of rights that 
coincide with being born-in-place and the renewal of earth-world-history as the realisation of those 
rights by acts of being-in-place, it undermines each element of earth-world-history and thus cannot be 
thought as an exclusively spatial concern. With this claim I suggest that to be excluded from the 
narrative of the present, to exist within the ‘voids’ of history is to assume an exilic position in the 
 
40 SW4: 390. On the intersection of natality and messianism see; Biss, 2012; Gottlieb, 2003; Kiess, 2016.  
41 On the status of the exile see, Said, 1979; 1984; 2000.  
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present, even while remaining physically in place.42 To be an historical exile is thus to exist beyond 
the fringes of historical appearance, to have been denied a role in the ‘storybook of mankind.’43 
Edward Said’s reflections on exile and ‘disciplinary communications apparatus that denies the exile 
the ‘permission to narrate’ are effectively echoed here, in terms of the denial to narrate history and be 
present.44 Exemplary of this position is the convergence of Australia Day and Invasion Day or the 
Palestinian nakba and the founding of Israeli statehood.45 At each of these junctures what first 
emerges as the physical exile of indigenous bodies culminates in exile from historical narration. 
Australian scholar Tony Birch thus describes the naming of spaces as the naming of history, the 
security of which ‘evaporates when the hidden history of colonial domination and Indigenous 
subordination is challenged.’46 Indeed, my introduction of the exilic condition is made possible via the 
identification of two exilic forces which I name History and Future.  
Locating an oppressive force in the capitalised spaces of History and Future, which 
undermine the claim of individual experience to historical expression (the rights coeval with the natal 
condition) and hence to the renewal of earth-world-history (the realisation of the natal faculty) is the 
threat that I locate in the climate crisis. With these ambiguous zones of imprisonment, History and 
Future, I mean to identify several things at once; 1) the hegemony of historical structures that 
overwhelm the present as a space of original historical creation – i.e., which render the present exilic; 
2) the extension of exclusionary zones beyond the physical, marking homelessness of the exile as a 
status occurring ‘in time’; 3) the loss of future unpredictability and the colonisation of the present by 
paradigms of prophetic fate; 4) a complex of social atomization and the erosion of intergenerational 
links. In contrast to the abstract spaces of ‘history’ and ‘future’ which denote spaces in time, History 
 
42 My intention here is not to deny or diminish the ongoing forms of physical exile that indigenous and other 
communities face in the context of territorial occupation, banishment to underfunded reservations, and limited 
access to housing but rather to bring into a consideration a new way of thinking exile ‘in place,’ see; Anderson 
et al, 2004; Moreton-Robinson, 2015; Nixon, 2011: 103-127, 150-174; Weizman, 2007. 
43 HC: 184.  
44 Said, 1984. 
45 On the convergence of Australia Day and Invasion Day, see for example: Caple and Bednarek, 2020; Darian-
Smith, 2017; Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 2014. On the convergence of Israeli statehood and the 
Palestinian nakba, see for example: Butler, 2012; Klee, 2020; Mbembe, 2019: 79-81; Raz-Krakotzkin, 2007, 
2013.  
46 Birch, 2003: 150.  
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and Future name those specific historical forces that undermine the potential of human appearance to 
realise its placedness in earth-world-history.  
Countering each of these claims I introduce my own zones of historical resistance which take 
form in the incomplete spaces of becoming that are ‘history’ and ‘future.’ Recalling the interruptive 
force of natality’s messianic potential, history and future resist the totalisation of earth-world-history, 
embracing in place the fragility of placedness as something that must continually be enacted.47 
Developed in concert with Benjamin’s fragmentary narratives of the past, Chapter Five, the first half 
of Part III aims to establish a narrative of earth-world-history under the climate crisis that is 
coordinated in dialogue with the past, heralding an asynchronous image of the present that can only 
belatedly come into view.48 In turn as I move to engage the exilic threat that assumes form as the 
Future, in Chapter Six, a threat that I further qualify as a threefold threat via an imaginative rereading 
of the Greek Moirai, or goddesses of fate, I invoke a mode of resistance in the future. Contrasting 
these two narratives of time, History and history, Future and future, my intention is to highlight the 
insidious ways in which the climate crisis operates, i.e., as a crisis that is not reducible to violence that 
strikes with each extreme and violent blow of the weather but appears in each subtle atrophying of 
potential under the guise of historical linearity and claims to futural fatalism.49  
Taken together, the three parts of the thesis aim to introduce a new side of Arendt, namely, as 
a political theorist who is not a stranger to considerations of the environment nor simply one whose 
political theory resonates with the unprecedented violence of the climate crisis, but one who is 
actively invested in exploring the earthly placedness of the human condition. What I introduce by way 
of the earth-world-history constellation is a new tool for engaging the climate crisis. In turn, earth-
world-history makes clear those intersecting forces that are brought into disarray by the exilic 
 
47 On the need to renew the fragile relationships that connect the present to the future, particularly in the context 
of planetary destruction, see; Fritsch, 2018; Gardiner, 2006; Jonas, 1979; Mulgan, 2018.  
48 A similar project is undertaken by those seeking to think the ‘deep time’ of the Anthropocene and the way in 
which the present intersects with events that ‘took place’ (and whose effect continue to take place) centuries and 
millennia ago, see; Gee, 2000; Nixon, 2018; Wood, 2018.  
49 On the need to develop a story that engages the climate crisis, see; Ghosh, 2016; Toadvine, 2017; Weik von 
Mossner, 2016. A similar problematic is engaged by T. J Demos and Amanda Boetzkes who inquire after the 
politicization of the climate crisis in visual arts, see; Boetzkes, 2010; Demos, 2012; Davis and Turpin, 2014. On 
the temporal violence of the climate crisis see Nixon, 2018.  
 25 
condition, a violence that not only threatens to undo the complex constellation in which we make our 
















Chapter One: Dwelling in place with Heidegger 
 
Engagements with time and place are central to Martin Heidegger’s writing. Perhaps the most explicit 
indication of this is the binding of experience to place, invoked quite literally in the Da- or thereness 
of Heidegger’s central existential analytic Dasein.1 Heidegger’s presentation of the being of being 
human is not simply intercut with a discussion of place but is shown as qualitatively determined by its 
ineliminable ‘placedness.’ Hence, ‘Dasein signifies that human beings have a sense of themselves as 
there in the world, a sense of their there-being.2 In his description of the polis Heidegger grounds this 
claim to thereness, writing that the polis is ‘the site, the there, wherein and as which historical Da-sein 
is. The πόλις is the historical site (Geschichtsstiitte), the there in which, out of which, and for which 
history happens.’3 Yet even as he opens up the way in which Dasein relates to the ‘thereness’ of their 
political being, he leaves open to reflection the constitution of the polis, inviting consideration on the 
fragile temporality of this place that is held together by ‘history.’  
Picking up on these themes of temporal placedness, this chapter moves between a discussion of 
earth, world, and history – those three spaces whose meaningful co-being is the constellation earth-
world-history – and the historical experience of coming into place in this constellation. In the first two 
sections of this chapter, I complicate the status of place in Heidegger’s writing, moving past the 
abstract thereness evinced in Being and Time’s Dasein and turning instead to his two shorter essays 
‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1936) and ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ (1954). It is across these 
two texts that I argue the complex ontology of place (the place of Dasein’s placedness) is most clearly 
articulated. In the final section I turn to the historicity of being, captured in the opening allusion to the 
fragile temporality of the polis, and bring Heidegger into dialogue with more critical accounts of 
historical placedness, most centrally that of James Baldwin. Throughout this chapter the existential 
analytic, the earth-world-history constellation, serves as a guiding methodological tool.  
 
 
1 It is important to note at the outset that I will adopt the pronoun ‘they’ in relation to Dasein rather than ‘it’ to 
recall the embodied of experience of being in the world and being with others.  
2 Oliver, 2015: 115.  
3 Heidegger, 1959:152.  
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1.1 On the Origin of earth-world-history 
There is a paradoxical simplicity that complicates interpretations of the earth. At once the literal 
ground of being, the earth is equally that which resists being known. Insofar as an existentially 
meaningful life is understood to be more than mere biological existence, what the earth is cannot be 
reduced to the conditions for survival that it otherwise so clearly establishes. Distinguished as a locus 
of immediate, immanent experience, the earth is simultaneously the space in which experience resists 
interpretation and defies comprehension, revealing the earth as an instance of the sublime and 
incomprehensible. The earth changes and yet remains the same, it ages and is weathered and yet it 
remains new and unknown, not only for the cycles of generations who year upon year arrive upon its 
surface but all of those who continually dwell within it. As the place that precedes any understanding 
of placedness, that is presupposed in each consideration of place and is present in each instance of 
assuming presence in place, the earth is both a provocation and a source of certainty. Provocative 
insofar as it resists being brought under control, certain insofar as it endures all change.  
It is this primordiality of the earth that Heidegger takes up in his essay, ‘On the Origin of the 
Work of Art.’ Framing his entry into this fraught relationship between the unknowability of the earth 
and the world that persists in wresting meaning from it, Heidegger begins the essay by turning to an 
analogous inquiry into the origin of art. He opens the essay as follows: 
 
The question concerning the origin of the work of art asks about the source of its nature. On 
the usual view, the work arises out of and by means of the activity of the artists. But by what 
and whence is the artist what he is? By the work; for to say that the work does credit to the 
master means that it is the work that first lets the artist emerge as a master of his art. The artist 
is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other. 
Nevertheless, neither is the sole support of the other. In themselves and in their interrelations 
artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely that 
which also gives artist and work of art their names – art.4  
 
4 PLT: 17.  
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While Heidegger’s remarks might at first read as setting up nothing more than a complex and esoteric 
reconsideration of the ‘chicken and egg’ problem, what he outlines is in fact a critical rethinking of 
the ontological tension of human experience. Indeed, Heidegger acknowledges the apparent 
circularity of his argument, noting all the same that ‘we are compelled to follow the circle’ that has 
arisen.5 He further stipulates that ‘to enter upon this path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is 
the feast of thought.’6 Seemingly recalling Benjamin’s original development of the constellation in 
epistemic terms, namely, as the framework through which to rethink the existence of concepts, 
Heidegger’s paper advances by unpacking the various claims to hermeneutic primacy at play.  
At its most simplistic, Heidegger’s argument hangs on the fact that art both precedes and yet 
cannot precede that which assumes the name ‘artwork’ or qualification ‘artist.’ Although the same 
semantic proximity is lost in the move to earth, world, and history, what I want to show is the 
reappearance of that same fraught ontology in the disclosure of earth, world, and history. And so, 
before I proceed with an exegesis of Heidegger’s essay and his own particular development of an 
earth-world relation as analogous to the art-artwork relation, I want to requote the opening 
problematic on the status of the artist and the artwork, substituting Heidegger’s initial concepts with 
those of the earth-world-history constellation. Where Heidegger poses his question in regard to the 
status of the work, I substitute this notion with the world, in turn, I reconfigure the status of the work-
producing artist in terms of those who produce the world, who create and renew it as history, hence 
the substitution of the ‘artist’ for the ‘historical ones.’ Finally, where Heidegger locates that which is 
prior to artist and artwork in the concept of art itself, I argue that prior to the world and those who 
produce it is the earth itself. Granting these substitutions, the original text would then read as follows: 
 
The question concerning the origin of the world asks about the source of its nature. On the 
usual view, the world arises out of and by means of the activity of the (worldly) historical 
ones. But by what and whence is the historical one what he is? By the world; for to say that 
the world does credit to the historical ones means that it is the world that first lets the 
 
5 PLT: 18.  
6 Ibid.  
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historical ones emerge as a master of his world. The historical one is the origin of the 
world. The world is the origin of the historical one. Neither is without the other. 
Nevertheless, neither is the sole support of the other. In themselves and in their interrelations 
historical one and world are each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, 
namely that which also gives historical one and world of worlds their names – earth.  
 
In the original essay Heidegger proceeds by asking, ‘but can art be an origin at all?’ prompting the 
question here, ‘but can earth be an origin at all?’ While the latter question lends itself toward a ready 
answer – the earth is an origin insofar as it is the material ground of being – this answer is 
problematised once we return to the ontology of the world. If the earth is merely the ground beneath 
our feet, the trees, rocks and air we breathe, then the earth would have no import regarding the 
development of worlds. And yet, it is clear that worlds are not merely located on the earth by chance, 
worlds assume form out of the earth, respond to the earth and become meaningful as earthly locales. 
Answering the question ‘can the earth be an origin at all?’ thus precipitates a return to Heidegger’s 
text.   
 As it pertains to my current analysis into the analogous framings of art-artwork-artist and 
earth-world-history, Heidegger’s answer to the question ‘can art be an origin at all’ hinges on what he 
uncovers as refusing disclosure in art.7 His argument here is coordinated in the tension that is set up 
between the work which opens up a world by drawing the earth out of concealment and into a form of 
worldly disclosure and the simultaneous refusal of the earth to be disclosed and thus the fraught 
project of sustaining the openness of the world. The original provocation then regarding the origin of 
the art, which refuses to be made reducible to the object quality of the artwork or the practice of the 
artist, coincides with the refusal of the earth to be ‘broken into’ and totally exposed. What Heidegger 
thus outlines in his discussion on the material form of art and the meaning that is disclosed in art as 
 
7 The essay also includes a threefold critique of the ‘thingliness of the thing.’ Heidegger describes these three 
modes as the conception of the thing ‘as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, [and] as 
formed matter’ (PLT: 30). Though this opening discussion informs his subsequent analysis of the artwork and 
its relation to earth-world, I leave it unexplored here in order to emphasize other aspects that more closely align 
with my own discussion. On the status of the thing, see: Magid: 2015; Morin: 2009.   
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something akin to its ‘function’ is the irreducibility of the artwork to the origins from which it stems. 
He writes in the essay that an artwork ‘as work sets up a world. The work holds open the Open of the 
world.’8 With this allusion to the opening of the world, Heidegger calls into consideration the ongoing 
tension through which the world is sustained as whole and, by virtue of this same tension or agonism, 
unable to ever be in a complete, secure and immobile sense. The world must endure as a space of 
action: the world which worlds (verb) as it brings the earth into its earthliness.  
 Heidegger clarifies the meaning of this antagonism between the setting up of worlds in 
artwork and the earth which withdraws from appearance inasmuch as it is disclosed in the artwork by 
turning to the specific materiality of the work. Here he writes that ‘the sculptor uses stone just as the 
mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up…To be sure, the painter also uses pigment, 
but in such a way that colour is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the 
poet also uses the word – not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, 
but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word.’9 In each of these 
instances Heidegger highlights what attains to a fullness in being only insofar as something like the 
‘completeness’ of that being is denied. The movement between the paint pigment which ‘shines forth’ 
and yet is not ‘used up’ points to the openness that exists between world and earth which come closer 
together as they move apart. The disclosure of the earth in the setting up of the world, here in the 
colour of the artwork, allows the fullness of that earth-world relation to come into being, while at the 
same time revealing the limit on that claim to pure earth-world knowledge. Acknowledging the 
tension of the relationship, one that is whole only insofar as it is fraught, he goes on to write ‘only 
what is in motion can rest.’10 This agitation allows the earth to maintain its claim to earthliness as a 
place irreducible to immanence and invokes something like the placedness that I introduced as central 
to the earth-world-history constellation; namely, the sustained act of being-in-place. 
What appears in this moment of creating a work is the disclosure of something that 
simultaneously recalls the earth, is in the most literal sense of the earth and yet presents something 
 
8 PLT: 44.  
9 PLT: 46.  
10 PLT: 47.  
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new in itself. In this moment of creation, or what Heidegger calls the setting up of a world in which 
things and art are central, what is made apparent for the first time is the earth as earth. No longer a 
mere space in which humans appear but a site of meaning from which experience – as in the 
experience of artistic creation – can be gleaned, Heidegger describes the construction of human 
worlds as that which ‘does not cause [earthly] material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth 
for the very first time… The work lets the earth be an earth.’11 More than anything, Heidegger is 
positing a claim regarding the disclosure of the earth via the construction of art in the world. 
Ineliminable then, is the status of the artist, who rather than existing merely as a conduit, brings earth 
and world into their disclosive co-being. This drawing of the earth out into the fullness of its being, 
reducible neither to mere materiality nor biological ground, shows Heidegger’s writing as offering a 
new understanding of what it means to encounter the earth as human: namely, via an encounter that is 
premised upon discovery rather than utility, sensibility rather than immanence.  
Kelly Oliver offers further clarity here, suggesting that ‘in terms of the work of art, earth 
resists and refuses ever being used up in any one representation or interpretation.’12 Invoking a 
methodology reminiscent of Benjamin’s constellation, she continues by noting that ‘Heidegger’s 
introduction of the notion of earth performs or enacts that operation [of interpretation] as well as 
announcing it.’13 Resisting any sense of a totalised universal or fixed truth, Oliver reveals the earth as 
the self-secluding ground which is unknowable except through acts of poetic interpretation in the 
world. Natalia Baeza reaffirms the aptness of calling an interpretation – artistic, poetic, or otherwise – 
a ‘constellation’ given its disclosure of ‘a content that is more than the sum of its part, in which 
correspondences are arranged in ways that are reciprocally illuminating and affectively suggestive.’14 
Drawn out in acts of interpretative disclosure, the earth and world come into being as existential 
phenomena, i.e., the locales of experience, and conceptual frames in which experience then assumes 
meaning. What Oliver’s project achieves in this quasi-Benjaminian reading of Heidegger’s depiction 
of the earth is precisely such a privileging of the earth and world intersection, or their inherent ‘co-
 
11 PLT: 45.  
12 Oliver, 2015: 126.  
13 Ibid.   
14 Baeza, 2015: 40.  
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being’ and hence the sustained becoming of earth and world, as the condition of earth and world 
ontologies in the first place.   
Heidegger explains this tension between what is revealed in meaning and what resists 
revelation as the groundwork for appearance as such. What is thus understood as an encounter with 
the essence of a thing – whether that thing is positioned here as object, world, or earth – is made 
possible precisely because in the moment of opening into the Open, a withdrawal is made towards 
concealment. Mimicking the forceful co-being that holds together my own iteration of earth and 
world in the earth-world-history constellation, Heidegger clarifies the antagonism that binds earth and 
world together. Resisting simplification, he writes that ‘the world is not simply the Open that 
corresponds to clearing, and the earth is not simply the Closed that corresponds to concealment. 
Rather, the world is the clearing of paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision 
complies.’15 Refusing the binary depiction of earth and world as closed and open, Heidegger develops 
an image of the agonistic co-being in which the withdrawal or concealment of the earth forms part of 
the Open.  
Insofar as the earth sets up the coordinates for the material conditions that inform the matrix 
within which ‘being’ becomes an existential question, reducing it to physical form becomes 
impossible. Hence, in relation to the earlier agonism between the Open and Closed, Heidegger 
describes the way in which the earth ‘rises up as self-closing’ and in this moment reveals itself in the 
world as a locus of withdrawal.16  Framing the earth as ‘not only the “ground” in the literal sense of 
“soil” but also that which in every instance gives rise to what emerges,’ totalising the earth would 
impose a threshold on the project of being itself.17 It is here that Heidegger’s language of 
concealment-unconcealment becomes meaningful. If the artist’s work consists of the perpetual 
refraction of the irreducible origin ‘art,’ Heidegger maintains a similar refractive element in the earth 
that is drawn into the ‘Open’ of historical experience.18 Beyond a mere space of understanding, the 
 
15 PLT: 53. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Foltz, 1995: 14. 
18 PLT: 44-45. For an overview of the way in which notions of the Open develop in Heidegger’s writing, see 
Schatski, 1989. 
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Open signals an historical intrusion into the earth, in which the meaning of worlding is wrought from 
the concealing earth. Jeff Malpas extends this point, suggesting that the Open be seen as an event, 
such that ‘to be is to be in place, and to be a phenomenon, in appearing, is similarly to be placed, or, 
as one might, to take place.’19 To exist within the Open then is to act in such a way that responds to 
the concealing earth which draws away and to the world which demands perpetual renewal. It is thus 
a mistake to think that the withdrawal of the earth is the only source of antagonism in the production 
of works, for so too does the world demand renewal through the work that continually confronts the 
world and finds meaning within it.  
To follow Malpas then, the ‘event’ of acting is met by an equal act of refusal to be drawn into 
the Open. Rather than assign the earth a form of agency, Heidegger’s claim points to the irreducibility 
of the earth and the impossibility of ‘completing’ or totalising meaning in relation to the earth. More 
than simply a passive openness, existence in the Open is traversed by the agonism of earthly 
concealment and worldly disclosure. Oliver illuminates this once again, showing that ‘world and earth 
do not exist apart from each other, but only in their conflict, the essential conflict between opening 
and closing, revealing and concealing, Sagen and Versagen.’20 Existence within what Heidegger calls 
the strife of the earth-world opening resounds as a historical task. Or, the ‘tension between the history 
of humans and their destiny through essential decisions is the strife between earth and world.’21 In 
other words, to respond to the Open is to wrest new beginnings out of the agonal space of experience.  
Returning to the force of artwork towards the essay’s close Heidegger makes this point 
explicitly: 
 
When art happens – that is, whenever there is a beginning – a thrust enters history, history 
either begins or starts over again. History means here not a sequence in time of events of 
whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a people into its appointed 
task as entrance into that people’s endowment.22  
 
19 Malpas, 2012: 46. 
20 Oliver, 2015: 123.  
21 Oliver, 2015: 125.  
22 PLT: 74.  
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Latent in Heidegger’s claim regarding the realisation of history in art, the construction of which 
coincides with the disclosure of the earth and the construction of the world, is something like the 
triadic constellation of earth-world-history. Indeed, what becomes clear at this moment is the way in 
which Heidegger’s own development of an earth-world relation depends on the potential for that 
ontological co-being to be read as a historical construct. I will return to this point in the final section 
of this chapter. Refusing an account of the earth that can be reduced to its immanent materiality, 
Heidegger argues for an account of being’s placedness where the realisation of that place cannot be 
understood in exclusively material terms. The refusal to subsume the status of the earth to precisely 
such a consideration emerges with greater clarity in Heidegger’s development of the ‘fourfold,’ a term 
that is central to his later writings.  
 
1.2 From Fourfold to three 
In the introduction to his book, The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger, Andrew Mitchell asserts 
that ‘the fourfold is nothing less than the inauguration of Heidegger’s late thinking.’23 The exact force 
of this point in relation to this project becomes clearer still with Stuart Elden’s qualification of 
Heidegger’s ‘late thinking’ as centred on ‘issues of earth, nature, space and time.’24 As Elden goes on 
to write, it was these determinants that formed the very substance of Heidegger’s writing after the 
Kehre, that moment in Heidegger’s writing that Elden classifies as ‘immanently spatial.’25 While I 
would want to add the further qualification here that Heidegger’s later writing, particularly in the 
context of the fourfold, is marked by an immanent concern for the temporality of experience, the 
presentation of ideas within a spatial format is distinct to his late writing. Namely, what is central to 
Heidegger’s discussion of the fourfold as an existential construct is the way in which its various 
elements are articulated within a spatial paradigm. A clear instance of this emphasis on the spatial 
dimension of experience is clear in Heidegger’s discussion of human mortals in terms of their 
‘gathering together’ rather than their orientation of their being towards death. Neglecting the very 
 
23 Mitchell, 2015: 3. 
24 Elden, 1999: 258 n 4.  
25 Ibid.  
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immediate temporality that is bound up with the classification of humans as mortals and highlighting 
instead their placed togetherness is just one instance of Heidegger’s preoccupation with space that I 
will further unpack as I explore the meaning of the fourfold.    
With the concept of the fourfold, Heidegger foregrounds the relational phenomenology of 
existence. In this sense he develops the original strife of the earth-world antagonism from the 
‘Artwork’ essay, centred on the move between concealing and unconconcealing, disclosing and 
refusing, and begins to depict a notion of the earth-world as unfolding within a network of relations. 
The original manifestation of the earth-world in the earlier essay matures into the dialectical exchange 
of the fourfold, where earth and world are recast in terms of earth, sky, mortals and divinities. The 
earth as a manifest ‘whole’ is thus subsumed into its relational exchange of the four. By contrast, the 
world, is displaced from its earlier representation as the earth’s opposing pole. In place, an account of 
the world as the space of relations produced in the co-being of the fourfold comes into view. To 
follow Oliver’s reading, ‘world is no longer one element amongst others in the fold of the four, but 
rather what results from their gathering.’26 The world thus becomes a site of meaning generated 
through the relational act of ‘dwelling in the fourfold.’ Indeed, Heidegger writes in the ‘Question 
Concerning Technology’ that to dwell is to ‘belong within the fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and 
divinities.’27 Moving away from the specificity of the artwork and the boundedness of Heidegger’s 
earlier interpretation of place to the appearance of the object, opens up his writing to a broader 
understanding of what it means to assume presence in place.  
The force of the fourfold is made most apparent via an analysis of dwelling’s intersection 
with being. And so, while Julian Young has described most readers of Heidegger as so ‘baffled by the 
poetic brevity of the fourfold’ that they are led ‘to consign it to the silence of the too-hard basket,’ 
given the centrality of the term to Heidegger’s later and ‘immanently spatial’ writing, it is via an 
analysis of the fourfold that greater understanding of what it means to be-in-place becomes possible.28 
Not only does the fourfold bring us into closer proximity with Heidegger’s later thinking, a move that 
 
26 Oliver, 2015: 140. 
27 QCT: 49. 
28 Young, 1993: 373. 
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shows his early work in a new light and establishes a more extensive genealogy of his writing 
generally, it shows the force of his writing in its application to current considerations on the 
placedness of being. The expansion of Heidegger’s earlier scene of the earth-world antagonism into a 
fourfold encounter of relations disrupts the potential divide of actor and enacted that risked exposure 
in the relationship between worlding subject and earth-world, thereby foregrounding the inter-
articulation of all facets of human experience – earth, sky, mortals and divinities – in the living out of 
dwelling.  
Moving on from the specific activity of the artist and the rendering of the earth, or ‘letting-be’ 
of the earth in worldly artworks, Heidegger’s discussion of the earth-world in the context of the 
fourfold is principally developed through the activity of dwelling. To dwell on the earth is to give 
meaning to the experience of being through a connection to place. A precondition to dwelling is thus a 
claim to space, hence Tim Ingold notes ‘to build or to cultivate, [Heidegger] reasoned, one must 
already be, and to be one must stay or abide in a place.’29 And yet, in much the same way that to 
sketch a line in the sand does not disclose a world and bring the earth out of concealment, to merely 
construct a building does not constitute dwelling. Dwelling attains through the disclosure of what it 
means to endure a human life, hence Heidegger notes that ‘not every building is a dwelling.’30 And 
while the earth informs the dwelling place of humans, ‘dwelling is not to be understood as the 
possession of accommodation and housing. Whilst such things are indeed dwelling, they do not fulfil 
or ground its essence.’31 Nor indeed, then, is dwelling synonymous with worlding. Recalling the 
language of the ‘Artwork’ essay, to dwell is to enact the constellation of the earth-world as co-being 
in history.  
Part of Heidegger’s ontology of dwelling is developed through an analysis of the etymology 
of bauen, the German word for dwell, into its modern formulation, bin, ‘I am,’ lending an intimacy to 
the two experiences – dwelling and being. ‘The way in which you are and I am,’ he writes, ‘the 
manner in which we humans are on the earth, is bauen, dwelling.’32 David Krell writes in his preface 
 
29 Ingold, 2008: 1797.  
30 BW, 1993: 347. 
31 Elden,1999: 266.  
32 Krell, 1993, 349. 
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to Heidegger’s 1954 essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ that in dwelling ‘man’s Being rests in his 
capacity to cultivate and safeguard the earth, to protect it from thoughtless exploitation and to defend 
it against the calumnies of the metaphysical tradition.’33 Carrying over the language of 
unconcealment, dwelling draws the earth out of concealment, creating a world in which the earth ‘juts 
through.’ Informed by their mutual antagonism and enacted via dwelling, earth and world carry one 
another beyond their current form. Resisting historical or ontological totalisation, the earth resists 
worldly disclosure, and, in turn, the world is renewed and sustained in acts of dwelling. In essence, 
then with every act of dwelling that draws the earth into unconcealment a move is made into 
concealment; a tension that simultaneously justifies and problematizes each act of worlding. In so 
doing, what is anticipated is future engagement with the earth as an origin which harbours greater 
potential meaning for the being of being human. Heidegger makes this point explicitly in Being and 
Time: ‘Dasein can be authentically having-been only because it is futural. In a certain sense, having-
been arises from the future.’34 I return to this theme of the future becoming of Dasein in section 1.3 in 
the encounter I stage between Heidegger and James Baldwin.  
Framed exclusively in terms of the agonism of dwelling, the fourfold risks appearing simply 
as a reiteration of the original ontology of earth-world dualism in Heideggger’s earlier writing. Yet, 
central to the move from a twofold relation to a fourfold is an appeal to the unknown. To dwell is then 
to encounter the mystery of the yet to be disclosed nature of a relational phenomenon. It is perhaps for 
this reason that Heidegger adopts Hölderlin’s position that ‘poetically man dwells’ on earth as an 
ethos for dwelling within the fourfold. For it is through poetic language, or, to follow Young, the 
‘poetic mediated experience’ of dwelling that Dasein can be understood as perpetually encountering a 
plurality of mysterious or concealed existential horizons. Stuart Elden describes the irreducibility of 
Heidegger’s account of dwelling as emerging out of his reading of Hölderlin’s poetry. He contends 
that the two river hymns, ‘The Rhine’ and ‘The Ister,’ help Heidegger in his ‘attempt to provide a 
non-metaphysical understanding of time-space.’35 Without overcoming metaphysics, Heidegger sees 
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in poetry a mode of dwelling in which ‘time is not understood in terms of calendrical dates, it is 
understood as the passage, as the journeying of becoming homely. Space is not understood in terms of 
Cartesian co-ordinates, extension or, indeed, space, but in terms of locale or place.’36 
Poetry in this sense dissolves the certainty affixed to any one account of existential meaning. 
Which is not to say that poetic language, or poetic dwelling, erodes existential traditions, a destruction 
which effectively paralyses development, rather that poetry transfigures what it means to be in any 
one instance and sows the seeds for a reimagining of being. Heidegger writes in the second lecture of 
the series, ‘What is Called Thinking?’ that the poet’s word attests to what is enigmatically beautiful, 
namely the potential concealed within that which is yet to be fully disclosed. ‘The beautiful is not 
what pleases, but what falls within that fateful gift of truth which comes to be when that which is 
eternally non-apparent and therefore invisible attains its most radiantly apparent appearance.’37 The 
affirmation of that which appears anticipates Arendt’s claim that I will discuss in Chapter Two, that it 
is only in saying what is that reality becomes legible.38 Echoing this sense of meaning’s development 
in relation to speech, Lovitt describes in his introduction to The Question Concerning Technology the 
way in which Heidegger had a poet's ear for language and often wrote in a poetic way. He writes that 
‘for [Heidegger] the proper function of words is not to stand for, to signify. Rather, words point to 
something beyond themselves. They are translucent bearers of meaning. To name a thing is to 
summon it, to call it toward one. Heidegger's words are rich in connotation’.39 The investment that 
both Heidegger and Arendt make in the notion that the truth of reality only comes into being once it 
becomes subject of poetry or debate is central to the hermeneutic qualities they attribute to spaces of 
experience. At the same time, this investment exposes the obligation Dasein and the political actor 
have towards the earth as a site of meaning and truth if they are to enact authentic being.  
 
36 Ibid.  
37 WCT: 19.   
38 ‘Each time we talk about things that can be experienced only in privacy or intimacy, we bring them out into a 
sphere where they will assume a kind of reality which, their intensity notwithstanding, they never could have 
had before. The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the 
world and ourselves…’ (HC: 50) 
39 QCT: xix. 
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Grounding the poetic once again within the constellation of the fourfold, ‘dwelling’ is thus 
envisaged not as the product of pure anthropocentric ideology, or total human sovereignty, but as that 
which corresponds to unfolding of earth, sky, mortals and divinities. Or, as Oliver writes, the fourfold 
marks the dispossession that is definitive of mortals.40 In other words, that it is precisely not mortals 
who exclusively govern the conditions of being on and of the earth; it is rather the force of relations 
manifest in the fourfold that provides the hermeneutic groundwork for mortal being on earth. 
Foregrounding the relationality of human experience via the fourfold brings Heidegger closer to a 
form of ethics that then rejects the logic of sovereignty and recalls the impetus to think appearance in 
terms of reciprocity. The force of this will become clearer in Part II. Projecting this line of thought 
regarding the anti-sovereign act of dwelling-in-place onto the work of Arendt, provides a schematic 
that is reflected in her emphatic association between the moment of birth and the act of the miracle.41  
Precisely because mortals cannot dictate the conditions of their own being, a fact that comes 
in advance of all instances of human experience, the moment of birth, the insertion of new life and 
thus fundamentally new forms of human potential appears as a miraculous moment. As an instance of 
pure affirmation of an undisclosed potential, birth corresponds with something like the essence of 
potential. Human birth thus acts as a reminder of the force of mortal potential within the manifold 
unity of the four. This is in particular contrast to the Heideggerian trope of being-toward-death, which 
though similarly motivated by the capacity for the mortal subject to enact originality, undergoes a 
radical reconstruction through Arendt’s linguistic turn towards a language of birth.42 Drawing closer 
again to the forceful relations of the fourfold, it is clear that within each term Heidegger instils a sense 
of movement. In so doing, what is made apparent is the incessant and enduring inter-articulation that 
pervades each force inherent to the fourfold, singularities that Heidegger presses to define as 
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42 Even in death Heidegger denotes a quality particular to its human experience. For whilst death is marked as 
an experience fundamentally beyond the comprehension or control of human agents, it assumes a particular 
meaning by virtue of a humanly conceived hermeneutics of Being. ‘To die,’ Heidegger writes means ‘to be 
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belonging not unto themselves, but in their appearance within the ‘simple oneness of the four.’ Hence, 
he writes of the earth which spreads out and rises up, the sky which is ‘the vaulting path of the sun… 
the wandering flitter of the stars,’ the divinities which emerge as ‘the beckoning messengers of the 
godhead’ and the mortal who are called as such ‘because they can die.’43 And while Heidegger stops 
short of providing a clear definition of earth, sky, mortals and divinities, contra his typically 
obfuscating and etymologically esoteric use of language, each can in fact be largely understood in 
terms of their popular meanings.  
Using the image of the bridge as an example for his reflections, Heidegger writes in ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’ of the earth as that which is gathered around the bridge as a landscape.44 Hence, 
the bridge ‘does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the 
bridge crosses the stream.’45 The bridge then discloses the relation of experience and place, it reveals 
the distance and proximity of place and how human experience can relate to that space as place. 
Hence, ‘the bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream.’46 The bridge divides and draws 
together, in essence, it discloses the relations of place.47 As the bridge endures in space, it equally 
resists ‘the sky’s weather and its fickle nature.’ More than simply providing a climactic or 
atmospheric definition of ‘sky,’ Heidegger invokes the temporality of seasons, the shifting of weather 
patterns and the harshness of the elements. In addition to a purely spatial landscape, he thus begins to 
introduce the temporal endurance of the bridge, which ‘weathers the storm’ of temporal exposure. 
This particular element of the fourfold comes to the fore with the introduction of mortals. Once again 
invoking a constancy of movement, Heidegger describes the bridge as it appears to mortals, writing: 
 
43 BDT: 147-8. 
44 Heidegger’s reflections on the rivers Ister and Rhine in Hölderlin’s poems of the same names in his 1935 
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47 A parallel can be discerned here with Arendt’s discussion of the table as a metaphor for the gravitational pull 
that grounds community: ‘To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those 
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‘always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so 
that they may get to the other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side.’48  
Persisting in time and space as a locus of meaning and meeting, the bridge gathers together 
and discloses a plurality. Static and seemingly devoid of internal evolution, the bridge evolves as a 
space with the passing of generations, disclosed anew in each encounter. If the three, earth, sky, and 
mortals already seem to have announced the triadic space of human experience, the earth-world-
history constellation, the appearance of the divinities seems an unnecessary addition. Indeed, Julian 
Young notes that while the fourfold as a whole is marked by ‘the almost total absence of any attempt 
by Heidegger scholars to explain what it is,’ the appearance of the divinities is particularly striking in 
light of the apparent simplicity of their meaning.49 That is to say, in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ 
Heidegger seems to locate the divinities in terms of a straightforward differentiation between theistic 
praise or atheism. In what follows I want to complicate this reading and introduce a new account of 
the divinities that recalls Heidegger’s concern with the historicity of experience.  
As noted, in the story of the bridge, Heidegger can be read as reducing the divinities to their 
physical representation: 
 
The bridge gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities – whether we explicitly 
think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, 
or whether that divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.50   
 
Though the passage invokes a simple duality between theism and atheism, to locate divinities in such 
isolated terms is to forgo what struck Heidegger as intrinsic to their being. Namely, their 
comprehensibility as discernible only within the manifold unity of the fourfold. If we recall the 
gathering together of the bridge in connection to earth, sky, and mortals, each assumed meaning as an 
ontology intercut with the plurality of the four. Hence, the bridge as gathering together a landscape for 
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49 Young, 1993: 373.  
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a plurality whose appearance renews as with the passing of seasons. To sever the divinities from this 
constellation is thus to fracture not only the ontological depth of the divinities but the broader 
constellation of the fourfold as a whole. Young offers one of the few solutions to the appearance of 
the divinities, one that informs my own dual reading of the divinities. And yet, his clarification, while 
insightful, I ultimately only agree with the initial contours of his position, the latter I view as 
complicit in the ontological severance of the fourfold. Moreover, that the fourfold is read as definitive 
of Heidegger’s later thinking, the danger of interpreting it in the way Young does has broader 
implications for his later work as a whole. Before I turn to Young’s reading, I want to reiterate a point 
that Heidegger’s makes in his essay: ‘But “on the earth” already means “under the sky.” Both of these 
also mean remaining before the divinities” and include a “belong to men’s being with one another.” 
By a primal oneness of the four – earth and sky, divinities and mortal – belong together in one.’51 And 
so, while I will show that I agree with the nature of Young’s reading, it is the polarized context into 
which he places it that I resist.  
 Young’s reading hinges on the coupling of the fourfold into ‘earth and sky’ and ‘divinities 
and mortal,’ at the expense of Heidegger’s reiteration throughout the essay that they ‘belong together 
in one.’ Markus Wielder describes the ‘ingenuity’ of Young’s approach as one of the most ‘thorough 
and perspicacious’ accounts of the fourfold. ‘For one thing, he couches the fourfold in a twofold. That 
is to say, for Young, the four dimensions on Heidegger’s list are grounded in a more basic duality, 
namely, the dynamic interplay between nature and culture.’52 However, Young’s couching of the 
fourfold into two polarised, albeit intersecting, axes undermines Heidegger’s emphasis on a manifold 
unity. It assumes that the ontology of the four is in fact the additive, rather than relational, result of 
two couplets. And yet, if the supposed clarity afforded by breaking the fourfold is not a solution to its 
role in Heidegger’s later work, what reading does offer an illumination? I suggest that there are two 
possible readings of the divinities as part of the broader fourfold constellation that recall Heidegger’s 
concern with Dasein’s determinant of historicity, while at the same time speaking to his later concerns 
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with the project of dwelling. While I present twin readings of the divinities, it is the latter account that 
I think holds greater merit as part of Heidegger’s broader existential project.  
The first reading I suggest shares common ground with Young’s account of the divinities, 
however only insofar as it denotes within them an axiology of moral worth. In opposition to Young 
who goes on to locate this ethos within a nature-world divide, I persist in thinking the ethical force of 
the divinities within the fourfold. In as much as this interpretation of the divinities centres on the 
question of ethics, it recalls Heidegger’s project of an original ethics, which becomes ‘godly’ as it 
transcends the appearance of singular generations to Dasein in a plural temporality.53 Young evokes 
this question of transcendent historical meaning by transforming ‘divinities’ into ‘divine destinings:’ 
 
The element of the fourfold that is most difficult to understand is “the gods,” die Gottlichen, 
literally “the godly ones.” Heidegger says of Greek tragedy that it “brought the presence of 
the gods, [i.e.,] brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings to radiance” (QCT 34). 
In some sense, therefore, the gods are the “divine destinings.” What are these? The divine 
destinings, “laws” (HE 312) or “edicts” (I 116), are the fundamental ethos of a community.’54 
 
For Young, divine destinings figure as the intangible ethos of a community, the grounds of appeal for 
moral claims and hence a form of tradition that acts as the basis for moral integrity within a 
community. Why he then separates this from the broader context of the fourfold is unclear. And so, 
rather than dismiss his contribution outright, I suggest thinking it together with the ‘oneness’ of the 
four. Indeed, in so doing, the environmental aspects of Heidegger’s project become apparent; namely, 
the ethos of divine destinings as located in the context of earthly dwelling. An ethics of the fourfold 
assumes form in the relational ground of experience in which place itself becomes a source of ethical 
meaning. That this place appears within the context of a plurality who continually appear in time and 
locate themselves meaningfully in relation to future and past times, an ethics of the fourfold cannot be 
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contained to one instance or one moment but must continually be rethought in relation to that 
historical plurality who find themselves within it. 
 If reading the divinities in terms of an ethos of dwelling is the first reading I offer, the second 
extends this realm into the context of the triadic constellation earth-world-history that I have been 
developing throughout this Chapter. Here again I rely in part of Young’s account. Going beyond the 
notion of a transcendent ethos, Young invokes the Heideggerian image of the hero as a historical 
figure in which to embody the ethical force of the divinities. Divinities thus invoke the ‘more or less 
mythologized figures preserved in the collective memory of a culture, who embody, collectively, what 
it is to live properly as an Athenian, a German, a New Zealander, or whatever.’55 Framed as the 
preservers of cultural meaning, the divinities affirm a form of historical transcendence. Developing 
this reading fully hinges on Heidegger’s reiteration in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ on the mortality 
of man. Hence, ‘to die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, 
as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities.’56 Recalled in this context, the 
divinities point towards that which makes the mortality of humans meaningful. I suggest that the 
missing variable here is the coming of future generations on earth, whose not-yet-present presence 
gives meaning to the present. Arendt adopts some of Heidegger’s language of the gathering of things 
into the world to make a similar point, and it is her idea of a potential earthly immortality that I 
suggest is, in essence, Heidegger’s divinities. I will quote her at length from The Human Condition to 
make this point, anticipating the common ontology that connects Arendt’s public space with 
Heidegger’s account of dwelling: 
 
Only the existence of a public realm and the world's subsequent transformation into a 
community of things which gathers men together and relates them to each other depends 
entirely on permanence. If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one 
generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men. 
Without this transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, 
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no common world and no public realm, is possible. For unlike the common good as 
Christianity understood it—the salvation of one's soul as a concern common to all—the 
common world is what we enter when we are born and what we leave behind when we die. It 
transcends our lifespan into past and future alike; it was there before we came and will outlast 
our brief sojourn in it. It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but 
also with those who were here before and with those who will come after us.57  
 
Read back into the context of the fourfold, a shared affinity can be gleaned between Arendt’s 
transcendence into earthly immortality and Heidegger’s divinities: each determines the present in 
terms of its historical potential, realised and preserved by virtue of an enduring ethos or orientation 
towards the not-yet-present presence of future generations. The dynamism between the divinities and 
the ‘wholeness of the fourfold’ is thus embedded within the historical development of the world as a 
space of mortal dwelling that always already exists for the sake of posterity.  
Yet, divinities are not simply present as a pre-constituted conditioning force; they, as with 
earth, sky and mortals, constitute a force that continues to evolve in acts of worldly dwelling. Within 
the fourfold there is thus a sense of reciprocal responsivity attached to each relational bind that is 
made manifest in the experience of dwelling and building up of worlds of meaning. In this way the 
fourfold reveals itself as a site of forceful activity, defying entrapment within a singular historical 
narrative. Hence, my appeal to think the space of human experience throughout Heidegger’s writing 
as an evolving constellation of earth-world-history. Indeed, taking up R. Raj Singh’s reading of the 
fourfold’s introduction in Heidegger’s thought it becomes clear how the fourfold in fact advances 
Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology towards something like earth-world-history. By 
blurring, as it were, the edges of earth and world and displacing any notion of primacy onto the 
relational phenomenon of the fourfold, Singh describes Heidegger’s chief aim as the destruction of 
‘the very way anything is “defined” and its “essence” articulated in metaphysical thinking.’ As Singh 
maintains, ‘Heidegger wants to grasp the “essencing” not merely the “essence,” “worlding” not 
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merely the “world.”’58 Not only does the fourfold enjoin a reading of earth and world that defies 
extant categorization, it recalls that language introduced in the introduction so central to the notion of 
a constellation, of earth ‘earthing’ as the world ‘worlds.’ With this in mind, it is perhaps little wonder 
that it is in Hölderlin that Heidegger finds an image of the irreducibility of relational being.  
Heidegger sees in Hölderlin’s poetry not only freedom from the humanist metaphysics 
entrapping other poets (here Heidegger identifies Schiller, Goethe, and Winckelmann) but a poetry 
that ‘problematizes its own essential being (Wesen)…Hölderlin is privileged because his poetry, as 
Heidegger understands it, questions its own destinal and onto-historical mandate.’59 Assessing the 
disclosedness of the fourfold within the onto-historical mandate of Holderlin’s poetry invites a 
conception of the fourfold that remains wedded to an irreducible ontological horizon. The persistence 
of the fourfold as a site of forceful relationality exposes the contingency of all acts of dwelling to 
receive each of the four; to world in a way that allows the unfolding of earth, sky, mortals, and 
divinities to assume presence. In light of this Mitch Rose proposes considering all acts of dwelling as 
the asserting of ‘claims.’ In this reading, against the unfolding of the fourfold, which is perpetually 
caught between concealment and unconcealment, the act of dwelling remains a mere claim to 
permanence. The endurance that is attached to each act of dwelling then simultaneously sows the 
seeds of its own potential destruction. For as Rose notes insofar as ‘the fourfold is the totality of 
changing shifting relations that variously allow the world to unfold as a world, that is, as a specific 
site marked out in and through material things,’ any attempt to alter the status of the fourfold through 
dwelling risks encountering its own redundancy or destruction.60  
To say that acts of dwelling can be subsumed under the language of assertion and claiming 
does not undermine the integrity of mortal force within the fourfold. Indeed, to undermine the force of 
any one of the four would by necessity undermine the simple oneness of the four. Fracturing the 
capacity for mortal force within the fourfold equally fractures the relational appearance of earth, sky, 
and divinities. Without Heidegger’s example of the mortal force constructing the bridge, the fourfold 
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cannot be gathered together; the two sides of a river remain alien to one another. Yet equally, without 
the river, the bridge cannot be built. Negotiating the development of the earth from its earlier 
presentation alongside the world in the ‘Artwork’ essay to its iteration within the fourfold, one need 
think only of Heidegger’s desire to emphasise the interconnectedness of different locales for thinking 
the hermeneutics of experience. The fourfold builds upon the tension of the earth-world to show that 
implicit in the disclosure of the earth are acts of truthful unconcealment which aspire towards the 
transcendent historical meaning. The fourfold thus figures as Heidegger’s way of attaching an 
immediately historical dimension to the earth-world. Attempts to separate the fourfold into axes that 
resemble the earlier earth-world framing such as those by Young, who distils the fourfold into nature 
and culture, or Graham Harman who attempts to view it along concealing/unconcealing poles, fall 
short of understanding what Heidegger is attempting to expose through the introduction of the 
fourfold.61 Instead it is through the fourfold that Heidegger shows the porous quality of the 
constellation in which worlds (noun) world (verb). When Young then attempts to advance his 
bifurcation of the fourfold into a nature/culture divide, by arguing that present within each world is an 
iteration of the fourfold unto itself he further obscures what Heidegger is seeking to show. The 
fourfold provides a common constellation for thinking human experience that is differently drawn out 
through acts of human worlding.  
When Young writes, ‘the primary object of my guardianship is not the universe or the planet, 
but rather the particular fourfold to which I belong,’ he encapsulates a mode of human experience that 
is in fact at odds with the manifold unity of the fourfold.62 To follow Heidegger in engaging the 
constellation of the fourfold is to think the singularity of its manifestation, even where the singularity 
defies totalization – here again elements of Benjamin’s dialectical analytic of the constellation are 
palpable. What Young then takes forward from his reading of the fourfold is precisely what 
Heidegger sought to avoid in his movement from the earth-world to the fourfold. If an attempt to 
bifurcate the fourfold is to be undertaken, more is to be gained by distilling modalities of approaching 
it than from severing it internally. Which is to say that to read the holism of the fourfold as an 
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encounter of space and time, rather than bring about a chiastic understanding of the fourfold itself, as 
undertaken by Young and Harman, gives rise to an understanding of dwelling within the fourfold that 
is suspended between the movement of history and the cultivation of place.63  
This mode of encounter allows for an authentic unfolding of experience without attempting to 
impede the internal constellation of the fourfold. Continually recalling that the fourfold ‘belongs 
together in one,’ the broader ecology of human experience comes into view, irreducible to the ‘earth’ 
as a seemingly exclusive space of primordial nature. It was precisely this sort of reductive reading that 
Heidegger espoused in his account of the technological encounter of the earth, in which the forces of 
the fourfold are reduced to a state of inanimate ‘standing-in-reserve.’64 Calculated within a paradigm 
of extraction, the earth in the technological worldview is denied its ontological import in 
constellations like the fourfold and earth-world-history. While the technological worldview in the 
terms that Heidegger first described it are explicit in current evaluations of natural resources, it also 
permeates the discourse of technological ‘green’ fixes that are presented in the guise of panacea-like 
resolutions to the violence of the climate crisis. Where resistance often appear in the attempt to 
emphasise debate around accountability for the climate crisis and the demand to respect indigenous 
alternatives to green technology, this resistance can be framed within Heideggerian terms. In other 
words, what can be shown to exist within the claims, for instance of indigenous activists challenging 
the oil pipeline in Dakota, who maintain that stopping the pipe is about ‘more than stopping a 
pipeline,’ is something akin to a Heideggerian realisation of dwelling.65 I will return to this point in 
Chapter Five.  
 
63 Oliver’s words reinforce this point: ‘Earth is associated with the past as given, our native ground and 
rootedness in history; but the past and history given as open to interpretation and reinterpretation such that they 
are never fixed or static but always dynamic and relational.’ (Oliver, 2015: 113) 
64 Heidegger discussed this concern of the ‘standing reserve’ in his essay ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’ (QCT: 3-35). The essay was a revised version of part II of his four part essay delivered in Bremen 
in 1949, see Heidegger, 2012.  
65 Estes, 2019: 2. See also: Estes, 2019; Gilio-Whitaker, 2019, Hoover, 2017; Pulido and De Lara, 2018; Voyles, 
2015. A similar attempt to enframe the world is evident in the expansion of resource extractive processes such 
as coal and gas mines which rely on the deregistration of sacred indigenous sites, see for example: Birch, 2016; 
Gartry, 2015; Jones, 2015.  
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Turning to the writing of Toula Nicolapoulos and George Vassilacopoulos, a realisation of 
Heidegger’s project of dwelling in the fourfold can be detected in the politics of decolonisation.66 
Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos describe the way in which the inability to respond to the history of 
settler-colonialism and the unceded sovereignty of the Indigenous people in Australia has created a 
situation in which ‘white Australians are yet to dwell in this land philosophically.’67 In dialogue with 
arguments like those of Aileen Moreton-Robinson, that Indigenous ontological relations to land 
‘continue to unsettle white Australia’s sense of belonging,’ Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos 
progress a critique of Australian settler-colonialism that puts into relief the fractured integrity of this 
dwelling.68 Invoking an Arendtian sense of reality or history, which assumes meaning through the 
impartiality ascribed by the plurality who attest to it, Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos’ use of 
‘dwelling’ exposes the way in which oppressive histories fracture not only the lived experience of the 
oppressed but undermine the claims to existential fulfilment of the oppressors. In essence, their 
critique of Australia effectively realises James Baldwin’s argument that ‘no community can be 
established on so genocidal a lie’ as that of colonial subjugation.69 Located within the Australian 
context then, they see the uncompromising presence of Indigenous sovereignty as the resounding 
condition giving conceptual shape to the fourfold that unreflective projects of settler-colonialism 
refuse to acknowledge. And so, even while located in the immediate context of the lived Australian 
experience, their reading lends itself to a broader project of critical historiography, not as the basis of 
a false universalism, but as the recognition, following Rose, that every claim to dwelling is marked by 
a relationality of exposure.  
The demand to respond to the history of oppression, a demand that Nicolapoulos and 
Vassilacopoulos locate in the question posed to white Australia ‘where do you come from?’ thus 
exposes the dependence of a claim to dwelling that is in fact a settlement based on dispossession. 
Challenging what was then never in fact a claim to dwelling, but merely a claim to presence, one 
 
66 On the co-implication of dwelling and settler-colonialism see for example Clarke and Yusoff, 2017; Darke, 
1996; Donaldson, 1996; McKittrick, 2006; Pulido, 2002.   
67 Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 2014: 15.  
68 Moreton-Robinson, 2015: xix.  
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which depended on the absence of the other, their history, and the entanglement of earth-world-
history linking them, coincides with the disclosure of the fourfold.70 Left intact, without the fissures 
imposed by the dualism of culture-nature, earth-world that dissemble and disfigure the unity of 
conditions out of which the experience of being arise, the lives of oppressors and oppressed are 
continually recalled in their need to respond to one another. The further description of this command 
as ‘the meeting place of two worlds and their corresponding accounts of their origins,’ is not then the 
collision of two or more ‘fourfolds,’ but the trace of the antagonism intrinsic to its manifold unity, one 
that recalls the original strife of the earth-world in the ‘Artwork’ essay.71 
 Recognising the ontology of the fourfold as occurring within the unity of its manifold forces 
is fundamental to the development of an ethics of earthly life, especially one that assumes a central 
function in the organisation of claims to environmental justice. Or, perhaps moreover, the recognition 
of the ontological boundedness of worldly dwellings to the forces of earth, sky, mortals and divinities 
is fundamental in developing an ethics central to which is the privation of a wholly anthropocentric 
concern. What the fourfold reveals is the quintessential interconnectedness of each facet of 
experience, and hence, the inability to reprise oneself from the others without simultaneously 
fracturing one’s own authenticity. What transpires in the attempt to multiply the fourfold and claim 
the presence of multiple fourfolds which each exist within their own specific ontology and as 
providing their own set of conditions for appearance is thus a form of alienation. The failure to 
understand the fourfold as itself a space of plurality which endures in the act of dwelling undermines 
what it means to interpret dwelling as a form of existential action. In other words, the negation of the 
fourfold, whether that occurs in the attempt to sever its internal relationality or in claiming that there 
is no common fourfold but merely distinct and atomized fourfolds, ultimately undermines the force of 
dwelling as a worldly practice that renews the oneness of the four. While the technological worldview 
undermined the resonance of the earthly world, the failure to apprehend the relational ontology of the 
fourfold undoes the capacity to think the rootedness of human experience in something that both 
 
70 The words of Mahmoud Darwish reflecting on the status of Palestine resonate here, namely as ‘the presence 
of absence’ (2011). 
71 Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 2014: 12.  
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precedes and endures beyond the temporal immediacy of experience. What I have sought to show 
here is that the fourfold is not only framed in temporal terms and the mortality of the mortal, but, 
recalling the image of a chiastic encounter is always already positioned within an expanse of space. 
Abstracting the fourfold through linguistic enframings such as ‘a fourfold’ or ‘this fourfold’ 
undermines the enduring commonality within all iterations of dwelling and all conceptions of worldly 
communities.  
 
1.3 Encountering History with Baldwin 
Implicit to the abstraction of the fourfold is the refusal to allow unconcealment to occur as a historical 
happening. From Heidegger’s earlier ‘Artwork’ essay what this limits is the agonism of that Opening 
in which the world worlds as the earth earths. Losing hold of this space of appearance in which the 
various spaces that coordinate place are refracted through one another ultimately signals a loss in the 
historicity of being. That experience is always already inflected through a historical lens is a point that 
Heidegger made explicit in his discussion of Dasein in Being and Time. While the ‘thereness’ of 
Dasein assumes greater clarity through the ontology of place that is developed firstly in terms of the 
origin of earth and world and later in the oneness of the fourfold, the temporality of this ‘there’ can be 
determined by returning to Heidegger’s discussion of historicity in Being and Time. Before I move to 
discuss the placedness of Arendt’s appeal to action in the intrinsically historical event of natality in 
Part II, the political condition that Arendt in fact describes as the original condition for history, I want 
to highlight the ways in which Heidegger’s ontology of place anticipates Arendt’s account of 
natality’s placedness.72 Moving forward with an account of earth and world developed in Heidegger’s 
two essays just discussed, I want to situate them in relation to his appeal to Dasein’s historicity and in 
so doing bring the coherency of the earth-world-history into view.  
The status of ‘history’ as it appears in Heidegger’s writing resists division into the distinct 
spaces of past, present, and future. Much like Heidegger’s refusal to separate the oneness of the 
fourfold, the question of history is treated with a similar openness. Indeed, Heidegger positioned the 
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collapse of time into the categorical divisions past, present, and future, as indicative of a 
fundamentally ‘inauthentic understanding of time.’73 In contrast to the authenticity of historical 
experience, in which past and future assume ontological meaning in the present as the ground of 
historiographical understanding that harbours the potential for original action, inauthentic time 
produces an alienated experience. Joan Stambaugh likens the task of confronting the historical 
inauthenticity discussed in Being and Time to a Kierkegaardian leap, namely as demanding a plunge 
‘straight into the ontological abyss’ that is the text. Bearing this caution in mind my remarks here are 
intentionally direct and transparent.74 In essence, then, the inauthenticity of history that Heidegger 
locates in the division of time, disguises the embeddedness of human experience in the constellating 
forces of time which disrupt the present in their anachronist and asynchronous appearances. 75 To 
experience life inauthentically then coincides with no longer ‘living a moment that is grounded in 
previous moments and that in turn grounds moments to come.’ In this inauthentic encounter with 
history what is lost is an ‘openness to time.’76 
More can be said on this point if we recall the opposition of earth-world-history to a fixed 
totality. Or insofar as the place of experience is what it is so long as it remains in contestation with the 
response of Dasein to the question of Being – something that Stambaugh describes as Dasein’s status 
as intrinsically relational – temporal, physical, let alone ontological fixity cannot be ascribed to either 
earth and world as distinct entities nor to past, present, and future.77 Forgoing the totalisation of earth, 
world, and history echoes the position recounted in the introduction in terms of Benjamin’s challenge 
to the subsumption of phenomena via an epistemology discerned exclusively through Kantian 
cognition – hence, the force of the earth-world-history constellation. The task of each inhabitant, or 
Dasein, thus being the active endeavour to discern (and re-discern and re-discern) meaning in spite of 
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phenomenon that we characterized at the beginning of our analytic of Dasein as its fundamental constitution; 
namely, being-in-the-world.’ 334-5. See also, Blattner, 1999: 98-121; Crowell, 2015. 
76 Mulhall, 2013: 160. 
77 Stambaugh, 1969: 31 
 54 
the impossibility of establishing a totalising a set of constellating relations. To be in place in earth-
world-history is then to be engaged in a perpetual act of ‘placing.’ An analogy might be felt here to 
Rose’s position regarding the ‘claims’ to appearance that are made within the fourfold. Or indeed, to 
Arendt’s account of thinking in The Life of the Mind in terms the image of Penelope’s web, which 
‘undoes itself every morning what it has finished the night before. For the need to think can never be 
stilled.’78 Turning back to the experience of being, itself an ‘unstillable’ act, redrawn with each 
renewed encounter with earth-world-history, I want to situate Dasein’s relation to the unfolding of 
time in the context of James Baldwin’s appeal to ‘history making.’ Bringing Heidegger and Baldwin 
into dialogue on the project of history foreshadows the direction in which I move throughout this 
thesis; namely, of thinking within a plurality. Indeed, it is my contention that Heidegger and Baldwin 
share a common concern for the normative force of tradition to override the present. And so, while I 
recognise the jarring nature of bringing Heidegger and Baldwin together, one that is reinforced by the 
distinctness of their immediate political and philosophical domains, the dialogue I create between 
them is intended to expose their overlapping reflections on the construction of history.  
While Heidegger frames his concern for Dasein’s inability to encounter history authentically 
as the loss of their openness to time, for Baldwin the erosion of history assumes the more immediate 
active status as the denial of the present as a space of original potential. That being said, what 
underpins both of their claims is the shared conviction that what being in the present entails is a 
recognition of the enduring force of the past and the capacity to critically engage the presence of that 
past for the sake of the future.  
 
Heidegger: 
In its factical being Dasein always is how and “what” it already was. Whether explicitly or 
not, it is its past. It is its own past not only in such a way that its past, as it were, pushes itself 
along “behind” it, and that it possesses what is past as a property that is still objectively 
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present and at times has an effect on it. Dasein “is” its past in the manner of its being which, 
roughly expressed, on each occasion “occurs” out of its future.79  
 
Baldwin: 
From my point of view, we have to take the past and find out to what extent the things one 
carries in one’s self – the burdens we carry out of the past – cause you to do what we call the 
past. That burden we all carry in the present; one has to discover to what extent your 
apprehension of the past dictates the shape of the future.80 
 
Without collapsing the chasm dividing the projects of Heidegger and Baldwin, which is clear in terms 
of the immediate concerns that prompt their engagement with the status of history, what comes out in 
these reflections is a shared concern with the ontological endurance of what is conceived as ‘past.’ 
And yet, what is also clear is the investment of meaning in the past insofar as it is engaged not merely 
as adjacent to the future but implicated within the future. Hence, Heidegger goes onto write in Being 
and Time that ‘Dasein is authentically having-been…Dasein can be authentically having-been only 
because it is futural. In a certain sense, having-been arises from the future.’81 Both Heidegger and 
Baldwin stress the indivisibility of history through an appeal to the immediacy with which past, 
present, and future, assume form. The implication this then has for thinking the place of human 
activity or experience is one that extends beyond the merely immanent to reveal the intersecting 
temporalities that appear as ‘history’ or the ‘historicity’ of being. This becomes clearer still in the 
context of earth-world-history where the idea of ‘history’ coincides with the continual withdrawal, 
unconcealment, and reappearance of that place in which appearance occurs.  
This intersection of past and future in the present is not then reducible to a temporal position 
outside the present. Rather, to cite Baldwin once again, ‘History is the present…If history were the 
past, history wouldn’t matter. History is the present, the present. You and I are history. We carry our 
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history.’82 The indivisibility of temporality is paralleled in Heidegger’s account of the renewal of the 
earth and world, which were shown in sections 1.1 and 1.2 as spaces in which rest is figured as 
motion and hence as always already caught in the tension of expiring and renewing. Part of Baldwin’s 
recognition that apprehension of the past dictates the shape of the future, is his injunction to reclaim 
the present as a space emancipated from the shackles of the past. To this extent he writes that ‘we 
can’t change the past, but we have to change the present. Or, we can only redeem the past by what we 
do in the present.’83 Anticipating Benjamin’s theological language of redemption, that will appear in 
the messianic reading of natality in Chapter Four, Baldwin implicates action in the present as a way of 
mediating actions in the past.84 Without then reducing this to eschatological ends, Baldwin builds an 
image of the present as an anti-instrumental convergence of temporalities. Maintaining a space of 
historical creation, without falling victim to an exhaustive account of the present geared exclusively 
towards an emancipation of past and present ‘for the sake of’ the future brings to the fore the need for 
an anti-instrumental account of action (Chapter Six).  
When Frantz Fanon writes in the introduction to Black Skin, White Masks that ‘every human 
problem must be considered from the standpoint of time,’ he evinces a position of worldly being as 
embedded in history.85 And yet, when he then continues that ‘the future should be an edifice 
supported by living men [which] is connected to the present to the extent that I consider the present in 
terms of something to be exceeded [depasser],’ he implicates the present in the future whilst still 
holding onto the present as a space of experience and not as an ends-oriented juncture in time.86 In 
other words, Fanon resists viewing the present as redemptive of the past and present exclusively for 
the sake of the future. Heidegger’s refusal to think the unfolding of experience in time as sequestered 
into the inauthentic categories of past, present, and future, functions as his own critical praxis of 
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understanding the temporality of experience. Hence, when Nigel Gibson describes Fanon’s project as 
‘not simply historical, or solely contextual, but one of praxis,’ he similarly locates praxis in the 
present as emancipated from the prescribed ends of future redemption.87 What Fanon and Heidegger 
then share in their reading of the subjectivity of experience as occurring under the weight imposed by 
the present as a space of open creation, is the intrinsic anti-teleological dimension of this experience.  
 Indeed, it is in coming to address the status of temporality in Being and Time that I make the 
links between Heidegger’s work and the currently unfolding climate crisis apparent. Or rather, it is at 
this point that I set up the links between Heidegger’s account of temporality and the indivisibility of 
temporal progression that will underpin redemption of the exilic condition in the climate crisis in Part 
III. What is implicit here is the openness to time intrinsic to an authentic experience of temporality. 
Indeed, in a description of Heideggerian temporal experience that might be read as speaking back to 
Baldwin as well, Lawrence Vogel writes that ‘history is not something over against a subject but is 
the lived context from out of which one’s possibilities emerge.’88 Echoed here is Baldwin’s central 
premise that ‘all of us are products of our shared history.’89And yet, precisely because the subject – 
Heideggerian and Baldwinian – remains free to respond to historical world-occurrences, a freedom 
granted by the existential determinant of historicity – the same historicity that also makes world-
occurrences possible as historical events – temporality becomes a ‘space’ of experience. David Wood 
makes this distinction between historicity and history, and while Wood’s point is made in relation to 
Heidegger, I want to argue that this argument applies equally to Baldwin:  
 
It will be Heidegger’s claim…that the very possibility of history as a discipline rests invisibly 
on our existential historicity. He distinguishes between historicity and 
historicality/historiography. The latter concerns the course of events, and our study of them. 
While historicity has to do with how Dasein, our manner of being in the world, is historically 
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engaged (or not), how it enacts or performs itself in and as history, which is itself a dimension 
of our fundamentally temporal existence.90 
 
Further clarifying the way in which historicity is constitutive of history, both Baldwin and Heidegger 
challenge the non-engagement with the existential of historicity to expose the way in which a failure 
to think historicity imperils the present. What is lost in this moment of forsaking the historical 
potential of present-being is the capacity to reject history’s claim to normativity and with it the 
normalisation of violence as such  
In Notes of a Native Son, Baldwin describes the weight of the world which pushes injustice 
into the realm of the commonplace as something that can never be accepted.91 In so doing, he 
confronts the insistence of the past in the present and the images of expectation or preconceptions that 
persist in the dissemblance of history as beyond the reach of original disclosure. What Heidegger’s 
project then offers Baldwin’s is a reanimation of the original impetus to challenge the role of history 
or history formation in the present. A further example of this is apparent in Fanon’s description of the 
colonial city as divided into two separate halves, bridged only by a communicative language of 
violence and counterviolence.92 What is made apparent in Fanon’s example is Heidegger’s notion of 
an ‘inauthentic’ relation to historicity or temporality, where tradition assumes a status exclusive of the 
emancipatory potential of original historicity (Chapter Five).93 Yet moreover, I would argue that it is 
here in Fanon’s divided city that the severed form of fourfold is discernible. Insisting upon the false 
claim to a plurality of fourfolds which exist in different registers, the colonial city refuses to recognise 
the wholeness (or perhaps oneness) of its history and its placedness. The confrontation with this 
alienation detected by Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopoulos in the question ‘where do you come from?’ 
speaks to the alienating and inauthentic ontology of Fanon’s divided city. Again, the exact force of 
this question will be explored in Chapter Five.  
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Present across both of Heidegger’s essays discussed in this chapter is a language of 
concealment and the historically situated practice of disclosure or unconcealment. What appeared in 
the setting forth of the Open in the ‘Artwork’ essay and the dwelling within the fourfold of ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’ was precisely the placedness of experience in time. That this intersection of place 
and history assumes an ontological status in the meaning of experience and those actions that give 
texture to experience is made apparent in the constellation earth-world-history. Rather than simply 
capture the varying forces that coordinate the appearance of action and thus might be made reducible 
to the mere locus of action, what earth-world-history emphasises is the way in which the placedness 
of being informs the very nature of action in the first place, hence my appeal to Baldwin and the 
politics of making history. The force of this argument becomes clearer still as I turn in Chapter Two 
to the placedness of Arendt’s account of political action. Mirroring the structure of this opening 
chapter of Part I, in my discussion of Arendt’s account of human placedness I move exegetically 
through her writing before turning to the historical condition of human natality to clarify the way in 
which this placedness assumes meaning in the context of action.  
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Chapter Two: Coming back to Earth with Arendt 
 
What we call real is already a web which is woven of earthly, organic, and human realities, 
but which has come into existence through the addition of infinite improbabilities. 
Hannah Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics’  
 
Hannah Arendt begins her 1958 monograph The Human Condition with the image of a satellite set 
against the gravitational pull of the earth. ‘To be sure,’ Arendt writes, ‘the man-made satellite was no 
moon or star, no heavenly body which could follow its circling path for a time span that to us mortals 
bound by earthly time, lasts from eternity to eternity.’1 The seemingly divine depiction of the satellite 
is abruptly cut off by Arendt, who turns back to earth rather than pursue its course out into space. 
With this shift she challenges the implicit view of the satellite, namely, that space is the new frontier 
and the earth a mere launchpad in the move towards extra-terrestrial dwelling.2 In place, Arendt’s 
return to earth coincides with a renewed investigation into the meaning of human earthliness or, more 
acutely, of what it means to dwell on earth in what she has identified as an age of earthly alienation. 
What thus sits at the forefront of Arendt’s most widely read and most frequently cited book is a 
preoccupation with the (earthly) placedness of human beings.  
Framing her discussion of the human condition, which serves not only as the book’s title but 
as its central problematic, is this question of human placedness. Indeed, the book’s central thesis 
regarding the threefold activities which correspond to the human condition, labour, work, and action, 
are each situated in relation to their placedness.3 Arendt’s discussions of world, space of appearance, 
the public, the household and, of course, the polis all position her as a modern thinker of political 
 
1 HC: 1.  
2 Arendt cites many of the popular responses to the satellite in the prologue, HC: 1-2.  
3 At its most simplistic this correspondence can be viewed in the following divisions: labour and earth, work and 
world, action and history. It is my contention however, that the relationships between each of these activities 
and spaces is far more complex, a complexity that is acknowledge by Arendt when she describes the integrity of 
reality as ‘a web woven of earthly, organic, and human realities, by which has come into existence through the 
addition of infinite improbabilities’ (PP: 112). Rather than persist with this simplistic correspondence then, I 
rely on the earth-world-history formulation to open up Arendt’s writing and illuminate the intersecting flows of 
her placed account of the human condition.   
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space. 4 And yet, it is the condition of earthly placedness that I bring to the fore in this chapter, 
locating each of these spaces in realtion to their earthly condition. Echoing Arendt’s return to earth in 
the prologue to The Human Condition, this chapter mediates space through the earthly lens of what I 
am calling Arendt’s latent environmentalism and the unchosen condition of dwelling on earth.  
In Arendt’s interpretation of the three weeks that the Russian satellite Sputnik lingered 
amongst the stars, a shift took place on the earth below, prompting her to claim that this was an ‘event 
second in importance to no other, not even to the splitting of the atom.’5 What occurred at this 
moment for Arendt was a radical reconsideration of the earth: no longer home but the ground of 
departure. What first constituted a technological development thus became for Arendt a demand to 
rethink the earthly status of human beings, hence her appeal to think the human condition in terms of 
‘what we are doing.’6 More than simply a provocation regarding the space of human dwelling, the 
launching of the satellite equally ignited the question of temporal existence, hence her remark on the 
conflict of ‘earthly time’ with that of the universe. Sputnik, this space dwelling object, served not only 
to index an encounter with the extra-terrestrial but with that unearthly time that defies the temporal 
conditions for life on earth. What Arendt perceived as the forsaking of human earthliness assumed a 
political tenor in her identification of worldly alienation: the loss of reality and, in many ways, an 
anticipation of what I detect in the exilic condition in Part III of this project.7 Implicit to Arendt’s 
claim regarding the coincidence of space travel and world alienation is an organising co-belonging of 
earth and world in the formation of the human condition. It is this affinity that organises my reading 
of Arendt in this chapter. In other words, my project turns on the claim that if space travel brings into 
question the stature of human beings, there must be something meaningful in the earthliness of 
humans that goes beyond the earth as the material locus of their dwelling. Arendt gestures to as much 
 
4 Many of these places appear as specific subsections in The Human Condition in their own right. Her 
discussions on the exclusion of slaves and refugees from their claim to place in the world, the refusal to admit 
cohabitation as a condition of politics, and the right to retreat from the public are all themes that appear 
throughout her writing. In addition to the invocations of physical place, Arendt’s vocabulary is marked by the 
recurrent use of spatial metaphors, the gathering of a political community around a common table, the web of 
human relations, the construction of reality in speech. See, HC: 22-79; 175-188; 199-212. See also, Canovan, 
1994: 99–154; Pitkin, 1998. 
5 Ibid.  
6 HC: 5.  
7 HC: 248-267.  
 62 
when she writes that the earth is the ‘quintessence of the human condition.’8 Unpacking the meaning 
of this claim and building on the earlier schematic of placedness developed in relation to Heidegger, 
this chapter further clarifies the role of place in the human condition and its bearing on the earth-
world-history constellation.  
While I begin this chapter by returning to that canonical moment in Arendt’s writing on the 
earth in relation to Sputnik in The Human Condition, the central thrust of my argument regarding the 
latent environmentalism in Arendt’s politics occurs in sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this chapter. The second 
section of this chapter explores the depiction of the earth as it appears in the context of Arendt’s more 
overtly political writings, highlighting those instances in which the earth appears as a condition for 
political appearance as such. What appears in equal measure here are those moments when attempts 
are made to qualify conditions for earthly appearance, moments which coincide in Arendt’s writing 
with the antipolitical. In the final section I turn to focus directly on Arendt’s political condition of 
human natality. Echoing the discussion of Dasein’s historicity from Chapter One, here I interpret 
natality as a condition of historical renewal, moving between the endurance of the concealing earth 
and the unconcealing originality of spontaneous worldly action.   
  
2.1 Sputnik: Leaving Home, Leaving Earth 
Arendt’s discussion of Sputnik is perhaps the most well-known instance in her work where she does 
take up questions of the earth and what it means to dwell on the earth. As I’ve already outlined in the 
introduction to this project however, the idea that this was the only place in which she discussed the 
earth is false. Arendt returns throughout her writing to the question of the earth and the role the earth 
has in giving shape and meaning to those political events and actions that unfold on its surface. Yet 
there is clearly something singular about the Sputnik event that marks it in Arendt’s imagination. As 
already noted, she heralded it as an ‘event second in importance to no other.’ The specific topic of 
space travel reappears at several moments in her writing and the more general themes of human 
stature and the meaning of earthly dwelling form two of the central axes around which her broader 
 
8 HC: 2.  
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political project develops. 9 Part of Arendt’s preoccupation with Sputnik emerged in view of the way 
in which it brought into question the meaning of human stature, a question that I contend is 
interchangeable with one of human placedness. In what follows, I offer a twofold reading of Sputnik 
drawn from two lines of the short yet rich five-page prologue to The Human Condition. Following the 
prologue so closely, my aim here is to qualify what constitutes an organising claim throughout this 
chapter, namely, this assertion that the question of human stature is a question of human placedness.  
 
The human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environment, but life 
is itself outside this artificial world, and through life man remains related to all other living 
organisms.10 
 
Part of the critique that Arendt stages in relation to Sputnik, and what I want to argue is implicit in 
this sentence, is directed towards its fractured ontology, namely, that its essential being does not exist 
beyond the limits of its own construction. By this I mean no more than to say that the meaning Arendt 
attributes to Sputnik is determined exclusively within the logic of its own unearthly claim to extra-
territoriality. Sputnik bears no relation to the earth except insofar as it solicits a negation of the earth’s 
hold on the plurality who dwell upon its surface. Bound neither to the earth’s gravitational pull nor to 
the mortal limits of its history, Sputnik existed – if only for three weeks – as an unearthly entity. 
Rather than invite a celebration, Arendt received this moment as a patent confrontation with the 
quintessence of the human condition. What was challenged with the launch of Sputnik was the 
richness of meaning produced in the co-becoming of earth and world. Here, Arendt encountered 
meaning produced in relation to a notion of the world alone. And I want to resist thinking the 
worldliness of Sputnik here insofar as it refused to admit the earthly condition of worldly appearance. 
In this way, it appeared both as unearthly and unworldly. Invoking an image developed in Chapter 
One from Heidegger’s discussion on the agonistic movement between earth and world, what Sputnik 
 
9 For an extended discussion on Sputnik and Arendt’s engagement with the space question see Oliver, 2015: 96-
101; Yaqoob, 2014. 
10 HC: 2.  
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refuted was the integrity of that relational scene in which the world – and with it the earth – become 
meaningful as the place of human dwelling. Arendt makes this point explicit in her claim that Sputnik 
was unable to remain connected to life itself. Without romanticising the meaning of this ‘life,’ what 
emerges in the opposition that Arendt sets up between ‘life’ and the ‘artificial world’ of production is 
the necessity for the latter to seek meaning beyond the limits of its own appearance. 
The connection Arendt stages between humans and ‘all other living organisms’ invites an 
understanding of human being, that is, the being of being human, as intercut with the plurality of 
species and environments that give texture to the experience of earthly dwelling. This unchosen 
dimension of human existence remains a source of interrogation in Arendt’s writing, both insofar as 
the human condition remains an epistemic and ontological provocation, unknowable and 
inexhaustible, and due to the continual arrival of new humans on earth. The political condition of 
natality that I will turn to more closely in section 2.3 recalls the unpredictable force of human 
appearance. Arendt’s invocation of ‘life’ in the context of the prologue as the unknowable condition 
of connectedness echoes Heidegger’s invocation of agonistic concealmeant. Where Heidegger denies 
the possibility of ‘using up’ the earth in order to attain greater proximity to the meaning of Dasein or 
the thereness of being, Arendt appeals to a sustained connection with the earthly quintessence of the 
human condition. To find meaning within this earthly nature is thus not to ‘use up’ the earth in pursuit 
of an ontologically bankrupt utilitarianism, yet nor is it for humanity to alienate itself from the earth 
and deny its necessary presence. To remain connected to the earth as the ‘quintessence of the human 
condition,’ action is called upon to continually wrest meaning anew from the earthly placedness of 
human appearance. And so, while it is clear that Sputnik existed both as a material entity and as an 
historical event, its meaning was coordinated as an absolute negation of the earth and hence of the 
human condition itself.  
Margaret Canovan, whose introduction to The Human Condition provides rich commentary 
on Arendt’s interpretation of Sputnik, describes the latter’s encounter with the dawn of the space age 
as akin to a moment of crisis, in which the demonstration of human ability to transcend nature ‘called 
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all natural limits into question.’11 However, rather than provoke a renewed consideration of the human 
condition, this demonstration coincides with a second dawning: the rise in modern alienation. The 
rejection of the earth not simply as the dwelling place of all humans but as the place that conditions 
and makes life possible or, as Arendt writes ‘harbours life itself,’ distinguishes the alienating force of 
Sputnik. This point emerges on two fronts. On the one hand, the interpretation of Sputnik as the first 
step ‘toward escape from men’s imprisonment to the earth’ produces a form of alienation intrinsic to 
physical placedness of humans on earth.12 On the other, Arendt’s claim is that alienation cannot 
simply be cast in physical terms but exists in relation to the very ontology of the human condition 
itself. In the prologue she makes this point clear by describing humans as ‘earth-bound creatures’ 
whose ‘earthly nature’ forms part of their fundamental condition. The consequences of alienation thus 
unfold not simply in relation to the literal placedness of human beings but in terms of their essential 
nature.  
The way in which Sputnik becomes an ontological provocation regarding the human stature 
and inaugurates a form of alienation cannot be resolved simply by retelling the story of its appearance 
in relation to the earth. Recalling the fact that Sputnik was ‘earth-born,’ produced and manipulated 
out of ecological materiality and admitted only temporarily and tentatively to dwell among the stars 
before its return to earth does not suddenly recover its earthly nature.13 What does clarify its alienation 
from the earth, however, is a return to the formulation developed in Chapter One that ‘the earth earths 
as the world worlds.’ Rather than two parallel processes of becoming, what this construction 
highlights is the indivisible oneness of earth and world, which move together in a state of reciprocal 
becoming or, to express this point with greater clarity, in a state of co-becoming. To further reiterate 
this claim in terms from the previous chapter, it is the pivotal ‘as’ that ties together these two places 
not only in time, and hence as occurring in the production of history, but as maintaining sustained 
recourse to one another in order to become/co-become. The appearance of Sputnik, which Arendt read 
as severing this bind, effectively denied the centripetal force of this ‘as.’ Indeed, in the prologue’s 
 
11 Canovan, 1998: x.  
12 HC: 1.  
13 On the ecological materiality of technology, see Parikka, 2017. 
 66 
opening paragraph she contrasts the ‘earthly time’ to which mortals are bound with the eternity of the 
universe. Setting up this opposition between two temporal spheres, Arendt gestures towards the 
temporal alienation that will be normalised if the earth recedes from view in ontological 
considerations of the human condition.  
Advancing the view that Sputnik erodes the ‘as’ that brings earth and world into a state of co-
becoming, Arendt brings into consideration a second earth-denying event: the production of life in the 
test tube. Establishing a common affinity between these two technological moments, Arendt argues 
that both can be interpreted as the refusal to embrace the necessary vulnerability of the human 
condition. What is instead made apparent in each of these moments is an attempt to realise the 
construction of a ‘future man’ who Arendt describes as ‘possessed by a rebellion against human 
existence as it has been given.’ The future man who appears in opposition to the earth-bound nature of 
human beings operates, like Sputnik, following conditions of his own making. For the future man the 
earth is thus recast as something ‘which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made 
himself.’14 The full force of this retreat from the earth becomes apparent later on in The Human 
Condition when Arendt introduces the threat of worldlessness.15 It is sufficient here however, to 
simply point to the way in which Arendt’s ‘future man’ is limited by his inability to operate beyond a 
system of his own making. If worldlessness as Arendt goes on to describe it corresponds to 
experience of being ‘thrown back upon [oneself], concentrating upon nothing it [one’s] own being 
alive’ then it is this experience that is effectively realised in the genesis of the ‘future man’ who 
cannot see beyond the limits of his own self-ordained existence.16 It is the launch of Sputnik that 
signals the possible realisation of this future, insofar as it is here that the bind between earth and 
world is weakened and the earth relegated an obstacle to the future man’s realisation. This point is 
further clarified by Arendt in her discussion on political speech in the second half of the prologue. 
Indeed, it is in this section that she addresses the co-becoming of earth and world in history as 
sustaining the fabric of reality.   
 
14 HC: 2-3.  
15 On the dangers of worldlessness, see: Brient, 2000; Kohn, 2018.    
16 HC: 115.  
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…it could be that we, who are earth-bound creatures and have begun to act as though we were 
dwellers of the universe, will forever be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about the 
things which nevertheless we are able to do.17 
 
Beyond the refusal to concede the meaningful co-becoming of earth and world that constituted the 
first concern prompted by Sputnik, the second can be drawn from Arendt’s discussion of how this 
fractured relation is made intelligible as a political phenomenon. That is to say, while the launching of 
Sputnik had immediate recourse to questions of temporality and space, the way in which Arendt 
explicates these as political questions signals the degree to which the launch confronted the limits of 
speech. If the intersection of earth and world constitute the place of human existence, it is via speech 
that this experience becomes political as such. With this in mind, Arendt describes the linguistic 
approach to Sputnik via mathematical formulae, which ‘no longer lend themselves to normal 
expression in speech and thought’ as denying something proper to its capacity to be interpreted in the 
context of politics.18 The loss of speech as a point of entry into considerations of space travel – and its 
relation to the human condition – echoes her earlier reflections on the obfuscating speech of Nazi 
generals. One of the central points that Arendt made in her analysis on the rise of totalitarianism under 
the Nazis was its erosion of language.19 Her contemporary, Victor Klemperer attributed the darkening 
of reality under the Nazis to the regime’s ‘brown sauce’ or oozy, meaningless speech which reflected 
no more than the party’s failed claim to meaning.20 Arendt describes a similar scenario when she 
writes in the prologue that the realisation ‘of life in which speech is no longer meaningful’ will render  
the integrity of reality incomprehensible.21 While the immediate implications of each consideration of 
speech are distinct, what is shared between Arendt’s view of Sputnik and her and Klemperer’s 
consideration of speech under totalitarianism is an attempt to dissolve the acuity of speech and its 
capacity to disclose meaning from the ordinary realisation of placedness.  
 
17 HC: 3.  
18 Ibid.  
19 William Spanos provides a rich overview of the way in which the vacuous language of political speech from 
Arendt’s account of Nazi Germany to more recent examples in the United States, see: Spanos, 2012.  
20 See; Klemperer, 2013: 9-17, 195-207.  
21 HC: 4.  
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Without speech the meaning of Sputnik became, at the very least for Arendt, opaque. While 
she could clearly see it as an obstacle to the ongoing co-becoming of earth and world and hence to the 
very organisation of the human condition, it was the difficulty in finding a way of speaking about this 
event that struck her as a central concern. She puts this matter-of-factly in the prologue when she 
writes that ‘wherever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for 
speech is what makes man a political being.’22 And so, while Arendt clearly saw that there was a way 
to reflect on the questions raised by Sputnik and did not, therefore fear the advent of space travel in 
any profound or paralysing sense, I do want to challenge claims such as those made by Dipesh 
Chakrabarty that Sputnik was a ‘symbol of optimism’ for her.23 Chakrabarty’s claim that Sputnik was 
a symbol for the ‘survival of the human race’ radically misconstrues what Arendt in fact saw as the 
possible disintegration of the human condition when faced with this speech-defying, unearthly and, 
insofar as politics is both earthly and speech dependent, quasi-antipolitical moment. Precisely because 
it could not be included within the paradigm of human earthliness, and hence the condition that 
precedes and endures as a frame of judgment, Sputnik signalled not optimism but the urgent need to 
think the world around us. As Arendt herself writes on the following page of the prologue: ‘what I 
propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing.’24 Rather than 
celebrate the redemption of humanity from its earthly condition, Arendt thus sees this moment as the 
impetus to take up with renewed concern those conditions of human existence captured by the 
constellation earth-world-history.  
Pushed beyond a realm of speech-based comprehension, Sputnik risked inaugurating a mode 
of ‘worldly’ being that refused recognition of those plural conditions that intersect to give meaning to 
the world. Again, it was alienation that Arendt identified as the consequence of this threat. Framing 
this concern in epistemic terms, Arendt argued that if the earth-bound nature of humanity were 
forgotten ‘it would be as though our brain, which constitutes the physical, material condition of our 
thoughts, were unable to follow what we do, so that from now on we would indeed need artificial 
 
22 HC: 3.  
23 Chakrabarty, 2012: 15.  
24 HC: 5. 
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machines to do our thinking and speaking.’25 Heeding this threat, Arendt moved to provoke her reader 
into a state of agitation, once again incorporating the tropes of agonistic reflection from Heidegger’s 
writing. Challenging the realisation of the ‘future man’ she appealed to her reader’s capacity to think, 
describing the concerns raised by Sputnik as political questions ‘of the first order’ and therefore 
unable to be left to the decision ‘of professional scientists or professional politicians’ alone.26 Again, 
this point leads Arendt away from the optimism that Chakrabarty misidentifies towards a sustained 
concern for the human condition. The principal injunction of the book thus emerges in the prologue as 
the need to hold onto reality rather than be led astray by an embrace of technological ‘progress.’27 
Taking up the claim to ‘think what we are doing,’ in the following section I move to think the 
placedness of our doing and its affinity to the earth-world-history constellation.  
 
2.1 The Earthliness of Politics (and the unearthliness of totalitarianism)  
Turning to uncover what I have called the ‘latent environmentalism’ or the earthliness of 
Arendt’s politics, I want to begin by returning to several of the earthly references first outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis. Firstly, the opening sentence of the somewhat didactically entitled essay 
‘Introduction into Politics,’ where she writes that politics is based on the fact ‘men are a human, 
earthly, product.’28 Putting into abeyance the omission of an original gender difference here, the 
emphasis that Arendt places on an original plurality (men and not Man) as deriving from the earth 
forms an implicit challenge to ideas of the earth as synonymous with a reductive biological 
determinism. Moreover, the emphasis she places on the locative ‘into’ invites a reading of the 
placedness of politics, as that into which an entry is made. Throughout my argument that latent in 
Arendt’s work is a politics of environmentalism, is the grounding force of this thesis that the earth 
serves as both the condition and space of political placedness.  
 
25 HC: 3.  
26 Ibid.  
27 The second concern that organises the prologue is that of automation, described as a ‘no less threatening 
event,’ Arendt locates a similar danger here regarding the realisation of the ‘future man’ (HC: 4-5).   
28 PP: 93.  
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Building on this account of politics, Arendt introduces an explicitly ‘earthly’ account of 
politics in her discussion of plurality in The Human Condition. While the definition of plurality, one 
of Arendt’s twofold political categories, most commonly cited from the text centres on its 
unrepeatable singularity and in so doing immediately recalls the unpredictable spontaneity of natality, 
Arendt’s other political condition, a second definition of plurality is offered. Indeed, on the page 
before what might be considered the favoured definition of plurality, namely that ‘we are all in the 
same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, 
or will live’ Arendt defines plurality as ‘the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit to 
world.’29 Recalling the force of her earlier account of politics in the ‘Introduction into Politics’ essay, 
this defintion of plurality reinforces the political conditions that arise from the fact of human 
earthliness. Indeed, the full force of this definition attains to a particular clarity in her final work, The 
Life of the Mind. Entering into the political earth towards which she gestured in ‘Introduction into 
Politics’ here she describes plurality as ‘the law of the earth.’30 It is in these moments that the 
organising coordinates of Arendt’s latent environmentalism can be found.  
 The force of Arendt’s comments on the intersection of plurality and the earth is apparent in 
the stark critique that they yield on the violence of genocide and the politics of sovereignty. Locating 
the foundation of human difference in the context of the earth provides Arendt with the basis on 
which to affirm the right to appear in place as the right to appear in one’s singular otherness. This 
simultaneous affirmation of difference and place highlights the originality of her ‘recovery’ of the 
Aristotelian categories of political appearance.31 Rather than simply resurrect the Athenian polis and 
its attendant conditions of exclusion and dependence upon a necessary exploitation of the other 
(women, slaves, and barbarians), Arendt’s account of difference as always emerging in place centres 
the unchosen condition of commonalty in difference as an earthly condition. The appearance of the 
polis or the political space of appearance in Arendt’s work is thus inextricable from the conditions set 
out by the earth itself, namely difference and the right to appear in place. The force of this argument is 
 
29 HC: 9, 8.   
30 LMT: 19.  
31 See Villa, 1995:3.  
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put into practice by Arendt in her confrontation with Adolf Eichmann. Challenging the hubris of the 
Nazi ideology which presumed itself ‘ordained to reorder the conditions for earthly appearance,’ in 
Arendt’s address to Eichmann she invokes the law of earthly plurality.32 
As though speaking directly to him, when Arendt wrote her report on his trial in Jerusalem, 
she was emphatic that it was Eichmann’s support for a regime that sought to determine ‘who could 
and could not inhabit the earth’ that meant that no one could be expected to want to share the earth 
with him.33 Appealing to the earth as the ground of human plurality and hence as intrinsic to the 
conditions for political appearance as such, Arendt’s judgment of Eichmann coincides with the 
development of her latent environmentalism. Moreover, what is clear in this move between earth, 
politics, and judgment is the way in which questions of the earth are relevant not only to concerns for 
the ‘environment’ or some romantic ideal of ‘nature’ but are pertinent to the question of politics more 
broadly. Judith Butler offers further clarification here, noting that what Eichmann failed to realise was 
that ‘no one has the prerogative to choose with whom to cohabit the earth.’34 Implicit to this 
interpretation of the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi party is their transgression of the 
‘unchosen character of earthly cohabitation’ – a cohabitation that I want to reconfigure in terms of the 
politics of earthly placedness. Indeed, anticipating the political force that I ascribe to this condition of 
placedness, Butler concludes her argument with the claim that it is this form of cohabitation that 
serves as ‘the condition of our very existence as ethical and political beings.’35 
 Whether she was aware of it or not, Arendt’s latent environmentalism continued to develop in 
her attempts to understand the particular violence and inhumanity that unfolded under Nazi 
totalitarianism. In the preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism she describes the way in which, after 
this violence, ‘human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political 
principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity.’ 36 
Frantz Fanon similarly appeals to the as-yet unfulfilled realisation of human dignity at the end of The 
 
32 EJ: 279 
33 Ibid.  
34 Butler, 2012a: 143.  
35 Ibid.  
36 OT: xi, (emphasis added). 
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Wretched of the Earth, where he writes that ‘humanity expects other things from us’ than the 
grotesque perpetuation of a European logic of exclusion.37 Where Fanon solicits pioneers who might 
attain to this humanity, precisely insofar as they might depart from the monopoly of European logic 
toward a political pluralism, Arendt appeals to plurality as the law of the earth. What is clear in both 
instances is the need to develop a form of human dignity central to which is the right-to-placedness or, 
more specifically the right to assume place on the earth and build up a structural world in which the 
original political conditions of life on earth might be realised. For Arendt, part of this need to affirm 
the plurality of the earth as a condition for politics and the construction of worlds generally hinges on 
the recognition that the inhumane violence of the European Holocaust was not exclusively an instance 
of anti-Semitism perpetrated on the Jewish body alone, but was an attack on the unchosen fact of 
earthly plurality. This culminates with Arendt’s claim in The Origins of Totalitarianism that what is at 
stake under totalitarian violence is ‘human nature as such.’38     
Achille Mbembe describes a similar loss of clarity regarding the spaces of experience in the 
overspill of colonial logic to rewrite worldly conditions the world over. In light of this, part of his 
development of a critique of colonial structures in the 21st century hinges on the identification of the 
‘planetarization of the world,’ one that he argues unfolds under the aegis of ‘militarism and capital 
and, in ultimate consequences, a time of exit from democracy (or of its inversion).’39 The loss of the 
agonal strife of earth-world-history co-being under the imposition of planetary worlds forecloses the 
potential for worldly disclosure that coincides with the realisation of plurality as the law of the earth. 
Mbembe continues by developing a spatialised account of his critique of modernity in which he 
follows a ‘transversal approach, attentive to the three motifs of opening, crossing, and circulation.’40 
Arendt assumes a similarly ‘transversal approach,’ when she sources her own path to overcome what 
can be read as the planetary threat posed by totalitarianism via a return to the earth. Pushing at the 
depth of human plurality, that law of the earth that the Nazis had sought to requalify, Arendt located 
 
37 Fanon, 2004: 239 
38 OT: 601.  
39 Mbembe, 2019: 9. Arendt makes a similar point in the final chapter of The Human Condition, in which she 
discusses world alienation emerging in tandem with the ‘closing-in of the earth,’ see HC: 250.   
40 ibid 
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an opening in the condition of natality. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, she began to shape the 
contours of natality as the groundwork of human miracles, developing this claim explicitly in The 
Human Condition seven years later.41  
Frustrating Mbembe’s image of a ‘time of democratic exit’ with the temporal opening 
established by natality, Arendt’s first depiction of natality in The Origins of Totalitarianism appears 
in the context of space, namely that ‘with each new birth, a new beginning is born into the world, [and 
so] a new world has potentially come into being.’42 The world that is disclosed with each new birth 
reaffirms the revolutions of the earth-world through history. Pushing at this intersection further it 
becomes apparent that each birth coincides with the reaffirmation of the earth. Indeed, what is 
foreshadowed in Arendt’s account of natality’s appearance into the world is plurality’s appearance out 
of the earth seven years later when she writes The Human Condition and defines plurality as 
corresponding to the fact that men ‘life on the earth.’43 Before I move to discuss the earthliness of 
natality in closer detail in section 2.3, I want to explore the latent environmentalism of Arendt’s 
rejection of sovereignty.  
Building on the shared and unchosen condition of earthly cohabitation, Arendt’s rejection of 
sovereignty hinges on the way in which the renewal of earth and world are inherently plural projects. 
What thus appears in her writing on political action is the continual reaffirmation of that original fact 
of earthly plurality: to act politically is to affirm both the plurality of politics and its earthly 
placedness. She describes the ‘very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the 
monopoly of all means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers’ as ‘the 
end of all political life as we know it.’ 44 Against the oppressive confines of earthly sovereignty, as in 
the claim to sovereignty attempted by the Nazi party, her political concepts are based on ‘plurality, 
diversity, and mutual limitations.’45 While the earth thus imposes itself in part as a liminal condition, 
 
41 OT: 629, see Totsching, 2017.  
42 OT: 611.  
43 HC: 7.  
44 MDT: 81.  
45 MDT: 81.  
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human life requires the provision of air for instance, it equally grounds the conditions of natal 
diversity that precede each disclosive act into the plurality of worldly appearance.46  
This intersection of the earthly and the manmade is evident in the opening citation to this 
chapter. Reflecting on the status of reality, Arendt writes ‘what we call real is already a web which is 
woven of earthly, organic, and human realities, but which has come into existence through the 
addition of infinite improbabilities.’47 The reality of worldly freedom, which is merely another way of 
describing the reality of politics, is maintained in this interwoven relationship with the primordiality 
of the earth and its unfolding in connection to the world. Not only does the earth thus precede worldly 
being as the material ground of appearance, it also reveals the ontological conditions for political 
appearance, namely the irreducibility of individuals and the unpredictability of their appearance as 
such. To be of the earth prior to acts of disclosure ‘in the world’ is already to exist as a latent 
individual and distinct actor. When Arendt then connects the ontological depth of earthly plurality 
with natality as the original disclosure of this difference, she establishes a link between the twofold 
political space of earth and world. And yet, in her appeal to think the intrinsic originality of natal 
appearances Arendt rearticulates Heidegger’s concern with the historicity of Dasein. This much is 
clear when she describes natality, which I introduced in the introduction as both the condition of 
human beginning inscribed at birth and the faculty of beginning attested to in original acts of 
beginning (what Arendt refers to as the ‘second birth’), as creating ‘the conditions for remembrance, 
that is, for history.’48 What begins to emerge as central to Arendt’s project of politics and the 
underpinning ontology of political being then is a concern with the realisation of natality and plurality 
as innately earthly. And yet, in as much as her project confirms a patent concern with the space of 
being, collapsing it into a form of biopolitical management would be to miss the expansive depth of 
her earth-world-history constellation.  
 
46 Heidegger makes a similar point in Being and Time; ‘the earth of the homeland is not simply a space 
delimited by exterior frontiers, a natural region, a locality (Ortlichkeit) destined to be a scene for this and that to 
take place. The earth which is the homeland is readied for the gods’ (GA39, 104). Oxford Maxwell ed. reference 
47 PP: 112. 
48 HC: 9; 176.  
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If we follow this premise, that the convergence of earth and world relies upon the disclosive 
force of plural encounters in order to assume meaning historically, then a clear link between the 
meaning of life as such and earth-world-history becomes apparent. Returning to the central role of 
people to give texture to the placed fact of being, Arendt stresses the necessity of communities when 
she writes that ‘only within the framework of a people can a man live as a man among men, without 
exhausting himself.’49 She makes this point at various stages in her writing, developing it fully in her 
account of the non-sovereignty of human being. But these arguments for the communality of being 
are grounded throughout in appeals to the earth. And so, beyond setting up a paradigmatic space of 
intelligibility, earth and world become meaningful as place as the earth-world-history constellation in 
which action is realised. When Villa describes the Heideggerian world as something that is ‘not 
originally “beheld,” but is dwelled in’ he provides an account that might be thought interchangeably 
with the space that is Arendt’s plural politics. Indeed, when Arendt quotes Nicias in Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian Wars that ‘wherever you go, you will be a polis,’ she is quick to clarify that this 
capacity to disclose a political space is only ever a potential.50 Hence, ‘this space does not always 
exist’ but hangs on the guarantee provided by the presence of other humans for whom it appears.51 Or, 
to finish the earlier reference to the framework of a people, she continues ‘only when a people lives 
and functions in consort with other people can it contribute to the establishment upon earth of a 
commonly conditioned and controlled humanity.’52 To be a polis thus requires the admission of that 
original earthly law of plurality into its foundation.  
Unpacking this qualification regarding the conditioned framework of humanity opens up 
Arendt’s account of politics to a project of earthly preservation as well as recognising the force of 
intergenerational claims. Or, recalling Heidegger’s project of earthly disclosure, ‘the earth itself, then, 
is not our home until we make it home.’53 The purposive drive that Arendt locates in the earth extends 
beyond the conditions manifest for survival: that humans eat, drink, stay warm, and have shelter. 
 
49 JW: 297.  
50 HC: 198. 
51 HC: 199 
52 JW: 279, emphasis added.  
53 Oliver, 2015: 74.  
 76 
Remaining bound by these conditions is described by Arendt in terms of the animal laborans. Arendt 
makes this argument more pointedly in reference to the slave body who is reduced to their earthly 
status, ‘condemned’ as Mbembe says ‘to live.’54 Certainly, the earth lays out literal material 
conditions that inform the needs of worldly individuals, hence the position of the animal laborans; the 
very embodiment of mere human earthliness, the subject who is never free from earthly want and 
whose life is subsequently dictated by the necessity of hunger, thirst and shelter. Yet, insofar as it is 
precisely not the satiation of earthly need in the feeding, clothing, and sheltering of the animal 
laborans that they assume a properly human life that the ontological depth of the earth becomes 
apparent.  
Arendt’s insistence then that politics is based on the fact of earthly existence signals a depth 
beyond mere animality ascribable to the earth. It is thus too simplistic to describe the earth as a ‘limit 
condition on the world,’ limiting movement and resources.55 The earth resonates not least as the 
quintessence of biological life, where it might indeed be thought as a limit condition, but as the 
expansive ground for political worlding – a project that builds upon the historicity of Dasein to create 
original historical conditions out of the fact – or expansive place – of being. Establishing this point 
merely reaffirms the original co-being of the earth-world-history constellation as it pertained to 
Heidegger’s writing. The severance of the triadic space of being, where the earth would become 
meaningful to the extent that its material conditions are met, is overcome via the return to plurality as 
‘the law of the earth.’56 When Arendt thus identified totalitarian lawfulness as pretending to ‘have 
found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth’ it was precisely plurality as the law of the earth 
that it had infringed upon.57 What we see then again is the severance of the triadic constellation, 
apparent here in the claim over earthly conditions by the worldly mandate of totalitarianism.  
 
54 Mbembe describes the status of the slave in the Atlantic Slave Trade as one ‘Imprisoned in the dungeon of 
appearance, they came to belong to others who hated them. They were deprived of their own names and their 
own languages. Their lives and their work were from then on controlled by the others with whom they were 
condemned to live, and who denied them recognition as cohumans.’ CBR: 2.  
55 Oliver, 2015: 75.  
56 LMT: 19.  
57 OT: 606.  
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 Grasping the implications of Arendt’s claim that plurality is the law of the earth and the 
contingent anti-sovereign foundation of freedom can be found in the political reflections of Audre 
Lorde. When Lorde writes in the now eminently quotable essay ‘The Master’s Tools’ that ‘difference 
must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity 
can spark like a dialectic,’ she evinces Arendt’s thesis that freedom can only by expressed within the 
logic of a plurality.58 With statements like these the links between Arendt and a school of thinking 
like Lorde’s are clear. Precisely because the ‘ontological fact of plurality prevents us from remaining 
masters of our action,’ the disclosure and affirmation of new beginnings depends upon the richness 
and solidity provided by the forces of reciprocal appearance and plural recognition.59 A similar 
celebration of anti-sovereign freedom can be found in Mbembe’s description of Fanon: ‘Fanon 
grasped his own life only by understanding the life of other living and nonliving beings, for only then 
did he himself exist as a living form, and only then could he rectify the asymmetry of relations and 
introduce into them a dimension of reciprocity and care for humanity.’60 Mbembe’s identification of 
an asymmetry echoes the intersection of intergenerational communities who, to borrow from the 
vocabulary of Adriana Cavarero, incline upon one another in states of dependence and exposed 
vulnerability.61 Implicit here as well is the connection to life that Arendt first discerned in her reading 
of Sputnik, namely, that it is outside the world of human artifice that connections to life are found.  
Cognisant of this dependence of life on forces outside the sovereign limits of the self, both 
Arendt and Lorde locate in acts of plural and worldly being, namely acts of original and reciprocal 
disclosure, the necessity of individual courage. Hence, where Lorde speaks of the ‘courage and 
sustenance to act where there are no charters,’ Arendt turns to courage as an intergenerational and 
historical force.62 Hence, courage as ‘indispensable because in politics not life but the world is at 
stake.’63 The ambiguity of Arendt’s reference to life here – whether individual life or the capacity to 
create life – skews her account away from a project of the necro or biopolitical subject towards a 
 
58 Lorde, 2017: 90.  
59 Axtmann, 2006: 100.  
60 Mbembe, 2019: 5.  
61 ICR 
62 Lorde, 207: 91.  
63 BPF: 155.  
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notion of politics that is always already intercut with the earth as a plural and intergenerational space. 
Both Lorde and Arendt are indebted to a relational model that positions difference as prior to political 
appearance and, in turn, political action as dependent upon the realisation of difference. Susan 
Bickford describes Arendt and Lorde’s shared concern with courage as operative in overcoming the 
fear that exists in the need to establish allegiances in what is an otherwise plural world.64  
Holding onto the difference of plurality as affording a form of security in resolute and 
irreducible difference, Arendt and Lorde depict a political ontology the fulfilment of which coincides 
with a reaffirmation of its underlying premise. Hence, ‘Lorde insists that difference is our greatest 
strength in the struggle for another, better world. She demands that we neither negate difference nor 
conceptualise it as something that puts people against one another.’65 Like Arendt, Lorde locates in 
human plurality the sources of new beginnings. Pushing the ground of this difference and locating in 
the earth the nascent condition of human plurality, natality, and hence, politics itself, a paradigm shift 
occurs in what it means to think the space of the earth politically. In other words, when Arendt argues 
in The Life of the Mind, that ‘plurality is the law of the earth,’ setting up an political and earthly 
paradigm she clarifies the Augustinian claim that ‘because man is a beginning, man can begin,’ that 
was so central to the formation of her account of natality.66  
Beginning is now to be understood as the affirmation of earth, or rather an interweaving of 
the earthly and human that coincides as earth-world-history. With this reappraisal of the natal subject 
as an earthly subject, Arendt’s claim that ‘to be human and to be free are one and the same,’ serves as 
an invocation of the freedom inherent to earthly dwelling.67 What Arendt points towards with this 
conjunction is the inhumanity that coincides with the attempt to qualify or recondition earthly life. 
Imprisonment thus becomes more than the negation of rights but the negation of that innate right to 
appear that coincides with being born on the earth. Without becoming an essentialist claim, Arendt’s 
positioning of the earth as the ground on which radical beginnings are made and latterly sustained, the 
earth enters into a dialogue on what it means to appear and to appear as free. She thus describes the 
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65 Hark and Villa, 2020: 132.  
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lives of those imprisoned in Nazi Death Camps as ‘removed from earthly purpose.’68 Unable to realise 
the twofold political conditions of natality and plurality, what transpired in these unearthly spaces was 
the attempt to essentialise earthly life and render it mere existence. Arendt’s redemption of earthly life 
via natality challenges both the limits of what it means to dwell on the earth while simultaneously 
opening up space in which to rethink the project of earthly life in and of itself.  
If the earth can thus begin to be thought as something intrinsic to Arendt’s account of worldly 
politics, it is possible to see how a reconditioning of the earth, as in the reconditioning force of the 
Anthropocene, radically alters what it means to think ‘the political.’ The declaration of the 
Anthropocene, however, as a novel iteration of the earth is ontologically distinct to the revolutions of 
the earth-world in the agonal strife of Heidegger’s appeal to the space of disclosure or Arendt’s 
project of worldly politics as grounded in the plural condition of the earth and the historicity of 
natality. The Anthropocene signals that the earth can no longer be thought in terms of its co-being 
alongside the constellating spaces of world and history. What is apparent here is a form of severance 
by way of a complete negation of the relational binds that hold each together as a manifold unity. That 
is to say, when the ontological limits no longer exist between earth-world-history, where each comes 
into being not as an encounter of ontological disclosure but as forced into appearance as the earth of 
human production for instance, the agonal strife of co-being is lost. While Arendt’s fear that the 
blurring of the public polis with the private household would result in the rise of the social, the ‘blob’ 
that culminates in the colonization of political discourse by the economic drives of neo-liberalism, the 
collapse of earth-world-history signals a new erosion to the space of politics.69  
The specific threat discernible in the blob of earth-world-history in the Anthropocene is the 
loss of relational agonism in the development of political projects. The loss of the earth as a space of 
unknown concealment out of which worlds might be constructed threatens the concomitant loss of an 
alternate project of beginning. In other words, where Lorde rejects the possibility of the master’s tools 
being used to dismantle the master’s house, the Anthropocene looms as a new iteration of the master’s 
house built out on the exclusionary systems of colonialism, the dismantling of which is made possible 
 
68 OT: 583.  
69 See Pitkin, 1998. 
 80 
only be a rethinking of the ground that the house supposes to have totalized. I will confront this 
problem in Part III.    
Returning to Arendt’s project of anti-sovereign politics, in which freedom operates in the 
locale of human plurality, I want to turn in the final section to the earthliness of natality, suggesting 
that it is natality’s unpredictable disruption of the world that presents a possible form of resistance to 
the continued practice of Lorde’s violent tools. Indeed, the intersection of natality and plurality allows 
for a reading of natality as the realisation and renewal of the ‘law of the earth.’ Resisting conformity, 
reading natality in this way highlights the potential it has to allows the earth to be wrested once again 
from concealment and shown as the productive and expansive ground of political action.  
 
2.3 …the fact that we are born into earth-world-history 
The title of this subsection presents a play on Arendt’s definition of natality as the fact that ‘we are 
born into the world.’70 In the previous two sections I have argued that the connection between earth 
and world cannot be reduced to nature/culture nor to essentialist sovereign grounds but that, like 
Heidegger, Arendt presents an account of earth and world as bound together in a common co-being. 
The ‘oneness’ that defines Heidegger’s placed construction the ‘fourfold’ thus reappears in Arendt’s 
discussion on the intersection of earth and world in moments of political action. The placedness of 
action which allows for the meaningful co-being of earth and world to appear was thus denied in the 
‘unearthly’ violence of totalitarianism. The mute violence of this period to which Arendt was witness 
thereby threatened to erode the very integrity of reality itself, moving, in this way, radically past the 
threat to speech as it was announced in the prologue to The Human Condition. What was thus brought 
to a critical point in totalitarianism was Arendt’s understanding of reality as always ‘already a web 
which is woven of earthly, organic, and human realities, but which has come into existence through 
the addition of infinite improbabilities.’71 These ‘improbabilities’ emerge out of the radical 
unpredictability that is human life, the ‘beginning’ that is disclosed both in the birth of humans and in 
the form of their actions. When Arendt recognises the spontaneity of human appearance on earth and 
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what I will come in Chapter Four to think in terms of the messianic renewal of the world in action, 
she begins to invoke something of that Heideggerian historicity that I discussed in Chapter 1.3.  
Indeed, where Heidegger discusses Dasein’s futural being, Arendt describes the worldliness 
of intergenerational connections. The threat of worldlessness that I first discussed in relation to 
Sputnik and then totalitarianism emerges once again as a political phenomenon when the assumption 
is made ‘that the world will not last.’ As Arendt writes, ‘on this assumption…it is almost inevitable 
that worldlessness in one form or another, will begin to dominate the political scene.’72 Without the 
guarantee of future generations and their inheritance of the world as it is constructed in action, the 
very meaning of that world disintegrates. Beyond the way in which this argument clearly implicates 
the future in the present and hence recalls the inauthenticity of thinking time as the ontically distinct 
spaces past, present, and future, what is apparent here is the placedness of action’s beginning. Or 
rather, insofar as worldlessness is resisted that mode of resistance coincides with the (re)production of 
earth and world for the sake of posterity. 73 Arendt argues this much herself in the essay ‘The Crisis in 
Education’ where she describes the confrontation between the placedness of the human condition and 
the renewal of the condition in each new generation. Framing her discussion in terms of the 
responsibility to preserve the world and maintain it as a space that might be renewed through original 
realisations of the placedness of being, she recalls the danger from Sputnik of losing hold of political 
speech and forgoing the historicity and futural-quality of action. To quote her at length: 
 
What concerns us all and cannot therefore be turned over to the special science of pedagogy 
is…our attitude towards the fact of natality: the fact that we have all come into the world by 
being born and that this world is constantly renewed through birth. Education is the point at 
which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it and by the 
same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new 
and young, would be inevitable.’74  
 
72 HC: 54.  
73 See, HC: 55, 68, 137, 198. 
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Appealing to a sense of common responsibility, Arendt ties education to a form of placedness. Before 
losing hold of the earth in this account of place, it need only be recalled that what gives depth to the 
world is its relationship to the earth and way in which meaning is disclosed in their co-being.  
The ‘realness’ of that ‘world’ into which we are born thus comes into being via the 
interwoven spaces of earth, world, and history. The play then, that natality is defined as the fact that 
we are born into the world, moves Arendt’s original emphasis from the fact of birth as the signifier of 
spontaneous originality – that we are born as beginners– to the locative fact that we are born into 
place. This transformation of birth from an abstract event to one that occurs in place is central to my 
argument that the meaning of birth is inextricably linked to the condition of human placedness. The 
argument that I advance throughout this section is that to-be-born is to be born-in-place, elevating the 
fact of place to a central and primordial condition in considerations of natality and instrumental to the 
claims throughout Part II that natality coincides with the right-to-placedness. 
Arendt makes multiple references towards the placedness of natality throughout her writing. 
Indeed, insofar as the notion of natality itself lacks a firm placeholder in her work, assuming presence 
as the central conviction that humans are born to begin, the proximity she establishes between action 
and place is an indication of the placedness of natality. And so, while I will explore the immediate 
links between natality and place, specifically in reference to the ‘earthly’ place of being, throughout 
this section, it is her oblique references to natality’s realisation as occurring in place that gives force 
to my claim. For instance, an explicit connection between natality and place can be read in the 
opening line to ‘Introduction into Politics’ where she writes that ‘politics is based on the fact of 
human plurality. God created man, but men are a human, earthly product, the product of human 
nature.’75 Gesturing towards the overlapping spaces of earth, world, and history here, the connection 
between earth and the worldliness of politics acts a further qualification of the way in which the 
constellation earth-world-history precedes natality as the place of its being. In a less immediate yet 
still resonant invocation of natality’s claim to place, her remarks in ‘Understanding and Politics’ 
invoke the question of the earth as the locus of historical being, hence ‘if we want to be at home on 
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this earth, even at the price of being at home in this century, we must try to take part in the 
interminable dialogue with the essence of totalitarianism.’76 Binding herself to earth and history, 
Arendt realises the latent quality of natality as the condition of historical remembrance.  
  Before I explore these links between natality and place, recalling that it is natality that saves 
the ‘world from ruin’ and in which ‘the faculty of action is ontologically rooted,’ groundings that 
serve as a poignant reminder to the placedness of natality, I want to return to the most common 
depiction of natality as coeval with humans as beginnings as such.77 At its most straightforward, it is 
this capacity to begin that defines natality. Taken over from Augustine’s claim that ‘with the creation 
of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself,’ natality enters into Arendt’s thinking as 
early as her doctoral thesis in 1929 and remains central to her political vocabulary, assuming a 
prominent position thirty years later in the publication of The Human Condition.78  Yet, even with the 
emphasis Arendt places on an Augustinian account of beginning, and the apparent simplicity of 
natality as interchangeable with a notion of original beginning, its exact political valence remains 
opaque. 
When it was introduced as a standalone political concept in The Human Condition the notion 
of natality operated, at least implicitly, as a challenge. A challenge first and foremost to a tradition of 
Western thought that had seen mortality and the centrality of (masculine) honour to which it gave rise 
– honour in battle, honour in death, honour in memory – natality also elevated questions of female 
experience – birth, labour, childrearing – typically deemed (even by Arendt) as alien to considerations 
of the political. The provocation of natality, not simply to think in terms of the human potential to 
begin but to position that potential in terms of the exposed vulnerability of childbirth has recourse 
beyond the limits of its apparent metaphoric depiction in Arendt’s writing. Indeed, it is the ambivalent 
status that natality has within Arendt’s writing, both as the central category of political thought and as 
the apparent metaphorical basis for the ‘second birth,’ the moment ‘in which we confirm and take 
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upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance,’ that contributes to its diverse, if 
somewhat contradictory application.79  
Lisa Guenther describes the way that not only does the equation of natality in the event of 
birth elide ontological inquiry but ‘when it is mentioned, it is often transformed in a metaphorical 
process of artistic or intellectual creation which is implicitly or explicitly coded as masculine.’80 
Wolfhart Totsching identifies a broad section of Arendt scholarship which engages in precisely such 
metaphorical reductions of natality.81 Of the many remarks made about the obscure use of natality in 
Arendt’s writing, Fanny Söderbäck, while tuned to the underlying question of natality’s role in her 
work, also accuses Arendt of saying ‘notoriously little of the concept;’ John Kiess refers to it as her 
‘most important, if least understood, contribution to political theory,’ yet it is Miguel Vatter who asks 
the judicious question: ‘if Arendt’s political thought is so “anti-biological,” then why does she root 
human freedom in birth?’82 Relishing this opacity, Adriana Cavarero reminds us that Arendt’s refusal 
to further illuminate natality ‘at least has the advantage of putting a somewhat unusual theme at our 
disposal.’83 Rather than baffle her readers then, natality invites speculation. Responding to the clarity 
sought by Kiess and the problematic raised by Vatter, Cavarero’s reading is distinct both in the 
manner that it avoids metaphorization and in the way that it develops a hermeneutics that surpasses 
the original text towards a far broader ethical project, one that I will aim to recreate throughout this 
project but specifically in Part II.  
 
79 HC: 176. The quasi-paradoxical status of natality, as the foundation of human beginning is also conditioned 
by its dependence on the maternal body. Rooted in the biological labour of the maternal subject, natality evinces 
both the dependence and vulnerability of labour, infancy, and care, and the miraculous unpredictability of 
original action. While Arendt emphasises the radicality of the latter, she rejects discussions on the specificity of 
the maternal experience. Indeed, where natality is heralded as the central category of political though in which 
action is ontologically rooted, the labour of domestic care is relegated to the realm of the apolitical. And yet, in 
spite of these seemingly definitive distinctions on the conditions from which natality is realised, much has been 
made of what can rightly be considered a notion underdeveloped by Arendt. On natality and rights, see Beiner, 
1984; Birmingham, 2006; 2007; Parekh, 2004. On natality and feminism, see Benhabib, 2000; Honig, 1992; 
Jantzen, 1999; Willard, 2015. On natality and subjecthood, see Butler, 2005; Cavarero, 2000; Kristeva, 2001. 
On natality and action, see Kampowski, 2008; Schott, 2010.  
80 Guenther, 2008: 99. 
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Tassin 2003. 
82 Söderbäck, 2018: 274; Kiess, 2016: 40; Vatter, 2006: 138.  
83 Cavarero, 2014: 17. 
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One of the earliest thinkers to seriously engage natality as a political resource, namely not 
simply as the groundwork for metaphorical abstractions on the capacity to begin,  Patricia Bowen-
Moore, describes the way in which natality inverts the enigma described by T. S. Eliot that ‘we had 
the experience but missed the meaning.’84 What eludes comprehension in the case of natality is the 
specificity of the experience itself; what is lost is its integrity, the actors who give it meaning and 
perhaps most of all, the unqualifiable connections shared between mother and child who are brought 
into ineliminable union. Guenther captures the perplexity of this event when she identifies the a-
temporality of birth, of this event that ‘slips away from me at the same time that it makes me.’85 
Drawing attention to the complex of actors whose presence affirms not merely their role as passive 
witnesses but as those who make the event, Anne O’Byrne writes that: 
 
the temporality of natality is such that I am with others before I can grasp that I am and who I 
am as a finite being. The origin from which I am removed is certainly mine, but it also 
belongs in an important sense to others. Our coming to be is therefore never a singular or 
solitary emerging into being; it is always, from the very start, a matter of plurality.86  
 
Here again the words of Benjamin come to mind, of an origin which ‘is not intended to describe the 
process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the 
process of becoming and disappearance,’ the origin of natality is the emergence of meaning between 
those present at birth.87 Unable to be remembered, the moment of birth becomes a locus of 
speculation; or rather, insofar as it resists remembrance, it enjoins a mode of engagement that passes 
over the specificity of natality as an event.  
Where Cavarero will contend with this withdrawal of natality from the immediacy of memory 
as she concretizes the event and recentres the role of the maternal figure, it is equally clear that to be 
born is to be born-in-place. Rather than remain focused on Arendt’s stipulation that we are ‘born into 
 
84 Bowen-Moore, 1989: 135.  
85 Guenther, 2008: 3.  
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the world,’ I want to move to think the earthliness of that world and, in so doing, recall the 
constellation of earth-world-history. Anticipating Cavarero’s critique of Kantian rectitude in Chapter 
Three, I want to go beyond reiterating that humans are an earthly product, and develop the placedness 
of natality insofar as it was undermined in the earth and natality denying events of totalitarianism. The 
entanglement between the earth and natality during totalitarianism, in particular within the ‘unearthly’ 
spaces of the death camp mentioned in section 2.2, bring into harsh perspective Arendt’s claim in The 
Human Condition that ‘a life without speech and without action…is literally dead to the world.’88 
Written in this context to emphasize the necessary plurality of life, Arendt’s point is neither 
hyperbolic nor exclusionary. Highlighting the givenness and potential of all humans, once again to 
parse Augustine because all humans are born to begin, Arendt’s announcement reinforces the claim 
that a worldly life coincides with the fulfilment of an earthly life.  
To speak of a life that is literally dead to the world is a way of saying that those lives which 
are, in Mbembe’s words ‘condemned to live,’ cannot be understood to ‘literally’ live in any 
meaningful sense.89 Mute to the world and rendered speechless, those lives condemned to live within 
the unearthly spaces of totalitarian death camps reaffirm the constellation of earth-world-history as 
the locus of human being. Namely, insofar as life is irreducible to its purely earthly form, to the 
conditions set out by mere biological necessity, earth-world-history resounds as the place proper to 
human life. Advancing the claim that what occurred in the death camp was both a denial of natality 
and the earthliness of being, I want to argue for their necessary interarticulation. Namely, that 
attempts to qualify the individual placedness in earth-world-history coincides with the attempt to 
qualify human natality and hence limit the integrity of politics itself. This synonymy, while posed 
here in terms of a mutual disavowal, effectively answers the question of what it means to be born-in-
place. In the following chapter, I will frame this equation positively, via the notion of the right-to-
placedness.   
While natality had already emerged in Arendt’s writing in her doctoral dissertation in 1929, 
the renewed application that it underwent in light of European totalitarianism radically transformed its 
 
88 HC: 176.  
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scope as a political force, creating the path towards its promotion in The Human Condition to the 
‘central category’ of her political thought.90 In the preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt 
sketched out the injunction to which the book would respond: 
 
Antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), 
totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) – one after the other, one more brutally than the 
other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only 
in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend 
the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled 
by newly defined territorial entities.91 
 
By the book’s final page this principle has been found in the promise of beginning. She thus 
concludes the book: 
 
But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new 
beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only ‘message’ which the end can ever produce. 
Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it 
is identical with man’s freedom. Initium ut esset homo creates est – “that a beginning be 
made man was created,” said Augustine. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is 
indeed every man.92 
 
Beyond a source of metaphorical abstraction, the force of beginning ascribed at birth provides Arendt 
with the guarantee upon which a new account of human dignity could be founded. That the crime to 
which she had been witness had attempted to qualify the rights to earthly appearance by denying natal 
 
90 HC: 9.  
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92 OT: 629.  
 88 
spontaneity, it was in the convergence of these two conditions for political action that Arendt 
grounded her new ideal of human dignity.  
At a fundamental level, Arendt’s response to totalitarianism progressed following an 
inversion of the ideology’s logic. Where totalitarianism found strength in ends, in the prescription of 
finitude to existence and the deprivation of human natality, its spontaneity and singularity, Arendt saw 
potential in beginnings. Put otherwise, insofar as totalitarianism sought ‘to deprive life of the 
existence of singular human beings’ a negation which coincided with the deprivation of life’s 
‘natality, of its chance to be free,’ the injunction in responding to the death camp was to recover 
meaning in the condition of being born, in the condition of life’s ontological relationality.93 This is the 
task to which The Origins of Totalitarianism attained and it is the task that guided Arendt’s 
subsequent writing, achieving a singular clarity in the treatise of The Life of the Mind that ‘plurality is 
the law of the earth.’94 Tracing the steps that Arendt took in developing this clarity by rereading not 
only the earthliness of natality, but the unearthliness of totalitarianism will be pivotal in developing 
an ontology of earthly being under the aegis of the climate crisis, a singularly new unearthly 
phenomenon.  
Leading Arendt towards the necessity to think the placedness of natality in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism was her initial inquiry into those conditions that preceded totalitarianism. Forming 
part of the book’s ‘unusual’ methodology, one that emerged out of her urge not to ‘conserve 
totalitarianism but to destroy it,’ the book began by confronting those ‘elements which crystallised 
into’ it.95 Part of Arendt’s motivation in making this decision was her conviction that while the 
phenomenon of totalitarianism under Nazi and Stalinist rule was over, the conditions for its return 
remain. Indeed, as Serena Parekh notes, it is the diffused nature of these underlying conditions that 
warrants an ongoing consideration of both totalitarianism and the (earthly) rights that it denied.96 
Chief amongst these conditions is the phenomenon of loneliness, which Arendt described as ‘the 
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essence of totalitarianism.’97 Distinct to feelings of isolation in which contact with the world remains 
and which is at times incumbent to the productive work of the homo faber, loneliness is closely 
connected with uprootedness and superfluousness. In this disconnection from place, both in the literal 
sense of homeland and the political or social sense of the polis, loneliness becomes parasitic to the 
human condition of relationality inscribed by natality and plurality. Invoking the earthliness of 
experience, Arendt describes the way in which once a person ‘left their homeland they remained 
homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their 
human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth.’98 Robbed of a space of appearance in which 
to disclose oneself, loneliness erodes a sense of belonging to the world. What thus makes loneliness 
‘so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self which can be realized in solitude but confirmed in its 
identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals.’99 As a precursor to 
totalitarianism, loneliness foreshadows the crime the ideology will pose to the condition of 
ontological plurality. Where loneliness diminishes the relationality of being, totalitarianism all but 
obliterates it. Further refining this concern, the years between The Origins and The Human Condition 
saw Arendt clarify not only the centrality of natality to political thought but rectify the misplaced 
emphasis placed on the philosophical conception of ‘Man’ in contrast to the ontological plural 
‘men.’100 
Building on precisely this categorical confusion, the dehumanisation of the death camp 
transformed humans ‘into specimens of the human animal ‘man.’’101 In the context of totalitarianism 
this uniformity assumes a particularly sinister colouring as the status ‘Man’ becomes a site of 
exclusionary specificity. Vatter accounts for the years between the publication of The Origins and The 
Human Condition as preoccupied by precisely this distinction between ‘men’ and ‘Man,’ hence the 
development of a definition of plurality in dialogue with the irreducibility of the earth to mere 
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materiality.102 Guiding her inquiry was the working hypothesis that ‘the entire western tradition of 
political thought has ignored this distinction, attempting to think politics from the identity of all 
human beings qua specimens of the same species, rather than from their “original differentiation.”’103 
Recalled to the two definitions that Arendt provides of plurality in The Human Condition, the popular 
understanding of plurality as the common unrepeatability of each individual and the more ‘earthly’ 
account of plurality as drawn from the fact that men inhabit the earth, the full force of Vatter’s claim 
can be felt. That Arendt’s writing on plurality reaches a point of particular clarity in her final work 
where it is cast as the law of the earth is further evidence still of the way in which she comes to an 
understanding of earthly dwelling as central to the human status. 
 The ontological crime of totalitarianism, which attained to a violent extremity in the context 
of the death camp is thus twofold. First, the assault on the singularity of humans and the givenness of 
human difference. Implicit here is the denigration of human natality as a faculty for beginning. Arendt 
touches on this an entry dated April 1951 in her Denktagebuch where she writes that ‘totalitarian 
extermination of men as men is the extermination of their spontaneity.’104 Indeed, the negation of 
natality under totalitarianism – and with it the eradication of human spontaneity and action’s 
unpredictability – effectively provided Arendt with the conditions to be redeemed in combatting 
totalitarianism. In other words, her project was not merely one of eradicating the historical specificity 
of this totalitarian government but of showing that inherent to human freedom are the instincts and 
drives that are born of human natality.105 That Arendt placed the responsibility of the death camps 
‘squarely at the feet of a philosophically invalid and politically impotent notion of human rights,’ 
meant that her redemption of natality would also become the groundwork of her renewed account of 
human rights.106 She thus concludes The Origins of Totalitarianism with precisely such an evocation 
of natality, noting that it is this principle of beginning that might restore faith in humanity.107 The first 
crime against plurality committed by totalitarianism was thus its complete denigration of the other 
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half of plurality, natality. Robbed of the faculty to begin, totalitarianism extinguished meaning from 
the fact of appearance, which could no longer rely on the spontaneous disclosure of new and different 
individuals but had become a locus of mute homogeneity.  
Coeval with the negation of human beginning was the utter abolition of human plurality, not 
simply as a fact of ontological difference, but as a quality of earthly existence as such. Once again 
Arendt’s words from the The Life of the Mind resound here: ‘plurality is the law of the earth.’108 The 
earth is the locale of natality and plurality and hence of the conditions of the political. This question 
of the earth not simply as a shared entity but as a common ontological condition underpinned 
Arendt’s pursuit of a new law of human dignity outlined in the preface to The Origins. Against the 
totalitarian perversion of this law, which sought to create a singular conception of ‘the human,’ 
namely, the inversion of the law that affirms that it is men and not Man who inhabit the earth is the 
law of difference inscribed in earthly plurality. Here again the intersection of natality and plurality is 
central to the crime committed by totalitarianism. If the first crime was the erosion of natality and the 
spontaneous beginnings that constitute the fabric of plurality, the second was perpetrated against the 
integrity of plurality as the earthly locus that would give meaning to natality. The intersection of 
natality and plurality become like two sides of the same coin in the context of totalitarianism. Hence, 
the account of natality as that which ‘stands in the way of achieving, of finalizing the human species 
because, according to Arendt, natality only brings forth singulars, radically diverse individuals, but no 
species “Man.”’109  
The expulsion of certain humans from the abstract and ideological definition of ‘Man,’ while 
a singularly violent extreme within totalitarianism spaces persists insidiously throughout liberal 
democracy. Perhaps most consistently in the normativity of the masculine subject ‘he’ who populates 
philosophical and political writing, but latent in the presumed whiteness, heterosexuality, cis-
gendered identity of the Western political subject. The self-referentiality to which the constructed, and 
yet ultimately abstract, iteration ‘the human’ or the ‘Man’ that ideology yields, while foreshadowing 
the discussion of the Kantian subject in Chapter 3 ultimately betrays its own limitations. Refusing to 
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acknowledge the placedness of natality and that each individual is born such that they might begin-in-
place, performing action in a way that brings into being a new understanding of what it is to dwell-in-
place in earth-world-history, coincides with Arendt’s depiction of a life that is literally dead to the 
world. While this account of natality in terms of its placedness is yet to answer the question of what it 
means to be born-in-place, the way in which the qualification of earthly life becomes a way of 
limiting the claim to natality’s realisation points to an answer. Namely, that where the negation of 
human spontaneity challenges something specific about what it means to live in the world, so too does 
it undermine what it means to be-in-place on earth-world-history. Unpacking this in more detail in 
Part II where the meaning of natality’s connection to place becomes the basis to think the fore-right to 
be-in-place, I want to conclude this chapter by reiterating the centrality of the earth to Arendt’s 
political writings and recall her insistence on the placedness of natality and hence the necessary 
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 Chapter Three: On being born-in-place – the Condition of Natality 
 
The central project of Part I was to bring into relief the constellation earth-world-history. 
Drawn in part from Walter Benjamin’s conception of constellations as a methodological tool, I 
developed an understanding of earth-world-history as it can be shown to exist within Martin 
Heidegger and Hannah Arendt’s engagement with the spatial and temporal conditions of human 
experience.1 Throughout these two chapters, earth-world-history functioned as a methodological tool 
to explore the co-becoming of time and place, in Part II I move to think this constellation in the 
context of action, developing it as a conceptual tool in which to ground Arendt’s political condition of 
human natality. Recalling the original distinction outlined in the Introduction between the condition of 
natality and the faculty of natality, the two chapters of Part II respectively explore the way natality is 
conditioned by its appearance within earth-world-history and, in turn, works to renew this 
conditioning constellation.  
The co-presence of earth-world-history and natality was made apparent in Chapter Two, 
which closed with a discussion of natality’s appearance in place. Central to this claim was a return to 
the second political condition on which natality is contingent: human plurality. Defining the latter as 
‘the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world,’ in Chapter Two I sought to 
demonstrate the inextricability of natality and plurality from considerations of the earth.2 When 
Arendt similarly describes natality in terms of placedness as ‘the fact that human beings are born into 
the world,’ the force of this prior grounding of world in the earth exposes the latent earthliness of 
natality.3 The explicit connection to place complicates her framing of natality as the ‘central category 
of political thought,’ for not only is natality now understood as coeval with political appearance but 
with the agonism of earth-world-history itself.4 And so, while Arendt emphasises the event of birth 
for natality, it is her qualification of this event as occurring in place, namely as taking place into the 
world, and hence inhering that constellation of earth-world-history that orientates this chapter.  
 
1 AP: 10. On the function of constellations in Benjamin, see: Krauß; 2011; McFarland: 2012; Ross, 2020.  
2 HC: 7.  
3 HC: 9.  
4 Ibid.  
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Complicating this moment of intersection between earth-world-history and natality is 
Arendt’s claim in The Human Condition that humans are ‘conditioned beings,’ and that while they 
contribute to this conditioning through acts that I understand in terms of Heideggerian dwelling or 
Arendtian action, their arrival into the world is conditioned.5 Accepting these two premises, that 
humans are born into place and that that place exerts a claim over the human condition, to be born 
into earth-world-history is to be conditioned by earth-world-history. This connection becomes even 
more important in the second half of Part II where I turn to the messianic force of the faculty of 
natality. As the first half of this broader inquiry, this chapter follows the central question, what does it 
mean to be born-in-place, while the next advances this question by asking what it means to be-in-
place? 
 Taking up the question of placedness and what it means to be born within the constellation 
earth-world-history inaugurates a further set of questions regarding the status of action as a placed 
event. Indeed, the force of the question, ‘what does it mean to be born-in-place’ and its attendant 
concerns become increasingly pressing in the context of the climate crisis where the integrity of place 
and the realisation of placedness are made increasingly perilous.6 While this threat to place is the 
central concern of Part III where I explore the exilic condition of the climate crisis, it is in developing 
an understanding of what it means to be born-in-place that a response to this exilic condition can be 
discerned. Basing my answer to this question on the acknowledgement that all humans are born-in-
place and thus that placedness is a common condition to the being of being human, in this chapter I 
turn to an analogous inquiry into the latent yet unexplored conditions of human birth. Following 
Adriana Cavarero’s parallel investigation into birth, which begins by reconfiguring the status of the 
maternal figure before developing an original set of ethical principles, I aim to uncover a similar 
 
5 HC: 9. This exploration between dwelling and anthropogenic conditioning will be central to Chapter Four.  
6 While clear threats to place exist in the context of extreme weather events, rising sea levels and ongoing 
droughts, as I turn to explore the precarity of place under the exilic condition it is equally the refusal to admit 
unqualified entry of all people to the ‘storybook of mankind’ that informs my understanding of threats to place. 
In other words, it is the refusal to tell an impartial history (and future) of the climate crisis and to thereby bring 
into question the legitimacy of each individual’s claim to be narratable and be able to narrate history that is my 
organising concern.  
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ethical framework in relation to natality’s condition of placedness.7 This chapter thus turns in equal 
parts to Cavarero’s critical retelling of Arendt’s writing towards a feminist project of relational ethics 
and to Arendt’s own writing on the intersection of place and rights. Beginning in section 3.1 with an 
overview of the Kantian tradition from which Cavarero establishes herself at critical distance, I turn in 
section 3.2 to discuss the specifics of postural ethics as they emerge from a reframing of the maternal 
figure in considerations of natality. In the closing section, I explore the connections between natality’s 
condition of placedness and Arendt’s largely ungrounded conception of the ‘right to have rights.’8  
Arguing that the placedness of natality provides an ontological basis on which to locate this 
framework for rights, this section anticipates the negation of rights to placedness in the exilic 
condition of Part III.  
 
3.1 Natality: the fact that we are born of a (m)other 
The methodological paradigm that Cavarero sets up sets up a precedent for my own methodological 
inquiry into natality. For Cavarero it is the recovery of the maternal figure at the scene of natality, 
effective not only in reorienting questions of gender and gendering, that ultimately gives rise to a 
specific ethical construct, one that Cavarero calls a ‘postural ethics.’ In turn, I rely on a similar 
recovery of the earth in order to develop my own ethical framework for the ‘right-to-placedness.’ 
Refusing to read natality as an instance of metaphorical abstraction in Arendt’s writing, a mode of 
reading that implicitly disavows the role of the maternal as anything other than symbolic, Cavarero 
sees within the event of natality the groundwork by which to rethink not simply questions of ethical 
relationality but the very position of natality as a political category. In turn, my own redemption of the 
role place and earth-world-history play in the formation of natality brings into sharp relief the ethical 
 
7 Cavarero’s feminist interpretations of Arendt’s work extend beyond investigations into the conditions and 
maternal origins of natality. See Cavarero and Bertolino, 2008 for an overview of the way in which Cavarero 
reworks Arendt’s political theory.  
8 Arendt introduces the notion of the ‘right to have rights’ in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Though the logic of 
the claim, namely, that human rights cannot be defined exclusively in relation to the nation state but need an 
organising framework, carries a lot of force and exposes the fallibility of human rights, the actual construction is 
largely underdeveloped by Arendt. On attempts to ground the right to have rights see; Benhabib, 2002; 
Birmingham, 2007; Hamacher, 2014; Ingram, 2008.  
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consequences that arise from the positioning of this inherently placed condition as central to 
conceptions of political action.   
 As one of the most prominent contemporary Arendt scholars, Cavarero’s project not only 
serves to enrich discussions, my own included, around the theme of natality, it informs the tone and 
direction of my project. Aimed less at exegetical inquiry, whether that’s in regard to the maternal for 
Cavarero or the earth for myself, Cavarero uncovers the depth of Arendt’s writing, allowing her 
themes to become ‘stepping-stones for the articulation of her own, unique feminist project.’9 While 
her opening salvo, to rethink the maternal may appear initially simplistic, the new ethical ground that 
she establishes through her account of what she calls ‘postural ethics’ informs the parallel extension 
of natality into the realm of earthly or ‘placed’ ethics.10 What Cavarero thus achieves by thinking 
natality in terms of its (m)otherly origins transcends the specific frame of her own discussion and 
becomes meaningful in its application to questions like the climate crisis and the responsibility to 
care.11 Beyond a straightforward reconsideration of the natal event in terms of the maternal rather than 
the infant, Cavarero’s work equally functions as an explicit critique of the Western emblem of moral 
rectitude, embodied, for her, in the Kantian figure of rectitude. Locating this figure within an 
antiquated ethical paradigm, the maternal rereading of natality thus works to ‘critique its limits, 
pretences and uncritical adoption in the fields of ontology, ethics and politics.’12  
The presence of the mother in Arendt’s introduction of natality is noted only in passing. Where 
Arendt explicitly lauds the arrival of the miraculous child, her reference to the maternal is subtle, 
invoked in the claim that life born in a test tube would mark ‘an escape from the human condition.’13 
While the disruptive child thus lays claim to a place of primacy in Arendt’s politics of the new and the 
condition of natality, allusions to the maternal figure are seen, nevertheless, to persist. Recovering the 
meaning of the maternal, Cavarero simultaneously works at a distance from Arendt, pursuing a line of 
 
9 Honkasalo, 2016: 77.  
10 ICR.  
11 I want to qualify Cavarero’s preoccupation with the maternal or motherly origins of birth with the subtle 
transition to think the parental or carer figure in the anti-essential terms of the ‘(m)otherly.’ I retain this notion 
throught this project as a reflect on the necessary plurality of natality, recognising the specificity of the maternal 
whilst also incorporating a more expansive understanding of who is recognised in this role.  
12 ICR: 128.  
13 HC: 2.  
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inquiry that Arendt did not, whilst also paying careful attention to the latent maternal references in her 
work. Indeed, that Arendt maintains the event of birth as central to her political ontology, not simply 
in its metaphorical abstraction as ‘the second birth’ but as the literal moment of birth serves as a 
pivotal point of departure for Cavarero. 14 Reducing her neither to a metaphorical basis nor to her 
purely instrumental role as the progenitor of life, Cavarero frames the figure of the mother as herself a 
conditioning factor to the condition of natality. Given Arendt’s insistence that natality is the 
ontological basis for political action more broadly, what Cavarero’s project thus suggests is 
something, if not maternal in and of itself, to the status of politics but at the very least something in 
political action that cannot be separated from its maternal origin.15  
Although clearly indebted to Arendt’s work, Cavarero makes clear that she is not naively 
accepting of her writings. A critical student, then, Cavarero’s readings of Arendt are distinct in the 
provocation they make of some of Arendt’s seemingly least provocative claims. Developed in part as 
critical exegesis, the motif of Cavarero’s use of Arendt’s work as ‘stepping-stones’ towards a more 
radical, concrete and emancipatory politics, is clear. 16 Rather than simply accept, for instance, 
Arendt’s politics of speech, in For More than One Voice, Cavarero develops an embodied politics of 
the voice, advancing a new politics of speech that calls attention to, what now reads, as Arendt’s 
abstract and disembodied rendering of Aristotelian speech.17 Assuming a more declarative stance still, 
Cavarero’s rereading of natality in Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude progresses a sustained 
critique of Arendt’s neglect of the maternal figure. Moreover, the recovery of the maternal figure not 
only challenges the limits of natality but, insofar as she qualifies the original appearance of that 
plurality into which the natal subject arrives, she calls for renewed attention to the status and 
conditions intrinsic to the political construct of plurality. What thus runs throughout her interpretation 
of Arendtian themes is the persistent attempt to make fleshy those bodies that otherwise appear 
troublesomely abstract in Arendt’s thinking. Cavarero’s insistence on concretising, grounding, and 
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ultimately problematising Arendt’s writing allows the depth of what can otherwise persist as 
unexplored ideas to emerge.  
Beyond the absence of the mother and the labour of childbirth, Cavarero calls attention to 
Arendt’s failure to consider the dependence of the infant. Stopping short of incorporating a discussion 
of either this or the mother’s exposed vulnerability in acts of care, Cavarero exposes the richness of 
underexplored terrain that make up ‘natality.’ Yet rather than abandon Arendt’s conclusions on the 
plurality and spontaneity of action that stem from the miraculous originality of this moment, Cavarero 
puts the recovery of the maternal figure and states of dependence to service in their ongoing 
development. It is precisely for this reason that I want to think in terms of a maternal ‘redemption;’ 
namely, the figure of the mother is always already present in Arendt’s use of natality, such that 
redeeming her position brings into force the fullness of the event’s ontological meaning. Before she 
even arrives at the geometrical plane of postural ethics then, Cavarero’s redemption of the maternal 
has managed to reinvigorate the relationality of Arendt’s account of politics, giving new life to the 
way in which reciprocity informs the meaning of political action. Fleshing out the lived conditions of 
childbirth, both in terms of embodied vulnerability and corporeal dependence, Cavarero clarifies the 
distinction that Arendt makes between childbirth as archetypal of political action and the more 
abstract ‘second birth’ which affirms the irreducibility of the self as natal beginner. Indeed, it is 
Arendt’s insistence that there be both a political ontology of literal birth and this second birth, that 
Cavarero brings to light in her move to explore the conditions of childbirth. If action were merely the 
product of the second birth, a metaphorical allusion to childbirth would be sufficient. But Arendt does 
not do that. She stresses that there is something specific to childbirth which serves not as the 
metaphorical basis of action, buts as its ontological foundation. This leads Fanny Söderbäck to 
conclude that the organising question behind Cavarero’s project, and which I requalify here in terms 
of otherness is ‘what does it mean to be born’ [of a (m)other]?’18  
 
18 Söderbäck, 2018: 276, emphasis added. Jeffrey Champlin asks a similar question: ‘what kind of fact is the 
fact of birth?’ Champlin’s inclination towards an episteme of birth, however, fails to attain the same degree of 
ontological inquiry as Söderbäck’s, 2013.  
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Although Arendt is emphatic about the centrality of natality to politics, as noted, she describes it 
as ‘the central category of political thought,’ in response to Söderbäck’s question, readers of Arendt 
are left wanting.19 If we are then to remain faithful to Arendt’s insistence, albeit one developed in 
oblique terms, that there is something intrinsic to childbirth that conditions natality, without slipping 
into metaphorization, an exacting account of birth must be undertaken. Cavarero assumes this task 
with a keen and critical eye, going beyond an exegetical reading of natality to develop an account of 
natality that sheds new light on Arendt’s concerns with plurality and the anti-sovereign dimension of 
freedom. The simplicity with which Cavarero calls attention to the neglected maternal figure in 
Arendtian natality – and considerations of birth more generally across the canon of Western thought – 
thus serves as a point of departure from which to develop a far more sustained and intricate web of 
human relations. Central to this development is the projection of relationality inscribed at birth onto a 
geometrical plane, where a schematic for ‘postural ethics’ might be discerned. Coordinated around the 
imagined inclination of the mother over her child and the infant’s repose or dependence upon the 
mother, postural ethics serve as a provocation to a history of moral rectitude and autarchic 
sovereignty, modes of being that Cavarero locates first and foremost in the Kantian ego. And so, 
whilst developed following a matrix of female labour and the specificity of a maternal experience, 
Cavarero’s redemption of the maternal extends beyond the female experience: it becomes a point of 
entry into a discussion of ethical relationality more generally.  
Cavarero begins her discussion of natality by returning to The Human Condition. Although the 
text represents only one instance in which Arendt invokes the human capacity to begin, it is here that 
she names the condition of natality as central to political action for the first time. While the book can 
thus appear as providing the definitive account of natality, Cavarero moves slowly through the work, 
seeking clarity in Arendt’s rushed description of natality in connection to the birth of Jesus. While the 
birth of Jesus assumes a central position as one of the disruptive moments of Western history, one to 
which Arendt returns throughout her work, when it appears in The Human Condition it is the subject 
of a misattribution. Though Cavarero concedes that Arendt frequently cited from memory, an attitude 
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that rendered misattributions something of a commonplace in her writing, her misattribution regarding 
the birth of Jesus, so Cavarero argues, warrants examination. Deployed in order to emphasise the 
anthropogenic miracle of birth, Arendt’s turn to the Gospels is intended to serve as evidence of the 
limits of political thought that has far passed over the political implications of the natal moment.20 At 
the close of the chapter on ‘Action,’ she writes:  
 
[The miracle] is, in other words, the birth of new men and the new beginning, the action they are 
capable of by virtue of being born. Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon 
human affairs faith and hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence which Greek 
antiquity ignored altogether… It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most 
glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels announced their 
“glad tidings”: “A child has been born unto us.”21 
 
While one of her clear intentions is to break the link between a discourse of birth and the language of 
theology, her broader project is sketched in relation to the status of ‘human affairs.’ The clarity to 
which natality attains in Arendt’s writing after the war can thus be read as part of her attempt to 
reconcile the ‘human affairs’ of the 20th century, first and foremost that of European totalitarianism, 
without succumbing to a form of existential nihilism. Beyond its application in the immediate context 
post-war era, however, natality signals Arendt’s reorientation of the human condition more generally; 
from one that culminates in mortality to one that centres on the event of beginning.  
Despite the force of this inversion Cavarero resists moving forward with Arendt’s 
misattributed reference to the Gospels. Aware that Arendt ‘often cited from memory, with rather 
imprecise results,’ in this instance Cavarero argues that her infidelity ‘assume a meaning that is far 
from banal.’22 Much of the meaning Cavarero attributes to this moment hinges on the way the child is 
depicted as entering a community. Cavarero clarifies this point by noting that ‘every newborn, each 
 
20 LSA: 6.  
21 HC: 246-7. 
22 ICR: 108 
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human being who makes its entrance into the world – is not born to us coming from elsewhere, but 
instead, according to the Arendtian vision, appears among us here.’23 Implicit in this claim is the 
locative and relational immediacy of natality. Namely, that this is precisely not the appearance of an 
infant from without, who comes from elsewhere, arriving as an autarchic and singular self, but an 
integrally relational and placed appearance. A clear contrast to the grounded account of natality can 
be seen in Peg Birmingham’s remark that natality is ‘the originary event [which] proceeds from 
nothingness.’24 Contesting Birmingham’s description, Cavarero firmly locates natality within the 
context of a plurality. In other words, natality and plurality are not simply conditions that coincide in 
the act of appearance, they are irreducibly linked in a common ontology. Much like the co-becoming 
of earth-world-history that I described in Part I, natality and plurality are bound in a similarly co-
constitutive union. Establishing greater distance still from accounts of natality like Birmingham’s, 
Cavarero describes ‘relation itself as originary and constitutive, as an essential dimension of the 
human, which – far from limiting itself to putting free and autonomous individuals in relation to each 
other, as the doctrine of social practice prescribes – calls into question our being creatures who are 
materially vulnerable and, often in greatly unbalanced circumstances, consigned to one another.’25 
 As an ‘original dimension of the human,’ there is thus a particular accuracy in thinking 
natality in terms of a disclosure; disclosed as such through a set of existing relations. Cavarero 
reminds us that in Arendt’s lexicon, ‘appearance’ is not a generic term but, ‘insofar as appearing 
coincides for Arendt with being in the world and being of the world,’ one with technical 
connotations.26 Appearing coincides with the disclosure of the world and its actors, such that natality 
transforms the ‘web of human relations which exists wherever men live together.’27 While Cavarero’s 
commitment to a project of feminist ethics and a politics of care and dependence will have her 
coordinate her response to Arendt’s misattributed citation in relation to the ‘us’ of ‘among us here,’ as 
a plural and intersectional space of inter-subjectivity, a space in which relations of dependence 
 
23 Ibid.  
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25 Cavarero, 2016: 13.  
26 Cavarero, 2014: 18.  
27 HC: 184.  
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assume a definitive force, Arendt’s ongoing attention to the placedness of natality, the ‘here’ in which 
natality appears hints at a second locative concern. Indeed, it is within this ‘here,’ one that I argue is 
located within the constellation of earth-world-history that the placedness of natality and its 
appearance ‘in place’ is determined. Rather than pursue this line, it is the prior plurality, the ‘us,’ to 
which Cavarero attends. Refusing a narrative of pure immanence, in which the child appears as an 
abstract rupture, both in the sense of who and where they interrupt, Cavarero grounds this moment in 
the matrix of social relations that is Arendt’s ‘web of reality.’ In other words, it is plurality – which 
should be recalled as the ‘law of the earth’ – out of which the child appears.28  
Remaining in proximity to the lived conditions of birth, Cavarero advances her argument in 
relation to the vulnerability and utter dependence of the infant, highlighting the conditions of 
dependence that coordinate the original appearance of natality. As she writes, ‘the scene of birth 
presents us, inevitably, with the absolute exposure of the child, the newborn, the one who announces 
the human condition as substantially vulnerable.’29 What thus appears first and foremost as a pedantic 
clarification of one of the many misattributions in Arendt’s writing allows her to foreground the way 
in which vulnerability is co-present with natality, inviting a conception of political action (the 
realisation of natality) that is simultaneously a realisation of vulnerability. Indeed, excising the 
condition that are co-present in natality – itself the ontological condition for political action – enables 
her to position natality as the affirmation of plurality’s uneven and interdependent formation.30 These 
unbalanced exposures play on the trope of asymmetry, recalling the dependence of the child on the 
parental figure as central to the original moment of natality. What is thus manifest in Cavarero’s turn 
to natality is the ‘desire to prompt a different cultural formation’ in which asymmetry might assume a 
productive and normative status in accounts of political commonality.31 Anticipating the way in which 
I will read the placedness of natality explored in Chapter 2.3 in the final section of this chapter, it is 
clear that once the conditions inherent to the condition of political action are exposed, the realisation 
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29 Cavarero, 2011: 196.  
30 Cavarero, 2011: 196. 
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of action assumes new meaning. In the case of natality’s placedness this meaning will pertain to the 
preservation of place co-present in political appearance.  
Beyond her vulnerability to the material conditions of birth and her exposure in the act of labour, 
Cavarero goes on to stress the enduring bond between parent and child throughout infancy. 
Completely dependent on the care of others, the child signifies the original precarity of community on 
the disposition, or inclination, of others to heed their call. The ‘peculiarity’ of Arendt’s ‘space of 
appearance’ that it ‘comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action’ 
but disappears with their dispersal or the arrest of their activities thus finds an archetypal origin in the 
tenuous union between mother and child.32 What might appear as a metaphorization of natality here is 
in fact the affirmation of the conditions for political community that are formed at the moment of 
birth, chief amongst them an asymmetrical relationality. Without equating motherhood with care, 
Cavarero repositions care as the brick and mortar of ethics, distilling it from a realm of feminized 
labour to a broader ontology of political difference and ethical relationality.33 Recreating certain 
tropes of Heideggerian ethics from Being and Time Cavarero gleans an ethics from the originality of 
care.34 Where Heidegger foregrounds the way in which ‘the conditional and contingent character of 
human life must forever disrupt any effort to forge a doctrine of ethics, and consequently, any ethics 
that is sensitive to this conditionality will not be able to deny its own conditional nature – in other 
words, it must recognise its own questionableness,’ Cavarero would have us privilege within the logic 
of ethics the undeniability of being born from another and dependent upon their care.35 Holding onto a 
similar theme of ‘questionableness’ sits at the core of an engagement with natality both as the 
ontological ground of political action and itself grounded by the broader constellation of earth-world-
history. Again, the inability to totalise the appearance of earth-world-history and locate within it an 
origin or something like an iteration of the fourfold can be felt in Cavarero’s embrace of ontological 
instability.  
 
32 HC: 199.  
33 On the ethics of feminine labour and care see, de la Bellacasa, 2012; 2017; Held, 2006; Tronto, 1993. 
34 This affinity between Heidegger’s use of Sorge and Cavarero’s use of care cannot be explored in greater 
detail here, however I raise this point to emphasize the variety of ways in which care has entered into a 
discourse of ethics.  
35 Schmidt, 2012: 39. On the connection between Heidegger and Cavarero see, Guenther, 2008.  
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The force of Cavarero’s maternal reading appears in her critique of Kantian rectitude, an account of 
appearance that explicitly denies the asymmetrical dependence of mother and child. Indeed, it is her 
challenge to Kant that highlights the depth of her claims in relation to Arendt. She begins this section 
of her work with a reading of Kant’s minor work, ‘Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History.’ 
Citing directly from the text, she actually coordinates the principal salvo of her Inclinations book 
around the Kantian thesis that a conjecture on the beginning of history, while not based exclusively on 
historical records must, ‘if we are not to indulge in wild conjectures…begin with something which 
human reason cannot deduce from prior natural causes – that is, with the existence of human 
beings.’36 Rather than follow Kant with the qualification that this human being ‘must also be fully 
developed [and] have no mother to support them,’ as has become clear, Cavarero’s conjectures on the 
human condition begin with the figure of the mother.37 In fact, what emerges as the paradoxical 
condition of Kant’s conjecture, that independence cannot be thought in proximity to the entity on 
which it was once dependent, is shown by Cavarero to undermine the viability of Kant’s conclusions. 
While Kant seemingly acknowledges the mother as a figure of dependence, for it is she who must be 
denied if conjectures on human independence are to proceed, at this stage her presence is ultimately 
inconsequential.  
This original negation takes a troubling turn for Cavarero when the mother is shown by Kant 
to become an active hindrance to the fulfilment of independence. Kant continues: ‘the first human 
being could therefore stand and walk; he could speak (cf. Genesis 11.20) and indeed talk.’38 The 
mother thus exists as irrelevant to the appearance of the child and their ongoing development, even in 
the context of those skills typically deemed the hallmark of sociability and relationality. Emancipated 
from the caring disposition of others, the Kantian self is free to explore his divinely entrusted skills of 
speech, not, to be sure to develop a conversation based on difference or the specificity of individual 
experience – each subject at the beginning of Kant’s historical conjecture can rightly assume to have 
sprung from the same box of providence – but seemingly to discuss the ethics born of innate and 
 
36 Kant, 1970: 222.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.   
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unreflective privilege. While this prospective conversation may indeed provide the ground for a 
partial rebuttal to the ontological autarchy of the Kantian self, insofar as Kant does not completely 
discount the presence of the other, this is not actually Cavarero’s concern. Here, we see the specific 
need to think in terms of the natal condition, or the conditions for that condition, become more 
apparent.  
 The problem for Cavarero is that Kant develops an account of sociability only after he has 
outlined a condition of selfhood developed in exclusively self-referential terms, a delay that omits any 
possibility of a relational ontology. Indeed, where Arendt locates the capacity of speech as 
performable only within the context of a plurality where others might attest to it and give it meaning, 
Kant claims that speech is a trait already acquired ex nihilio. The contrast between Kant and Arendt, 
as Cavarero sees it, is stark. For Arendt speech, together with action, constitutes ‘the fabric of human 
relationships and affairs. They become “worldly things” insofar as they are ‘seen, heard, and 
remembered.’39 In contrast, Kant’s account of speech, while located in the context of a multiplicity, is 
shown by Cavarero to be the product of an already existing self-determined reality. Cavarero will 
further this argument and link Arendt’s worldly speech with the corporeality of experience, thereby 
‘putting flesh on the bones’ of Arendt’s argument, and linking speech to the guttural realm of the 
voice.40 Developing a philosophy of the voice, she describes the way in which ‘the voice, whatever it 
says, communicates the uniqueness of the one who emits it, and can be recognised by those to whom 
it speaks.’41 The divergence between Arendt and Kant becomes all the more apparent in relation to the 
latter’s unqualified account of speech: 
These are all skills [speaking, walking, talking] which he had to acquire for himself…I 
assume, however, that he is already in possession of them, for I wish merely to consider the 
development of human behaviour from the ethical point of view, and this necessarily 
presupposes that the skills in question are already present.42 
 
39 HC: 95.  
40 Guenther uses this image to describe the way in which Cavarero emphasises the embodied dimension of 
Arendt’s largely disembodied account of natality, 2008: 109. 
41 Cavarero, 2005: 24.  
42 Cavarero, 2005: 222-3 
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What underpins Kant’s claim here is the implicit assumption that methods of learning and, prior to 
that, states of ignorance and hence forms of epistemic vulnerability,y are not ethical concerns, 
certainly not the groundwork for an ethical doctrine.43 Kant’s evasion of an ethics of vulnerability 
proffers the dangerous conclusion that the question of ethics is without application when posed in 
consideration of those individuals lacking in the behaviours of speaking, walking, and talking.  
Cavarero’s insistence on exposing these underlying assumptions in Kant’s account of the 
subject not only exposes the limitations of the methodological framing of his own ethical conjectures 
– namely, that if they presume the status of skilled independence as already given, upon what, if any 
basis can they consider questions of inequality or injustice– it problematises the very foundation from 
which Kant assumes his conjectures to begin. Not only does Cavarero progress a well-established 
politicisation of the private in the pursuit of a feminist ethics then, she also exposes the always already 
political ground of an event so frequently denied entry into conceptions of political ontology. Once 
again then we are reminded of the way in which Cavarero is not simply drawing out a metaphorical 
extrapolation of natality but invested in highlighting what was already political about birth.   
 Beyond the relative ease with which Kant refuses the mother ethical consideration, as either 
an ethical subject or as a figure whose presence conditions the very status of ethics, he reveals a far 
more extensive disapproval of relationships either founded or premised upon states of mutual 
dependence. For Kant, the figure of the self should stand erect, upright and without the interference of 
others, hence Cavarero’s critique of the verticality of the Kantian ‘I.’ The bond between mother and 
child worries Kant because insofar as the child depends upon another, its own independence is 
delayed. Indeed, Kant’s definition of enlightenment as ‘the human being’s emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity’ in infancy reveals an understanding of maturity as premised on overcoming the 
maternal bond.44 In the context of education, Kant misconstrues maternal stimulation of speech as 
baseless affection: ‘when the child tries to speak the mangling of words is so charming the mother and 
nurse that this inclines them to hug and kiss him.’45 While the omission of a gender plurality here 
 
43 On the ethical implications of epistemic injustice see, Fricker, 2007.  
44 Guenther incorporates a similar etymological reading of infancy, in-fans or without voice, to supplant the 
original relationality of birth and childhood, 2008: 2.  
45 Kant, 2006: 16.  
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might lead us to conclude that the female child pronounces her words clearly, it is perhaps more likely 
that Kant is unconcerned with the development of girls. Yet it is the position of the mother, depicted 
her as inclined over her child that allows Cavarero to move past the original maternal condition of 
natality to develop an ethical paradigm. While for Kant the inclined body presents both a literal 
obstacle and moral perversion of the child’s pursuit of reason and morality, for Cavarero it provides a 
geometrical image of the asymmetrical relations that organise a political plurality.  
The force of Kant’s rejection of inclination gestures towards the ethical depth that Cavarero 
will go on to locate in her recovery of inclined or postural ethics. Hence, when Kant describes 
inclination over the child as ‘retarding the process that will free the self from dependence and 
culminate in the figure of the autonomous self – the self, that is to say, who will function as his own 
moral legislator, and who, once he assumes a typically erect posture, will be balanced on the internal 
axis of his own “authentic self,”’ a contrasting image can be seen to form in Cavarero’s mind.46 And 
so, before she even develops the geometrical plane upon which a postural ethics will operate, Kant 
has already provided an imaginary opposition: the political as an aggregate of self-referential subjects, 
free from the obstacle of inclined mothers and careers who seek to obstruct their development. Unlike 
Arendtian plurality, where selfhood coincides with irreducible difference, there is nothing to 
distinguish the vertical ‘I’s of Kant’s multiplicity. Indeed, it is precisely a multiplicity – the multiplied 
projection of identical I’s, morally erect subjects who while they might depend on no one also fail to 
sustain meaningful relations with them – that provides an undeniable binary to the depth of Arendt’s 
relational plurality.  
Cavarero goes further in her pursuit of an originally relational plurality by contrasting the 
depiction of Adam in Arendt and Kant’s writing. Deprived of an infantile state of dependence, As the 
basis for an account human ontology Adam would seem to inspire little other than a world of vertical 
Kantian subjects. Indeed, in words that evoke the original independence of the Kantian self, Cavarero 
cites John Locke’s description of Adam as emerging with ‘body and mind in full possession of their 
strength and reason.’47 Anticipating Cavarero’s suspicion of Adam’s self-sufficiency, Arendt rejected 
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the Adamic origin of humans precisely on the ground of preserving the political integrity of plurality. 
Miguel Vatter goes into even greater detail on Arendt’ resistance to Adam: 
 
For if such a progenitor becomes the model for political association, then this association will 
never be one that begins from the plurality of men. That is why Arendt has no hesitation in 
praising Hobbes, and modern contractarian theory in general, for rejecting the Adamic origin 
of men and replacing it by the state of nature, thus preparing the way for thinking about the 
political from the originary plurality of individuals who form the in-between by way of 
compacts.48 
 
Kant, however, insistent upon a model of autarchic singularity, goes as far as to gesture to Adam’s 
fig-leaf as evidence of original moral uprightness and control over the inclination of sexual desire. 
Distancing himself from the ‘satisfaction of a purely animal desire,’ Kant views Adam’s sartorial 
intervention as evidence of reason and the move away from desire ‘to love, and so also from a feeling 
for the merely agreeable to a taste for beauty.’49  
Yet, what is lost in the rendering of inclined desire into aesthetic consideration is the 
vulnerability of love itself. In Kant’s account love loses its dangerous edge, reducing the other to a 
form of aesthetic immanence, here the loveable subject is no longer met an at angle of inclined 
exposure but viewed as a complete and self-sufficient whole. 50 Challenging this view, when Cavarero 
develops her account of love, it is precisely in reference to those qualities co-present in natality – 
vulnerability, dependence, and exposure – that sustain it. Love is thus defined less in terms of 
aesthetic distinction, but as the affirmation of individual irreducibility, in other words, as the 
impossibility of understanding the other as aesthetically distinguishable. Like the instability and 
 
48 Vatter, 2006: 148.  
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50 Although Arendt’s views on love are mixed, described in The Human Condition as an anti-political 
experience, in her final work The Life of the Mind, she develops an account of love that returns to her doctoral 
work on Saint Augustine. Here she follows Augustine that love is the affirmation of the self, amo: volo ut sis, I 
love you: I will that you be. On the diverging accounts of love in Arendt’s writing see, Chiba, 1995; 
Tamboukou, 2013; Tatman, 2013. 
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irreducible origin of earth-world-history, love functions as the affirmation of natality’s intrinsic 
otherness. Recovering a language of maternal inclination so dismissed by Kant, Cavarero thus 
describes two lovers, as following a path of inclination, who ‘want to embrace the full splendour of 
the finite according to the reciprocal uniqueness that exposes and distinguishes them in the with. 
Loving each other, they are simply reborn to the inaugural and relational fragility of their existence.’51 
Love thus becomes a way to reinvigorate what was so intrinsic to the condition of natality. This point 
will be central to the realisation of natality in overcoming the exilic condition in Chapter Six.  
 Remaining in the proximity of love, the distance between Cavarero and Kant on the ethical 
force of inclination is put into greater clarity still. In the context of sexual desire, Kant cautions that 
inclination can erode the very viability of happiness. Belabouring the importance of rectitude, he 
writes in the Critique of Practical Reason, that ‘an upright man cannot be happy if he is not first 
conscious of his uprightness.’52 States of inclination, which Cavarero would remind us are present 
both in the inclination of the carer over the vulnerable and the vulnerable toward the carer and thus 
irreducible to questions of power, become for Kant an obstacle to the very fulfilment of happiness. 
Pushing further at this point a line can be drawn to Kant’s propositions regarding the historical 
development of man in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.’ Told through the 
image of a forest, Kant creates an ominous image of trees who, ‘by seeking to deprive each other of 
air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and 
straight – whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from others, grow 
stunted, bent and twisted.’53 Kant sees the pursuit of support, of trees that ‘put out branches at will,’ 
inclined towards their peers in the attempt, perhaps, to overcome isolation, as an aesthetic perversion 
of the natural order. In contrast, those trees that seek the privation of their peers are compelled 
upwards, their abuses seemingly necessary in the pursuit of moral rectitude. If the spectre of Kant’s 
trees is the basis of ethical uprightness, it is the gnarled and twisted trees that populate Cavarero’s 
geometry of ethical inclination that celebrates the otherness of relational plurality.  
 
51 Cavarero, 1997: 21.  
52 Kant, 1996: 233.  
53 Kant, 1991: 46. 
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3.2 Natality as Postural Ethics 
To be born from a (m)other has an ontological consequence. This is the claim on which Cavarero’s 
recovery of the maternal rests. Where the centrality of the maternal figure has already been brought to 
the fore, clarified in the distance it establishes from the traditional Kantian depiction of verticality, 
here I want to unpack the implications of her presence. While for Kant the negation of the mother 
enabled him to develop a form of ethics that hinged on the centrality of the morally erect subject, for 
Cavarero the subject of ethics is distinguished by their inclined geometry. Establishing greater 
distance still then, Cavarero’s embrace of (maternal) inclination opens up a paradigm in which to 
think the intersection of inclined bodies who turn themselves outward from the moment of birth in an 
ethical praxis of shared dependence. Cavarero advances her argument via a close reading of the 
painting that adorns the English language translation of her book, Inclinations (2016). Indeed, it is her 
analysis of Leonardo’s oil painting The Virgin and Child with Saint Anne (1503-19) that forms the 
visual basis for her geometrical plane of ethical relationality.  
Relying on the inclined postures of the painting’s three figure, what is embedded within 
Cavarero’s description is a reflection on the intergenerationality of natality.54 This connection to the 
role of natality in linking generations will be central to later chapters on the force of natality not only 
to disrupt the movement of time but create lasting bonds between generations. She describes the 
painting: 
 
Mary is at the centre of the canvas, leaning forward, bent over her son, seated on the lap of 
her own mother, Anne. Anne, in turn, inclines her head slightly toward Mary, and also, 
following the axis of oblique gazes traversing the portrait, toward baby Jesus. Jesus, 
meanwhile, leans against his mother’s leg, holding a lamb, a symbol of the passion and 
sacrifice that awaits him…Leaning over baby Jesus, as if to spare him from his fate, the 
 
54 For a close reading of the historical implications of Cavarero’s ‘inclined’ reading of natality see Benjamin, 
2020.  
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Virgin Mary holds his hand and body with on ordinary gesture of maternal care. Unbalanced 
along her own axis, she noticeably inclines herself.55  
 
Caught between two positions, the image of Mary as swaying between a past and future personified 
by mother and son invokes Arendt’s depiction of past and future as intersecting axes which meet and 
rupture in the present. Cavarero’s use of geometrical language is perhaps best anticipated by Arendt in 
the latter’s reading of Kafka’s parable ‘HE.’ Here the eponymous ‘he’ is depicted in a fight with ‘two 
antagonists’ who confront him from ‘behind’ and from ‘ahead.’56 In Arendt’s account, the scene of 
the story is the ‘battleground on which the forces of the past and the future clash with each other.’57 
And where Mary serves as the pivotal figure for Cavarero, as the one who captures the state of 
inclination that gives meaning to the arrival of the newborn, Arendt’s concern is with ‘he,’ the one 
without whom the meeting of past and future would pass without consequence.  
 Holding onto the image of Mary’s inclined body and the way in which it feeds into an ethics 
of inclination, I want to reread Arendt’s historical geometry, supplementing her description of the gap 
between past and future as co-present with the realisation of natality’s placedness. Returning to 
Kafka’s story then, she writes: 
 
The antagonistic forces of past and future are both indefinite as to their origin; seen from the 
viewpoint of the present in the middle, the one comes from an infinite past and the other from 
an infinite future. But though they have no known beginning, they have a terminal ending, the 
point at which they meet and clash, which is the present. The diagonal force, on the contrary, 
has a definite origin, its starting-point being the clash of the two other forces, but it has 
resulted from the concerted action of two forces whose origin is infinity. This diagonal force, 
whose origin is known, whose direction is determined by past and future, but which exists in 
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its force toward an undetermined end as though it could reach out into infinity, seems to me a 
perfect metaphor for the activity of thought.58  
 
If thinking serves as the metaphorical index for this collision, it is the condition of natality that 
determines its potential. Unlike Kant’s conjectures on the beginning of history, Arendt’s reliance on 
the notion of a ‘definite’ origin echoes the paradox of Heidegger’s origin in the work of art: there can 
be no substantive origin without a simultaneous consideration of the conditions that make conceptions 
of the origin possible. Though ‘definite’ there is an intrinsic irreducibility at the origin. Hence, there 
can be no account of the ‘origin’ of natality without offering a simultaneous account of those 
conditions that give rise to it. Caught between past and future, Cavarero’s image of Mary recalls the 
ineliminable connection of the present to those generations that precede and follow it.  
 Even as natality remains embedded in the plurality of historical generations, its appearance as 
a beginning is not diminished. Recognising the relational temporality of natality simply recalls what 
figured for Cavarero as the relational ontology of natality. Indeed, for Matthias Fritsch, the injunction 
to acknowledge the present as a beginning enjoins a singular responsibility, namely that ‘we must see 
ourselves as only one generation among many others before and after us, while also seeing ourselves 
as unique in being singled out by a special responsibility.’59 Returning to Cavarero then, the fact of 
this responsibility is shown to exist at birth. When she describes the infant’s cry as ‘an invoking life 
that unknowingly entrusts itself to a voice that responds,’ to respond in the negative is not simply to 
absolve oneself of responsibility and care but to denigrate the original relationality that connects the 
unknowing infant to something other than themselves.60 In other words, an ethics of response is 
inherent to the very ontology of natality, and this is true whether that natality is read within the 
context of an immediate plurality or distended through a historical plurality, across generations, and 
perhaps even space. James Baldwin similarly attests to the cry as indicative of the child ‘having opted 
against solitude.’61 Kant offers a seemingly inverted reading of the infant’s cry, one that attests to this 
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self-referential ontology and the convergence of verticality, moral uprightness, and freedom. In 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, he suggests that the child enters the world with loud 
cries, because at this inaugural moment they have recognised the profound injustice that is ‘the 
inability to make use of its limbs as a constraint, and thus [in sobs] it immediately announces its claim 
to freedom.’62 Again, that the child has an innate grasp on the notion of freedom is moderated through 
Kant’s admission that he has, if not a developed sense of freedom, ‘an obscure idea’ of it. For 
Cavarero, Kant’s prejudice against the newborn and insistence on ‘the model of an autistic ‘I’ that 
legislates and obliges itself, a vertical and steady I,’ undermines the capacity of politics to be 
informed by questions of otherness and responsibility.63  
 Structurally aligned with the formation of political communities, natality inheres in the 
unfolding of politics toward the future, away from the past. Retaining an intergenerational link, the 
meaning of the past moves through natality as part of its ontological condition. And yet, this meaning 
remains partial, remedied by the necessary inclination that moves action away from the past towards 
the future. Unbalancing the axis of the past, unseating the normative force of tradition, natality 
problematises the givenness of what will inhere into the future, ensuring that it is newness that 
assumes structural primacy in the unfolding of history. The declarative claim of James Baldwin that 
‘we are history’ attains to a critical force here.64 Indeed, the same sentiment appears in Arendt’s 
depiction of natality as creating ‘the condition for remembrance, that is, for history.’65 While we are 
our history, a fact that emerges in the context of natality, the realisation of this human status always 
already recalls the plurality of generations from whom we born. Which is merely to say, that insofar 
as being born of another, or Adrienne Rich reminds us, ‘of woman born,’ history always inheres in the 
formation of the present.66  
What others have called the ‘belatedness’ of natality does not, however, mean passive 
resignation to history – Arendt’s insistence on the social pariah as antinomy to historical or cultural 
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expectation is testimony to this.67 Like the inclined Madonna, the pariah moves outside of history’s 
claim, unbalancing the present without succumbing to the future as a space of pure instrumentality. 
The arrival of the child, who appears ‘among us here’ unleashes a new beginning, one that fate cannot 
prophesy, nor the past overpower. As the stage of initium is set, it is done in presence of otherness, 
vulnerability and dependence. In this space ‘humanity as a whole delegates itself in the world and 
receives from the world confirmation of its own being as well as its fragility.’68 Sown into the fabric 
of beginning, fragility establishes natality as a beginning without end, the durability of which depends 
on the support tended by others. If all this is gleaned from Cavarero’s reframing of natality’s existing 
coordinates, the question arises as to whether rethinking the locative ‘here’ might yield similarly 
provocative glimpses into what Arendt’s politics might possess. Responding to this qualification feeds 
into the question I answer in section 3.3: ‘what does it mean to be born-in-place?’  
Arendt was not oblivious to the obligations of intergenerational dependence raised by 
Cavarero. Her essay ‘The Crisis of Education’ is structured around an engagement with the 
responsibility generations have to posterity to ensure the survival of the world.69 In the same essay she 
actually points towards the states of vulnerability around which Cavarero develops her postural ethics. 
Beyond the claim that the world must be prepared for the ‘onslaught of new generations,’ Arendt 
enjoins an injunction from birth, one that cannot ‘be turned over to the special science of pedagogy,’ 
but must continually be confronted. This injunction is the condition of natality, which persists as a 
feature of existence insofar as ‘we have all come into the world by being born’ and are called upon by 
those who seek our care.70 Refraining from naïve sentimentality, Arendt recognises that to respond to 
this call is a matter of choice. She thus concludes her essay on education with the admission that 
‘education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility 
for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of 
the new and young, would be inevitable.’ 71 Once again, this appearance of love in the context of 
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ethics and the affirmation of the world as a locus of potential brings us closer to the argument of 
Chapter Six.   
Further advancing her reading of Arendt as a figure of inclination, Cavarero describes the act 
of turning to face the arrival of children as an instance of inclined ethics. Here the response to the 
‘onslaught of the new’ coincides with the affirmation of natality and plurality. Indeed, Arendt’s 
comments on inclination, in addition to the implicit inclinations of natality, provide Cavarero with a 
point of semantic entry into Arendt’s writing. Similarly motivated by a reading of Kant, in Arendt’s 
1965-66 course on Kant’s moral philosophy, Arendt describes the act of inclining oneself in terms of 
a relational ontology: ‘Every inclination turns outward, it learns out of the self in the direction of 
whatever may affect me from the outside world. It is precisely through inclination, through leaning 
out of myself as I may lean out of the window to look into the street, that I establish contact with the 
world.’72 Beyond an ontology of the self, Arendt’s comments equally attest to the relational 
foundation of reality. Yet for Cavarero interpretations of this inclined and relational conditions of 
plurality and reality cannot be separated from a consideration of the maternal, for it is here that the 
spontaneity of those conditions of political worldliness are grounded in the condition of natality. And 
so, Cavarero is emphatic about the displacement of primacy from the child to the others before whom 
the child necessarily appears, reminding us that it is the mother ‘who earns herself a prominent role in 
the augural scene.’73  
Cleaving together the relationality that is so central to the condition of being born with the 
irredeemable fact that it is the mother’s exposed vulnerability who makes this moment possible, a 
particular framing of that relational paradigm assumes form. Namely, that while relationality is 
always already present in the condition of being born so too is an ineliminable status of dependence.  
Recovering Arendt’s inversion of Kantian inclination, the condition of natality can be rethought as the 
condition of ‘leaning out.’ More than simply an inclination towards the others who populate my 
presence, Cavarero’s depiction of natality’s ‘leaning out’ can be refracted through history. The 
condition of being born, to return to Arendt’s essay on education, implicates action in the progression 
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of history and the anticipation of the future. Read through a Derridean lens, Matthias Fritsch describes 
the natality as a gift something that cannot be returned to one’s parents but passed on ‘only to a third 
party, a future generation.’ He clarifies this point, going on to note that while ‘one can only give birth 
because one has been born of others…this does not make giving birth a mere species reproduction, a 
handing down of the “same” gift one received.’74 Recognising that this would diminish the 
unpredictable and disruptive appearance of natality, Fritsch complements Cavarero’s reading of 
natality and embeds it within a scene of plurality, simultaneously reaffirming a moment of relational 
ontology as it renews it.   
Guenther similarly articulates natality in terms of a gift. Like Fritsch she puts this framing of 
natality to work in service of an intergenerational ethics. Remaining close to Cavarero’s organising 
concerns of vulnerability and otherness, she develops an avenue unexplored by Fritsch, one that calls 
to mind the complexity of thinking the ‘origin’ or event that natality signifies. In an account of 
natality that would seem to simultaneously interweave the relationality of Cavarero and the historicity 
of Heidegger’s Dasein, she writes: 
 
To be born is to be given to Others, such that I do not choose my own origin; further, it is to 
be given in responsibility, such that I do not merely “choose” to be good. I wish to recognize 
in the gift of imperative – and not merely the choice of an autonomous subject – to pass on 
this gift of time and responsibility. Perhaps it is only by giving to Others that we may recall 
the givenness of our own birth, precisely in its immemoriality.75  
 
The immemorial event of natality, which sits paradoxically outside of me as an event experienced by 
others and yet at the very centre of ‘who’ I am as the central condition for my own being, divests the 
self of any claim to a totalized sovereignty. Precisely because we are born of others and remain, in a 
certain way, indebted to them as contingent to the very performance of our own natal condition, the 
‘gift’ of being born coincides with the injunction to receive others. As Guenther goes onto write, the 
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intermingling of giving and receiving in natality conspire in such a way that ‘the givenness of birth 
suggests that my existence is not quite my own, that my time is already bound up with the time of the 
Other.’76 Recalling that for Benjamin our coming was ‘expected on earth,’ Guenther reaffirms the 
recurrence of natality and plurality throughout time.77 Each of these points regarding natality, its 
atemporality and ‘gift-like’ quality yield greater clarity still when read in connection to Cavarero’s 
maternal account of natality. As the meaning of postural ethics as co-present in the event of natality 
are brought into sharper relief via accounts of history like those of Fritsch and Guenther, the richness 
of Arendt’s natality as a source of both politics and ethics is made apparent.  
 
3.3 The fore-right of being born-in-place  
In an apparent turn away from the earthliness of natality and its embedding within the plural 
constellation earth-world-history, the previous two sections have sought to show how the redemption 
of another figure who, while largely absent from Arendt’s reflections on natality – and hence from 
literature on natality – is nevertheless essential to its formation. More than simply an instrumental 
figure, however, recentring the role of the maternal incurs a radical extension of natality’s ethical 
import. Returning to the role of the maternal and responding to the question ‘what does it mean to be 
born,’ thus establishes the ground on which to think an ethics of relationality. Framed in this way, 
answering the question on the meaning of birth becomes a provocation of those ethical paradigms that 
pass over the fact that humans are all born of a (m)other.  
Played out on Cavarero’s geometrical plane, this renewed interrogation of the maternal figure 
highlighted the ethical implications of action given its affinity to both natality and plurality. In other 
words, not only does action occur in spaces of original plurality, that scene is prefigured within a 
space of perilous inclinations, in which each subject exposes themselves and inclines towards the 
other in an act that precipitates both unpredictability and vulnerability. Redeeming the role of the 
maternal figure, Cavarero exposes the depth of natality’s meaning while also positing an explicit 
challenge to the logic of Kantian verticality in which the figure of moral rectitude assumes prime 
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position. Yet ‘postural ethics’ form just one axis of ethical relationality drawn from natality. 
Responding to the question of space and the ‘earthliness’ of natality uncovered at the end of Chapter 
2, in this concluding section I want to clarify the placedness of natality and the ethical import of the 
question ‘what does it mean to be born-in-place?’  
 It is important to remember here that the role the earth plays in the conditioning of natality is 
not fixed. The earth, beyond the ebb and flow of its appearance between concealment and 
unconcealment, is only disclosed as a locus of ontological meaning in its relation to world and history. 
Once again then, to think the earth is to think the oneness of earth-world-history. I make this 
clarification because I want to emphasise that the form of rights yielded by the fact that we are born-
in-place persists as a right-to-placedness. With this subtle movement from the question of place to 
placedness what assumes a central position is the active component of place, namely the way in which 
it comes into being as place. Rather than evince natality as the foundation of the right-to-place, the 
right-to-placedness enjoins the agonistic tension of both Heidegger and Arendt’s understanding of 
earth and world while also recalling the intrinsic movement or agitation in earth-world-history. And 
so, as I advance a reading of natality as inaugurating a set of rights that inhere that original question of 
earth-world-history as place, it is with this concern for the agonism of place in mind. Indeed, this 
ambivalence regarding the status of place, which is understood to depend upon the sustained practice 
of dwelling and hence the ongoing realisation of that right-to-placedness anticipates Chapter Four 
where the affirmation of natality coincides with precisely this renewal of earth-world-history.  
 The proximity of natality to questions of rights was invoked in the previous chapter’s 
discussion of totalitarianism and its attempt to determine admission to earthly appearance. Recalling 
this attempt to qualify the right-to-placedness, Arendt described one of the central contentions of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism as the attempt to provide a new political principle that would ensure human 
dignity as an earthly construct.78 For Arendt the need for a right before all other rights became 
apparent in the wake of totalitarianism, when the destruction of human natality coincided with the 
negation of human rights. As Serena Parekh notes what Arendt was responding to was the relative 
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impotence of rights, namely that they ‘were not inalienable, but rather radically contingent.’79 
Countering the impotence of this claim to inalienability, Arendt clarified her thinking in relation to 
natality, taking what had appeared only notionally in her dissertation to new lengths, hence the appeal 
to an earthly construct of human dignity.80 With this renewed turn to human natality as one of the 
ontological conditions for the being of being human, what Arendt put into relief was the specifically 
ontological crime of totalitarianism: its challenge to the placedness of natal plurality.  
And yet, for others responding to Arendt’s discussion of rights and the ethical force of 
dignity, the centrality of the earth as a grounding construct slips from view. For instance, when Peg 
Birmingham, whose work on the intersection of natality and rights is perhaps the most prominent in 
this field, asks if Arendt provides the substantive ground on which to engage the question of rights, 
she simultaneously poses this question in terms of place and neglects the question of place. 
Birmingham’s question then, as to whether Arendt’s thought provides ‘any normative basis for the 
“right to have rights” that is, for a universal right to belong to a political space’ can be read as 
anticipating my own inquiry: what does it mean to be born-in-place?81 Yet while Birmingham invokes 
the spatial quality of rights in her question, her answer rests almost exclusively on the temporality of 
natality; namely, that it is an-archic quality of natality that affirms the logic of rights. While the 
question of natality’s temporality is indeed central to its realisation, something that I explore in closer 
detail in Chapter Four, it is the force of natality’s placedness that provides a more compelling ground 
to the logic of rights.  
 Making explicit what Birmingham leaves under-explored gives rise to an account of rights as 
proper to the placedness of natality. In other words, returning to Arendt’s first extended reflections on 
the political condition of natality in The Origins of Totalitarianism, a text where she discusses both 
the political principle of beginning and history’s attempts to qualify life’s being-in-place, provides the 
framework in which to think not only the fore-right of rights but the right-to-placedness. Without 
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rewriting Arendt’s position after the fact, the tropes of earth-world-history are latent in her own 
reflections on the right to have rights. Before Arendt finds an ontological remedy to the question of 
rights in the fact of human natality and hence the intrinsic right to appear, she describes the ‘calamity 
of the rightless’ in terms of the denial to belong to any community. Putting into further relief the 
spatiality that is implicit to the construct of the political community, which exists in concert with the 
‘space of appearance,’ Arendt makes a point that is pivotal to the argument here: ‘the fundamental 
deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world 
which makes opinions significant and actions effective.’82 Arendt could not be clearer: to be without 
rights is to be denied the realisation of the right-to-placedness. Indeed, the placed quality of rights – 
the right to appear, move, assemble, relocate, asylum, and migration – mark not simply the proximity 
of rights and place but their original inextricability.83 Moreover, to be denied the right-to-placedness 
is to be denied that specific human capacity to disclose oneself. Recalling Heidegger’s language of 
disclosure from Chapter One, eroding the potential to disclose meaning from one’s placedness erodes 
the meaningfulness of place itself. Read in dialogue with Cavarero and the condition of plurality as 
co-present with placedness, the destruction of place as a locus of meaningful dwelling coincides with 
the destruction of plurality. Forced to occupy a space in the world in which the placedness of action is 
unrealisable, not only does the subject without rights lose their claim to placedness so too does the 
very structure of rights more generally.  
As Arendt unpacks the deprivation of rights under totalitarianism, she turns both to the 
political principle evinced in natality and to the ontological fact of human earthliness. While it is 
already clear that natality cannot be thought apart from the earth, it is the realisation of natality in the 
world and as the condition of historical remembrance that recalls the ineliminable connection between 
natality and earth-world-history.84 Hence, it is not simply freedom to inhabit the earth as a species-
being that entails rights, nor the right to live within the limited ideological confines of a totalitarian 
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world that accords with the realisation of rights.85 Rather it is the specific set of rights – the right-to-
placedness – within the manifold plurality of earth-world-history that sets up the paradigm in which to 
think rights. Arendt enjoins the language of the constellation throughout The Origins of 
Totalitarianism writing that ‘history and nature have become equally alien to us, namely, in the sense 
that the essence of man can no longer be comprehended in terms of either category.’86 The extent of 
this alienation becomes apparent in her reading of Sputnik seven years later in The Human Condition 
discussed in Chapter 2.1.  
Remaining in the context of The Origins however, Arendt cautions that humanity cannot be 
relied upon, in its alienated state from ‘life itself’ and the constellation of nature and history to 
provide a substantive basis for rights. Anticipating the lack of ethical grounding in the ‘future man’ of 
The Human Condition who relates only to those conditions he has created for himself, she describes 
the post-war situation ‘in which “humanity” has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature 
or history’ as producing a similar scenario: ‘in this context that the right to have rights or the right of 
every individual to belong to humanity should be guaranteed by humanity itself.’ She then cautions: 
‘it is by no means certain whether this is possible.’87 Implicit in Arendt’s claim here is the argument 
that the abstract entity ‘humanity’ cannot be relied upon to guarantee a framework of human rights. as 
she notes, ‘one fine day’ a highly organised ‘humanity’ might conclude that ‘for humanity as a whole 
it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof.’88 What is thus necessary is a substantive basis on 
which to ground the fore-right that is the right to have rights or, what I prefer to think as the right-to-
placedness, that is, the right to appear and give meaning to the human condition of being born-in-
place.  
 
85 Arendt’s discussion on the distinction between the subject excluded from the law and the prisoner, 
particularly in regard to their freedom of movement clarifies this point. Namely, that while the prisoner has less 
freedom of movement, they exist within a set of rights – indeed, their imprisonment rather than banishment 
from a community of rights signals their inclusion within the logic of rights – the one whose appearance in-
place is no longer meaningfully realizable has no freedom. Hence, Arendt describes their freedom of opinion as 
‘a fool’s freedom’ for having been denied appearance in a plurality ‘nothing think matters anyhow’ (OT: 387).  
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Establishing this affinity between the placedness of rights and the condition of being born-in-
place can be put into greater relief via a return to Arendt’s discussion of loneliness, a phenomenon 
that I introduced in Chapter Two as the ‘essence of totalitarianism.’89 Indeed, if the latter coincided 
with the absolute negation of rights, it was the insidious expansion of loneliness, which corrupts the 
integrity of natality and plurality – those conditions for political appearance and hence anathema to 
loneliness as such – that established the groundwork on which this perversion of rights could occur. 
Before the first loss of the rights, identified by Arendt as the loss of homes, which ‘meant the loss of 
the entire social texture into which they [the recently rights-less] were born and in which they 
established for themselves a distinct place in the world,’ what took hold was the sense of loneliness. 
Not simply the experience of solitude or isolation, but the inability to appear within a plural matrix in 
which meaning is the product of unconcealment, loneliness anticipates what it is to be denied the 
right-to-placedness. Hence, ‘the calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness…but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever.’90 
Namely, it is not the deprivation of those measures that affirm the quality of life that distinguishes the 
loss of rights, but deprivation of the conditions through which the placedness of natality is realised 
that marks their loss. This point becomes clearer once it is recalled that mere existence is not the 
activity proper to earth-world-history, but to the ontologically deprived space of a fixed entity, like 
the ‘World’ of totalitarianism which assumes an organising logic unto itself or the biological earth in 
the life of the animal laborans.  
Arendt provides an example of the danger that befalls humanity when it forgets ‘that man is 
only the master, not the creator of the world.’91 On the attempt to qualify the definition of the ‘human’ 
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If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and nothing else, he loses along with 
his right to equality that freedom of action which is specifically human; all his deeds are now 
explained as ‘necessary’ consequences of some ‘Negro’ qualities; he has become some 
specimen of an animal species, called man.92  
 
While the individual immediately deprived of human rights and dignity here is clearly the ‘Negro,’ 
what is equally apparent is that any qualification of the human status yielded through the 
disqualification of human plurality undermines the very integrity of politics as such. Indeed, Arendt 
writes that such a community will ‘end in complete petrifaction.’93 Parekh clarifies this point by 
returning to the coincidence of self-disclosure in action, a mode of appearance that realises both 
natality and plurality: the conditions for politics as such. Once again connecting the question of place 
with that of rights, Parekh describes the rightless as ‘having been deprived of a place in the world for 
meaningful speech and action…and so must be treated according to ‘what’ they are (Jew, Communist, 
homosexual, etc.)’94 Unable to act in a meaningful way, in a way that would accord with their right-
to-placedness, Parekh concludes that ‘the impossibility of self-disclosure is an essential feature of 
rightlessness.’95 
It is worth reiterating the connection between this argument and the earth-world-history 
constellation once again. There can be no permanence in this constellation, which assumes presence 
in what Heidegger calls the ‘strife’ of ongoing ontological agonism. Caught within a plurality of 
forces that become, that indeed are, only within a web of co-becoming, earth-world-history exists 
paradoxically as an archive of history and the gap between past and future in which history or 
meaning is made. Simultaneously moving forward in time yet retaining a claim to anachronism 
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through ongoing redemptions of what was or what was present only in absence, earth-world-history 
insists on the irreducibility of relationality to a moment or an encounter. Out of this entangled co-
being natality appears. Already an ontology of being is declared. When Arendt writes concisely in the 
German addition of The Origins of Totalitarianism that the life of the rightless is characterised as ‘the 
abstract nakedness of being human’ she describes a life that does not exist within this constellation.96 
To return to the earthliness of human existence is not to return to this life of abstraction but to one of 
original, irreducible difference. The ‘unqualified, mere existence’ of the rightless is the product of the 
enforced, ontological fixity on earth, world, and history; spaces in which reality has been ossified by 
the force of alienation.  
If Cavarero’s recovery of the maternal figure enables her to prompt a reconsideration of the 
ethical paradigm latent in natality, such that the realisation of natality in action might coincide with 
the affirmation of plurality and vulnerability, the recovery of natality’s placedness might now be seen 
to provide a similarly substantive foundation to the question of rights. Without exploring the meaning 
of this placedness which forms a central condition of natality, which to recall emerges ‘among us 
here,’ the meaning of those acts – like totalitarianism and the production of the rightless – that operate 
at their most basic level to uproot, displace, and disqualify earthly life is diminished. 97 When 
Birmingham thus presents the claim that ‘crimes against humanity are crimes that attempt to eradicate 
plurality from the face of the earth,’ without interrogating the force of this location, she leaves open 
the question as to why it matters that crimes against plurality occur on earth. 98 And yet, much like 
Arendt’s insistence that the event of birth is not simply a metaphorical basis for natality but intrinsic 
to its very meaning, neither can the sustained emphasis on the intersection of earth and plurality be 
overlooked; if only for the reason that Arendt’s combats the earth-qualifying, world-denying logic of 
totalitarianism with a claim that human rights are an abstraction of the pre-political right to have 
rights, a right that is enshrined in human plurality, itself ‘a human, earthly product.’99  
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Bringing natality and the earth into dialogue with one another, indeed by showing natality as 
conditioned by the pre-political presence of the earth, and hence as always already in dialogue with 
the earth, greater insight is afforded into those actions ontologically grounded in natality and the 
contestations of natality seen in totalitarianism or the production of the rightless more generally. That 
the climate crisis now assumes a central role in diminishing diminish claims to place through the 
destruction and degradation of urban and natural ecologies reinforces the need to ground a basis of 
rights in something like the unchosen condition of human placedness.100 Moreover, by continually 
thinking the framework of rights to which the condition of natality gives rise as the right-to-
placedness and hence as distinguished by the ongoing affirmation to claim place and affirm a mode of 
dwelling in earth-world-history, the question of rights assumes an ontological weight that cannot be 
reduced to the mere provision of land. Reducing appearance to the question of immanent space rather 
than meaningful place undermines the original conditions of placedness and plurality that coordinate 
what it means to appear in place (namely, to be born-in-place) in the first place. What is thus essential 
to the placedness of natality is the capacity to continually claim place as meaningful.101 
What has been brought into renewed consideration throughout this chapter is precisely this 
question of natality’s placedness. Going beyond an exegetical reading of natality’s placedness, I have 
followed the methodological paradigm of Adriana Cavarero to highlight the way in which natality 
informs the nature of action, the realisation of plurality, and more broadly the framework for human 
rights. Answering the original question ‘what does it mean to be born-in-place’ thus cannot be thought 
apart from the substantive ground of rights that it yields nor the relational ontology of plurality that it 
affirms. Exploring the full force of this question and these attendant considerations is the task of 
Chapter Four where I explore in detail what it means to realise natality and bring into renewed 
meaning the earth-world-history constellation into which it is placed. Where this chapter has thus 
outlined the way in which earth-world-history is prior to and in part conditioning of natality and the 
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attendant spaces of rights, action, and ethics, Chapter Four aims to shed greater light on the way in 
which these ideas assume political force.  
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 Chapter Four: Being-in-Place – The faculty of Natality 
 
 
In the second half of Part II, I want to bring into relief the exact modality through which the right-to-
placedness is realised, reframing the question from Chapter Three, ‘what does it mean to be born-in-
place’ to ‘what does it mean to be-in-place?’ This transformation from an inquiry into the condition of 
being born to one that pertains to the fact of having been born, moves from a pre-emptive discussion 
about the anticipatory potential and meaning of birth in the right-to-placedness to the effective 
realisation of that potential and its meaning. Returning to the themes of dwelling and action, this 
chapter recentres the constellation of earth-world-history as the locus brought into being (or 
unconcealment) through the actualisation of natality. Building on the previous section of Part II, 
where the project was to locate within a ‘placed’ account of natality the grounds on which to think a 
structure of human rights, this chapter extends that claim to placedness in the realisation of place 
through the faculty of natality. Before I outline the exact movements of this chapter, I want to 
confront the risk of circularity that threatens to overwhelm the revelatory force of natality. Insofar as 
earth-world-history both precedes and conditions yet relies on and is reaffirmed by natality, clarifying 
the nature of disclosure and natality’s unpredictable force is central to the force of my argument going 
forwards.   
 In Chapter Three, I relied upon Adriana Cavarero’s parallel inquiry into the condition of 
human natality to highlight the way in which the conditions of natality can inform a broader political 
matrix incorporating ethics, plurality, and rights. In her critical rereading of natality, Cavarero 
explored the meaning of being born of a (m)other, ultimately offering an answer in terms of natality’s 
reaffirmation of plurality and an ethics of vulnerability, one that she called a ‘postural ethics.’1 What 
this meant in terms of those actions that coincide with the realisation of the natal condition was the 
reaffirmation of plurality as a locus of vulnerability and dependence, tropes which Cavarero framed in 
terms of an ‘asymmetrical relationality.’ Here the danger of Cavarero’s work being reduced to a 
circularity arises: natality is conditioned by its appearance within an asymmetrical plurality, one that 
 
1 ICR.  
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informs the ethical paradigm to which natality gives rise; in turn, the performance of natality – the 
realisation of that political condition of beginning – is coeval with the reaffirmation of human 
plurality and the inclined and asymmetrical nature of relationality. In essence then, natality both 
emerges from and latterly reaffirms the same set of ontological conditions. Cavarero returns to Arendt 
to remedy the apparent risk of circularity of a pure and immanent repetition by emphasising natality’s 
intrinsic unpredictability: beginnings are always radical breaks, the consequences of which cannot be 
known in advance.2 While it is plurality that reappears in natality, it is the paradoxical nature of that 
re-appearance as intrinsically original and hence unrepeatable that identifies it as such. Arendt’s 
definition of plurality as the fact that ‘we are all the same…in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live’ serves as a further remedy.3 For Cavarero, it is 
the introduction of a geometrical imagination that proves to be a particularly salient tool here: in 
contrast to the cyclical renewal of earth-world-history which would lend itself to the image of the 
ouroboros, Cavarero’s reliance on intersecting lines to visualise natality’s interruptive new beginnings 
functions as a challenge to the limits of an ontological circularity.4 
 While natality is itself then marked by a set of extant conditions, it perpetually and 
unpredictably alters what those conditions are.5 An echo can be heard here to the agnostic movement 
that Heidegger first saw within the manifold conditions of the fourfold, which never remain the same 
yet persist in their ‘oneness’ by virtue of their change.6 Or, borrowing from Heidegger’s language of 
unconcealment, the disclosure of the self through natality is never a totalising event but one that 
points to a greater and unexplored depth. Yet what first appears as natality, or even as the fourfold or 
Arendt’s conception of place, always already appears out of an existing set of organising relations. 
Weaving together this existing web of human relations from which the event of birth and the 
 
2 ICR: 112. On the Heideggerian origins of those mode of ontological inquiry that overcome ‘circular reasoning’ 
by returning to the ontic primordiality of concepts themselves see Villa, 1996: 113-117; see also, BT: 7-13. 
3 HC: 8. 
4 In apparent anticipation Cavarero’s use of a geometrical language, in The Life of the Mind Arendt also relies 
on a geometrical plane to visualise the break made by natality’s action (LMT: 208).  
5 HC: 9.  
6 The ‘unstillable’ quality of the fourfold can be felt in Heidegger’s use of the present continuous to describe it: 
dwelling, preserving, presencing, all point to this sustained and outwards force towards unconcealment (PLT: 
148).  
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condition of natality emerge with the meaning and change signalled by this event informs the richness 
that Arendt sees within the second political condition of plurality. As she writes in The Human 
Condition, the disclosure of who someone is and ‘the setting of a new beginning through action, 
always falls into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt.’7 Yet rather 
than re-iterate this existing web, the disclosure of who someone is, which is simply the realisation of 
natality, starts ‘a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, 
affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom [the disclosed] comes into contact.’8 As the 
two conditions for political action as such, the insistent claim of natality and plurality to originality 
and unpredictability yields a form of politics premised upon the eradication of stagnation and an 
emphasis on the new. Indeed, Arendt’s emphatic appeal regarding the unique newness of the self’s 
disclosure (or unconcealment) will be central to the way in which I explore what I see in this chapter 
as a similar affinity between the unpredictable renewal of earth-world-history and the faculty of 
natality.  
 To summarise the overarching premise of Part II then, as I move forward from Cavarero’s 
exegesis into the implications of natality’s appearance within an ethical paradigm for which it is both 
origin and affirmation, is the claim that earth-world-history – the place of natality’s dwelling – both 
precedes and is dependent upon natality. Rather than be reduced a collapsible circularity however, 
what this connection invokes is the agonism of Heidegger’s original depiction of earthly concealment 
and Walter Benjamin’s irreducible account of the origin. Indeed, in Benjamin’s ‘stream of becoming’ 
through which earth-world-history is continually brought into unconcealment, natality figures as those 
‘eddies’ that make becoming recognisable as such.9 Remaining with Benjamin, in this chapter I want 
to think the unconcealment of earth-world-history in natality through the paradigm that Benjamin sets 
up in his use of political theology as a praxis of critique. Whilst it may appear a somewhat esoteric 
choice of methodology, Benjamin’s political theology in fact offers a prescient mode of critique in 
which the object of criticism is also that which is sustained via critique. Rather than evince a 
 
7 HC: 184 
8 Ibid.   
9 OGTD: 45.  
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theocratic logic then, political theology provides Benjamin with a way of thinking that operates 
outside the limits of existing doctrine. Made possible by virtue of his rejection of an original, 
mediative presence of a divine figure, Benjamin sees within political theology a set of principles that 
resonate with the an-archic beginnings of natality.10 Indeed, his rejection of the necessity to position 
political theology in the service of theological law and the force of theocratic scripture is central to his 
secularisation not simply of the theological praxis but his recasting of messianism within a secular 
paradigm. In fact, it is the centrality – and secularism – of Benjamin’s messianism that will be pivotal 
to my reading of natality’s actualisation within the earth-world-history constellation.  
 Attaining to an understanding of natality that accords with Benjamin’s account of messianism 
coordinates the overarching project of this chapter. Having already established the placed quality of 
natality in Chapter Three, I have already gone someway in showing the link between action – the 
product of natality – and place. Namely, insofar as action occurs in place, it realises the intrinsic 
placedness of being. The affinity between natality and place thus exists in terms of being born-in-
place and acting-in-place. And so, I begin this chapter not with Arendt whose writing I have already 
clarified but with Benjamin whose methodology of political theology warrants clearer explanation.11  
Mirroring the structure of Chapter Three then, this chapter begins with a discussion not of Cavarero’s 
methodology but Benjamin’s, outlining the way in which political theology can be used as a mode of 
critique. In section 4.2 I illuminate the potential of this methodology through the specific faculty of 
messianism, which Benjamin qualifies as a ‘weak’ potential endowed in each generation.12 Taking 
seriously this qualification of messianic ‘weakness,’ I return to a dialogue with Cavarero on the tropes 
of vulnerability and asymmetrical plurality, creating space in which to think through the implications 
 
10 On the an-archic function of natality see, Birmingham: 2007.  
11 While the initial inclusion of a theological language could be seen to prematurely curtail discussions of 
earthly action, evident for instance in the Gnostic equation of the earth with fallenness, Benjamin approaches 
political theology less in order to evince a teleological end to action – as in one proposed through theistic 
intervention – and rather to highlight the necessary earthliness of a theological project. What is thus central to 
Benjamin’s account of political theology is the inherent fact of place that, quite literally, grounds the project of 
politics. Instead of forsaking the earth for an otherworldly redemptive realm, Benjamin imbues the weak 
messianism of human action with an inextricable earthliness, what thus emerges as messianic renewal cannot be 
conceived apart from its earthly context. On the intersection of place and religion see Boscaljon, 2016; Hopkins 
et al, 2013; Medietta, 2011; Stump, 2008.  
12 SW4: 390.  
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of Benjamin’s introduction of messianism as an inherently earthly and intergenerational faculty.13 
Anticipating section 4.3 in which I present a messianic reading of natality, section 4.2 presents a 
reading of Benjamin’s varying qualifications of messianism as implicitly reinforcing the centrality of 
earth-world-history as the locus both preceding and sustained via natal (and messianic) action. In the 
final section I show how natality shares a common affinity with Benjamin’s weak messianism as a 
praxis of worldly renewal. Complicating the linear movement between earth-world-history and 
natality, here I employ Anne O’Byrne’s investigation into the temporality of natality. O’Byrne’s 
invocation of natality’s belated claim to meaning and the ‘syncopated temporality’ to which it gives 
rise advances my earlier analysis in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of Benjamin’s fragmented history.14 
Articulating an account of time that is both delayed and revolutionary, I return to that original 
agonism of earth-world-history to highlight the way in which the faculty of natality interrupts and 
renews time, giving rise to an asynchronous conception of earth-world-history.  
 
4.1 Political theology: Benjamin’s godless theology 
The proximity of Benjamin’s work on political theology to that of Carl Schmitt threatens to 
undermine its application in the context of an emancipatory project. Published in 1922, Schmitt’s 
reflections on sovereignty in Political Theology proved influential on Benjamin, and while the 
dialogue sustained between them as interlocutors on the theological resonance of modern politics has 
been subject to much debate and contestation, Benjamin considered himself methodologically 
indebted to Schmitt. When Benjamin sent Schmitt a copy of his 1930 publication The Origin of the 
German Tragic Drama, he credited the legal theorist’s exploration of sovereignty in Political 
Theology as formative of his own thinking.15 Further relaying his compliments, Benjamin testified 
 
13 A brief reference is made to this aspect of Benjamin’s discussion on the intergenerationality of history in 
Matthias Fritsch’s reflections on the earthly ethics of responsibility. Although the language of messianism is not 
explicitly incorporated into his reflections on the obligations linking generations, Fritsch nevertheless relies on a 
similar language of history’s claims and the asymmetry of the ‘gift giving’ that is the passing over of earthly 
presence. See Fritsch, 2018: 91-98.  
14 O’Byrne, 2010.  
15 The letter is translated by Samuel Weber in his reflection on Schmitt and Benjamin (1992, 5). While the letter 
was published several years prior to that in Benjamin’s Collected Writings edited by Rolf Tiedeman and 
published in 1980, it was left out of Benjamin’s Correspondences collated by Scholem and Adorno and 
published in 1966.  
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that it was Schmitt’s modes of research in his later writings that had confirmed Benjamin’s own 
methodological entry into research in the philosophy of art. When Benjamin’s correspondence was 
first published in 1966, this letter was left out. For Adorno and Scholem who collated the 
correspondence it served as an unnecessary link between two thinkers for whom political theology 
would serve diametrically opposed purposes. For Schmitt this would be advocating for an 
authoritarian state and the necessary existence of a legal-political order, one that was violently 
realised under Nazism, while Benjamin advanced political theology towards revolutionary politics, 
taking a ‘messianic perspective that regards the legal-political order as destined to wither away.’16 The 
affinity between their political theology thus falls away at the point of application. And so, while a 
connection existed between Benjamin and Schmitt at the level of theoretical concern and the shared 
conviction that ‘in spite of secularisation, political phenomena are to be understood primarily in light 
of certain theological concepts and images,’ it cannot be argued that this led to the realisation of a 
common project.17  
Rather than reignite a debate around the varying degrees of divergence and convergence in 
their writing, a task already initiated by Ellen Kennedy’s controversial 1987 article on the affinities 
between Schmitt, Benjamin, and other members of the Frankfurt School and later duly rebutted by 
Martin Jay and Ulrich Preuss, my task here remains concentrated on the specifics of Benjamin.18 
Beyond the rather straightforward way in which Benjamin develops a political theology that refers to 
the ‘(re)appearance of theological figures of thought in a political sphere that has become exposed to 
processes of secularization and neutralization,’ the specific nuance of his project in fact works against 
the subsumption of politics to legal instrumentality.19 It is the latter mode of critique that distinguishes 
– and complicates – his project and to which I will return in close detail in Chapter Five. Part of 
Benjamin’s rejection of political and legal instrumentality (notions largely embodied in the image of 
‘the law’) hinges on his development of a ‘godless’ theology, one in which the mediative presence of 
 
16 Ibid.  
17 de Wilde, 2011: 365.  
18 Kennedy: 1987; Jay: 1987; Preuss: 1987. On Benjamin’s renewed application of Schmittian concepts see, 
Bolz: 1989; Heil: 1996; Weber: 1992. 
19 de wilde, 2011: 366.  
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the theological figure is removed and the subject of the logos, no longer coordinated in terms of an 
omnipotent God, turns to engage the problem of the origin.  
I have already addressed some of the ways in which Benjamin complicates the degree to 
which the origin can be identified as an isolated moment. Putting into further relief Benjamin’s 
interrogation of the origin, I want to introduce his framing of the origin in theological terms, namely 
as an anarchic instance embedded within a broader matrix of historical forces. Part of this account of 
the origin allows Benjamin to establish a critical distance between theology and the suspension of 
critique in the face of dogmatic scripture.20 The force of this point will continue to emerge throughout 
this chapter. In essence though by holding on to the distinction between Schmitt and Benjamin, the 
revolutionary force of Benjamin’s political theology can be felt: where Schmitt saw in political 
theology a framework through which to reinstate the necessity of legal orders, namely as the 
omnipotence of God reinscribed as a juridical frame to ensure state sovereignty over the people, 
Benjamin saw the framework into which he might interpolate a Marxist appeal for revolution.21 
Rather than preserve the law, Benjamin’s intention was to break it. That being said, to reduce 
Benjamin’s relationship to political theology to the service of fracturing legality would miss much of 
the nuance with which Benjamin incorporated it throughout his political writings. The perhaps overly 
quoted and certainly enigmatic reference that Benjamin makes to political theology as ‘saturating’ his 
thinking is thus worth taking seriously as a provocation regarding the extensive use of political 
theology in his writing and the limitations that arise in viewing it simply in reference to the structure 
of law or as antithetical to Schmitt.22  
Gerhard Richter describes the self-conscious refusal of Benjamin’s writing to provide stable 
concepts as itself a mode of resistance. Political theology proves to be no exception, which Richter 
describes as ‘a variegated and heterogenous reservoir of discourse and reflection in [Benjamin’s] 
corpus’23 And so, when Benjamin writes in convolute ‘N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of 
Progress]’ of The Arcades Project that ‘my thinking is related to theology as blotting paper is related 
 
20 OGTD.  
21 On the distance between Benjamin and Schmitt see, Butler, 2012; de Wilde, 2011; Weber, 1992.   
22 AP: 471.   
23 Richter, 2016: 40.  
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to ink. It is saturated with it. Were one to go by the blotter, however, nothing of what is written would 
remain,’ it is perhaps unsurprising that the reader is left with rather more perplexity than clarity 
regarding the status of the theological in Benjamin’s writing.24 While a section of 20th century thought 
has relied on the discourse of political theology ‘to reconfigure both religion and politics in a new 
democratic constellation,’ Benjamin’s conceptualisation of political theology reveals an 
understanding of its application that cannot be readily subsumed under the secularization of 
theology.25 And though Benjamin is not alone in exploring the complex resonance of political 
theology in this way, the singularity of his work does reveal something particular about his own use of 
the term.  
Part of the particularity of Benjamin’s status as a political theologian stems from a tension 
implicit in ‘Jewish theology’ generally. Unlike Schmitt’s basis in Catholicism and the givenness of 
Christ as a mediative figure, who was later interpolated into the system of sovereign statehood in 
terms of the centrality played by legal governance, Benjamin’s relationship to a theological figure is 
premised on an im-mediacy. In other words, where the trespassing of theological concepts into the 
political inhered for Schmitt ‘the centrality of sovereign power to decide,’ for Benjamin the equation 
of theology with the organising omnipotence of a sovereign overlooked the anarchic project of 
theology as a praxis of critique.26 In other words, the theological is not coterminous with dogma – an 
equation which, for Benjamin, is to be found in the institution of religion – instead theology opens up 
rather than closes down the meaning of politics. The nuance of this claim pivots on a distinction at 
work in Benjamin’s writing between the religious and the theological, moving from the operative 
force of political theology as the secularization of theology in political society to political theology in 
service of revolutionary critique. And yet, even this task of distilling the theological from the religious 
 
24 This translation, now standard, is provided by Eiland and McLaughlin, see Benjamin, AP: 471. Richter also 
calls our attention to the earlier Hafrey and Sieburth translation (1989: 61): 
 My thinking relates to theology the way a blotter does to ink. It is soaked through with it. 
 If one were to go by the blotter, though, nothing of what has been written would remain. 
25 Vatter, 2020: 1. On the resurgence of political theology at this time see, Gordon, 2013; Hammill and Lupton, 
2012; Kaplan and Koshar, 2012; Stroup, 1987. 
26 Vardoulakis, 2009: 125.  
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is fraught. Insofar as Benjamin departs from a tradition of Jewish theology, the enduring presence of 
an organising theological figure must be confronted.  
Hans Jonas captures this difficulty in his reflection on Jewish theology in the essay, ‘The 
Concept of God after Auschwitz.’ Although he writes in broad brushstrokes and misses much of the 
complexity of Christian thought, the general distinction he is drawing is between the world as an 
intermediary before the Kingdom of God and the world as itself godly. He writes: ‘To the Christian 
(of the stern variety) the world is anyway largely of the devil and always an object of suspicion – the 
human world in particular because of original sin. But to the Jew who sees in “this” world the locus of 
divine creation, justice, and redemption, God is eminently the Lord of history’ and hence the world 
must be contended with as the immediately theological.27 In other words, there is no other divine 
space that might be contemplated through the mediative presence of God. Taking this further still, 
Gillian Rose contends that ‘there is no Judaic theology – no logos of God.’28  
A far more fruitful conversation on political theology can be found in the intellectual 
friendship of Benjamin and Gershom Scholem given that both shared a common investment in the 
role of the messianic in Jewish traditions.29 Remaining within a far more religious setting, Scholem 
saw Jewish theology as a praxis that enabled the sort of critical political engagement seen as 
necessary within his social milieu of exiled German Jewish intellectuals, while at the same time 
advancing a program specific to the Jewish religion. This later orientation of theology was anticipated 
in the succinct account of theology that he provided in his memorial speech for Franz Rosenzweig in 
1930 in which he located theology in the service of ‘concrete questions’: 
 
As for theology, the discipline ... that deals with man's innermost and darkest needs, that 
seeks to bare the riddle of his concrete existence and show him the deed he must do in order 
to uncover the path leading from creature to Creator theology is not a science of the essence 
 
27 Jonas, 1987: 3.  
28 Rose, 2017: 178.  
29 Scholem, 1995; see also Eddon, 2006; Mosès, 2009.    
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of the divinity beyond creation but consists rather of the eternal questions of love and will, 
wisdom and ability, judgment and mercy, justice and death, creation and redemption.30  
 
While Scholem would advance this study of political theology in the direction of restoring an intimate 
proximity to God, it nonetheless reveals his recognition of an anarchic potential in political theology 
(one that Benjamin will realise in the context of weak messianism).31 Consistent with the redemption 
of Heidegger’s divinities from their theocratic setting, Benjamin’s theology invests the immediacy of 
human worldliness with a form of theological potential. Worldliness thus becomes a space of creation 
and anarchic beginning, not following the word of God but advancing precisely that Arendtian claim 
of unpredictable and plural beginnings, namely, the faculty of human natality.  
Establishing greater distance still between the project of Benjamin’s political theology and the 
centrality of God in both religious doctrine and classical theology, Richter turns to the etymological 
distinction at work between theology and religion. Playing on the imperatives at work in religion and 
theology, Richter positions theology far closer to the ontological-political stakes that will form the 
foundational basis on Benjamin’s critique of modernity. Without imposing a metaphysical basis on 
Benjamin’s writing, Richter’s highlighting of an original etymological distinction allows the 
revolutionary dimension of Benjamin’s theology to come into greater relief.  
 
Theology is derived from the Greek theologia, itself comprised of théos (God) and logos 
(study, sense, speech); it is the study of God or Gods and the scholarly engagement with the 
sources, scriptural or otherwise, undergirding belief. Religion, by contrast, derives from the 
Latin religio. According to Cicero, religio derives from relegere, meaning to regarter, to 
reconsider, to reread; but according to according to Lactantius’ later account, religio derives 
from religare, meaning to re-bind, and, by extension, to re-bind oneself, through faith, to the 
Divine.32 
 
30 Scholem, 1988: 26.  
31 Scholem, 1995: 3; 19.  
32 Richter, 2016, 42. Arendt presents a similar discussion of religare in ‘What is Authority?’ (BPF: 126).   
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Although Richter goes on to say that for Benjamin both elements are at play, namely, scholarly 
engagement and a rebinding of the self, the figure of the divine as the locus of study is replaced with 
the more expansive concern for that which undergirds belief. And so, what appears as the object to 
which faith is reaffirmed is the pursuit of scholarly study itself, which beyond its Judaic setting in an 
original plurality – the Jewish study group or chavruta requires at least two participants – is 
reinscribed as a belief in the potential for worldliness. Extending this reading of Benjamin’s theology 
back into the Heideggerian strife at play within the existential analytic earth-world-history, Richter’s 
description of theology as ‘that which generates writing, belief and presentation, while thinking…is 
there to cancel, to erase, to undo, to extinguish’ yields new force. 33 The unfixable status of the origin, 
which Benjamin had already addressed in The Origin of the German Tragic Drama illuminates 
Richter’s distinction here; the theological poses an interruption and in so doing inaugurates a new 
beginning. It is perhaps here that the link between natality and the politics inherent in theology or, at 
the very least, theology as understood by Benjamin, can be discerned. 
 Pursuing this link to the origin illuminates the resistance of Benjamin’s theology to the logic 
of religion, I want to return to a citation first reference in the Introduction:   
 
Origin, although an entirely historical category has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis 
[Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent 
came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and 
disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming.34 
 
If Benjamin’s theology inheres as both scholarly engagement and the rebinding of the self to the 
object of inquiry that Richter describes, the status of that object as perpetually one of ‘becoming,’ 
unleashes him from the fixity of dogmatic religion. The ‘origin’ that organises theological study is 
thus precisely not the figure of the divine but the continual opening up of what it means to engage in 
 
33 Richter, 2016: 49-50.  
34 OGTD: 45.  
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such critique. Benjamin’s relationship to ‘God’ thereby becomes the basis for an anarchic ground of 
experience, hence the investment of divine power in the act of revolutionary beginning. Without a 
fixed origin, the divine act of creation cannot be subsumed into the finitude of instrumentality. A 
particularly insightful overlap can be felt here once again with Jonas’ account of God.35 Where Jonas 
heralds ‘becoming God,’ he invests a fundamental anarchy into the theological. In Jonas’ account, the 
status of God was so affected by the act of creation that God is now to be understood in terms of a 
continual relation to the object of creation, which itself persists as an entity of perpetual change, reset 
with the coming and going of generations. Ceding self-containment, ‘becoming God’ serves as an 
object only insofar as such scholarly engagement recalls the immediacy of the world as fraught with 
change. 
 As a praxis of engaging becoming, Benjamin’s theology reveals its proximity to thinking the 
unconcealment of earth-world-history, itself a form of becoming, particularly as that unconcealment is 
actualised through the faculty of natality. Indeed, by further clarifying Benjamin’s anarchic 
relationship to the notion of the origin, a parallel can be uncovered with Arendt’s reflections on 
thinking.36 Where Benjamin invokes the perpetual movement of becoming in the anarchic ground 
from which origins emerge, one which reappears in the methodological frame of political theology as 
perpetually without origin but always working within a notional origin, Arendt describes the process 
of thinking as one of perpetual ‘rethinking,’ where the object of thought resists identification. Relying 
on the image of Penelope’s web, Arendt describes the movement of thought as that which ‘undoes 
every morning what it has finished the night before. For the need to think can never be stilled by 
allegedly definite insights of “wise men”; it can be satisfied only through thinking, and the thoughts I 
had yesterday will satisfy this need today only to the extent that I want and am able to think them 
anew.’37 Locked into a temporality of relationality, the becoming-God and the thought object persist 
as provocations, unknowable and locatable only in practice. From Benjamin’s theology we thus learn, 
in Richter’s terms that the ‘unyielding vigilance of thinking… must take account of the very 
 
35 Jonas: 1987. 
36 LMW: 109-110.  
37 LMT: 88. 
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conditions that first make thinking possible.’38 Mirroring the fragility of earth-world-history which 
remains in flux with the coming and going of generations, who interpolate meaning anew, theology 
progresses on the presumption of a foundational precarity. And yet, rather than undermine the project 
of theology tout court, the inter-articulation of theological thought and change, namely, its perpetual 
claim to renewal, reorients theology away from dogmatism to the anarchic ground of the origin. 
Without the threshold of religious or eschatological ends as prescriptive to the project of theology, 
Benjamin’s political theology assumes methodological primacy in the organisation of revolutionary 
anarchism.  
The force of this point can be made via a return to Schmitt. Schmitt’s preoccupation with the 
theological omnipotence of legality leads him towards the preservation of sovereign law in violence, 
what Benjamin comes to understand in the ‘Critique of Violence’ essay as mythic violence.39 In the 
essay he describes mythic violence in its archetypal form as ‘a mere manifestation of the gods. Not a 
means to their ends, scarcely a manifestation of their will, but primarily a manifestation of their 
existence.’40 The immanent proximity of godly existence to the dogmatic force of that presence 
reappears in Schmitt’s political theology in the relation between the sovereign and the law. For 
Benjamin this renders the law inextricable from the means, which Benjamin identifies as inherently 
violent, that make and preserve it. What thus appears in the essay as the mythology of ‘law-making’ 
and ‘law-preserving’ violence, each of which emanate from the presence of violence as the organising 
origin of the law, is countered by Benjamin’s unpacking of a political theology without proscriptive 
means and organised around the absent ground of anarchic potential.41 A clear example of the former 
is apparent in the use of police force, particularly where the origin of police law is the preservation of 
racial segregation and is thus sustained through ongoing practices of racial oppression and 
marginalisation.42 Unable to rid the law of its violent essence, which operates as its origin, the law 
operates as the mediative force linking the omnipotence of the sovereign and the people. Whether the 
 
38 Richter, 2016, 57.  
39 Sw1: 248-252. 
40 SW1: 248. 
41 The exact force of this point will be explored throughout Chapter Five and in section 5.4 specifically.  
42 Benjamin includes a brief discussion on the violence of the police in his essay on violence, see SW1: 243. On 
the intersection of race and policing see, Felker-Kantor, 2008; Muhammed, 2010.   
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rule of the sovereign is benevolent or not is beside the point for Benjamin, who sees within the violent 
origin of the law the loss of anarchic potential.  
In contrast to the frontiers imposed by mythic violence, Benjamin develops an account of 
‘divine violence,’ which disrupts the normativity of the law without imposing a new framework.43 
Recalling the anarchy of the origin, divine violence functions as the domain of the messianic. Playing 
on the distinction between messianism’s destruction of the law in divine violence and the violence of 
law-making through a reading of the godly injunction, ‘thou shalt not kill,’ Benjamin makes clear the 
non-coercive claim on action made by the messianic. Indeed, it is the proximity of this commandment 
to the principle of justice rather than that of power that distinguishes the primordiality of the 
commandment to a discourse of violence. In other words, not only does the commandment precede 
the crime of murder, the meaning of ‘thou shalt not kill’ persists whether or not murder occurs. 
Organised around the role of justice rather than retribution, the commandment resists the punitive 
force of mythic violence and highlights a way in which to conceive the theological apart from the 
force of theocratic law. The theological dimension at play here thus unfolds ‘not as a criterion of 
judgment, but as a guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in 
solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it.’44 Moving 
against Schmitt, Benjamin sees a mode of divine violence in theology that exposes and brings to an 
end the dialectic corrupting encounter of law-preserving and law-making violence; hence the priority 
of the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ Laying claim to action, the commandment becomes the 
basis on which to think the meaning of action, not the force of its transgressive retribution.  
Maintaining this complication of the law, Benjamin extends his discussion to reveal the 
violence as it operates in the context of history. Rather than simply locating the law as the exercise of 
power over oppressed minorities, Benjamin locates its presence as unfolding across time, dissembling 
the status of the law’s victim and its preserver. Identifying what he calls the normalisation of the ‘state 
 
43 Derrida stages a challenge to Benjamin’s position here arguing that a divine force can be located in the law-
making institution as justice. The foundation of the law is then not coeval for the oppressive force of mythical 
violence but attains to a form of mysticism in the name of justice. See Derrida, 1992. For an extended 
commentary on Derrida’s critique of Benjamin see; Sinnerbrink, 2006; Zacharias, 2007. 
44 SW1: 250.  
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of emergency’ Benjamin appeals to a form of divine violence whose object is the mythic violence of 
historical normativity. The nature of this violence will be made stark in Chapter Five as I explore the 
historical violence of the climate crisis and its ongoing negation of the other through the exilic 
condition. Anticipating the project of the next chapter then, it is Benjamin’s indictment of what he 
calls historical ‘progress’ that makes patent the need act ‘into’ history and ‘wrest tradition away from 
conformism’ (and exile).45 Michael Löwy describes this encounter with history as giving political 
theology its aim, namely ‘to achieve no less than a new understanding of human history.’46 In an 
attempt to realise this project Benjamin turns to the theological trope of messianism.  
Once again forgoing a mode of thinking determined by religious study of a mediative godlike 
figure, Benjamin incorporates a weak messianism into political theology, moving from an 
understanding of the Messiah as the completer of history to an idea of messianism as a human 
faculty.47 Responding to the claim of the past, weak messianism coincides with historical materialism 
to disrupt the movement of past into present. This rupture in the linearity of history exposes the 
belated claim of the past over the present, thus effecting Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’ and 
reintegrating past, present, and future in the manifestation of divine justice.48 It is precisely this 
rupture that hints at the potential of Benjamin to be read within the context of the climate crisis in 
which the past exerts an organising force over the present, not least in terms of the violent structures 
that maintain the crisis but in terms of the as-yet unrealised appeals for climate justice. In Chapter 
Five, I will address this directly through the language of history’s ‘after-lives’ and thinking in terms 
of a contrapuntal plural temporality.49   
 
4.2 Weak Messianism as praxis of Political Theology 
With weak messianism Benjamin establishes himself at a critical distance from accounts of 
messianism that operate in the service of God and hence as defined in terms of the realisation of 
 
45 SW4: 391.   
46 Löwy, 2005: 1.  
47 SW4: 390.   
48 AP: 10.  
49 Afterlives of history is a notion that Benjamin reflects on in his writing on translation, yet here I am 
borrowing more specifically from Saidiya Hartman’s use of the term, Hartman, 2007.  
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religious salvation. In place, messianism is put to work as the anarchic – and secular – beginning that 
will break away from the historical atrophy preserved in the violence of history’s ongoing 
normativity. Rather than contend with the religious domain of the Messiah, Benjamin’s discussion of 
the messianic, one which is tempered by the qualification of this secular faculty’s intrinsic weakness, 
allows him to develop a sophisticated account of the messianism that appears in the context of human 
action. Once again emphasising the latent worldliness of his argument, one which hinges on the 
potential fulfilment of a Marxist revolution, Benjamin’s weak messianism serves as a motif for the 
enduring potential not only for worldly action but for the historical nature of that action to reorient the 
givenness of the present. Anson Rabinbach thus describes the goal of Benjamin’s messianic thought 
as not ‘simply a redefinition of Jewish culture. [It] also emphasized a certain kind of intellectuality as 
politics, a spiritual radicalism that aimed at nothing less than “total transformation” of the individual 
and society.’50 With his investment in secularization Benjamin makes a clear departure from the 
religious structures to which others, like Scholem, remain bound.51  
In ‘On the Concept of History,’ Benjamin describes messianism in terms of the oppressed, its 
task, as noted, to ‘wrest tradition away from conformism.’52 Following this claim, Raluca Eddon 
positions messianic redemption in Benjamin’s writing as his ‘revolutionary idea par excellence.’53 
Elsewhere, David Kaufman describes Benjamin’s weak messianism in terms of a suspension of ‘the 
horrific train of “progress” by redeeming (and therefore fulfilling) the hopes of the past. Thus, the 
hopes and desires of the downtrodden serve as incomplete figures of redemption,’ their emancipation 
entwined with the openness of the present.54 While the messianic in Benjamin’s writing lends itself to 
ready secular interpretation as a mode of ‘rebeginning,’ in which messianism becomes synonymous 
with the disruption of historical continuity, this move glosses over some of the more particular 
elements to which Benjamin ascribes this faculty of human messianism. In much the same way then 
that I resisted the metaphorization of natality in Arendt’s writing, I want to challenge a similar 
 
50 Rabinbach, 1997: 30. 
51 A discussion of religion can instead be found in Benjamin’s critique of capitalism, see SW1: 288-291.  
52 SW4: 391. 
53 Eddon, 2006: 263 
54 Kaufman, 2001: 172. 
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indexical reduction in Benjamin’s writing. Taking seriously the conditions that Benjamin stipulates in 
regard to messianism then, not simply its ‘weakness,’ but its appearance in the coming and going of 
each generation on earth, I want to move slowly through its development in his writing, anticipating 
at each turn the ways in which it will reappear in Arendt’s writing on natality.   
While the critical distinction at play in Benjamin’s writing between theology and religion has 
already been outlined, it is worth unpacking this differentiation as it pertains to messianism. Although 
Benjamin’s writing was pivotal to the extension of theological thought beyond the parameters set up 
by Schmitt, Eric Jacobson highlights that by the 16th century a radical transformation had already 
taken place in regard to the exceptionalism of the messianic figure.55 His study of the intellectual 
friendship of Benjamin and Scholem, Metaphysics of the Profane, begins with an account of this 
earlier disembodied or emancipated messiah.56 Hence he points out that three centuries prior to 
Benjamin’s writing, the human figure had already assumed a very active and central role in its own 
redemption.57 Even here, however, the original features of Jewish messianism remained; like the 
Messiah, the messianic figure was understood as ‘without features, yet performing distinct, 
predesignated historical acts.’58 This type of discourse on the humanist form of the messianic is 
reflected in Benjamin’s use of messianic tropes without succumbing to the necessity of the Messiah.  
Central to Benjamin’s appropriation of messianism is his own displacement of the messianic 
from the individual figure of redemption, the Messiah whose appearance is passively awaited, to a 
power weakly endowed in each generation. Dispersing this messianic potential across a generational 
plurality, one that is enriched if recalled in relation to Cavarero’s intergenerational ethics of 
inclination, the realisation of messianism becomes the task of acting in concert. Borrowing from 
Arendt’s vocabulary of the plurality of action, in which acting in concert is the modus operandi 
through which new beginnings are recognised as such, Benjamin’s transference of messianism onto 
the people signals a similar investment in plurality.59 The appearance of the messianic is thus 
 
55 Jacobson, 2003. On the history of the Messiah see: Neusner, 1987: 59-80.  
56 For further discussions of this intellectual partnership, particularly in the context of messianic thought, see: 
Mosès, 2008; Styfals, 2019; Taubes, 2016.  
57 Jacobson, 2003: Footnote 16, 239. 
58 Jacobson, 2003: 24. 
59 HC: 179-180. 
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described by Löwy not as a ‘question of waiting for the Messiah, or calculating the day of his 
arrival…but of acting collectively.’60 Benjamin makes this point in the second thesis of ‘On the 
Concept of History’: ‘Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak 
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.’61 Returning again to Cavarero, Benjamin’s 
description of the claim made by the past brings into further relief the ethical implications of being 
born of a (m)other. Even before the placedness of this appearance is brought into question – a quality 
that Benjamin himself addresses in his appeal to the earthliness of generational appearance – the 
explicit reference he makes to an intergenerational obligation extends Cavarero’s original ethical 
exegesis. What this means in terms of the question ‘what it means to be born of a (m)other’ is 
immediate: the fact of being is always already conditioned by its relation to the other to whom it has 
an ethical relation. Heidegger invokes a similar ethics of response in his ‘Letter on Humanism’; 
namely, that every appeal from the other, while it may be ignored and discredited, is nevertheless 
heard. 62 To not respond or, in Benjamin’s terms, to deny the claim of the past is thus already to 
infringe upon that conditional guideline for action’s appearance. Here the meaning of the 
commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ can be felt again. To appear in relation to another is to already be 
in an ethical relation with the other, such that every transgression of that relation coincides with the 
mythic violence of oppression. 
Advancing the secular pluralism of Benjamin’s weak messianism, a similar qualification is at 
play regarding the object of messianic redemption. Responding to the provocation that is the past’s 
claim on the present, Benjamin locates the ‘spark’ which flames messianism’s realisation in relation 
to the narrative of the oppressed. Again, what emerges as a central point of consideration here is the 
function of history as a site of violence. Rather than confront the sovereign subject as the figure of 
violence, it is the exclusionary hegemony of history that is challenged. Against the imposition of this 
historical frontier, in which the oppressed are denied historical appearance and the right to 
remembrance, messianism assumes a redemptive function. Recognising the oppressed and reorienting 
 
60 Löwy, 2005, 33.  
61 Ill: 246.  
62 Heidegger, 1976.  
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the givenness of the present, messianism – including the context described by Benjamin – offers up 
unimagined possibilities in an era described by Jayne Svenungsson as ‘permeated by philosophical 
pessimism about the possibility of radical political change.’63 Anticipating the messianic project of the 
next chapter, this ‘radical change’ will reappear in the critical historiographies Saidiya Hartman, 
Christina Sharpe and Kathryn Yusoff, each of whom read history against the force of racialised 
exclusion to which popular histories of the climate crisis frequently yield.64  
In each of these contexts, the practice of critical historiography parallels Benjamin’s 
messianic project of interrupting history and reaffirming rupture as the trace of human spontaneity, a 
power to create which itself can be understood as a form of messianism. Maintaining this claim to 
history’s capacity to be retold, Benjamin overcomes the danger of instrumentalising the narratives of 
those dispossessed by historical conformism. In other words, instead of rewriting history with the 
teleological goal framework coordinated around an ethos ‘for the sake’ of history’s oppressed, the 
messianic force of Benjamin’s historical materialist assumes worldly implications.65 Challenging the 
idea of a Hegelian dialectic of historical progression, Benjamin counters the very premise of progress, 
writing in The Arcades Project that one of his methodological objectives is ‘to demonstrate a 
historical materialism which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress.’66 He goes on to 
explain that this is precisely because the ‘founding concept [of historical materialism] is not progress 
but actualization.’67 Historical materialism thus ‘aspires to neither a homogeneous nor a continuous 
exposition of history.’68 In the context of the messianic rupture what is brought into being is history as 
an open space of creation. And so, anticipating once again the next section of this chapter, the fact 
that Arendt describes those actions that attest to natality as creating ‘the conditions for remembrance, 
 
63 2016: 154. It is worth noting that Svenungsson’s reflections on messianism draw not from Benjamin and 
Scholem but Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Giorgio Agamben, a diversion from the seemingly more classical 
Jewish writers that highlights the extent to which political theology has been incorporated into seemingly more 
secular texts.  
64 Sharpe, 2016; Yusoff, 2018.  
65 Avoiding this instrumentalization of oppression and victimhood will be central to the concluding section of 
Chapter Five in which I seek to join others in decolonising the Anthropocene without simultaneously co-opting 
narratives of oppression ‘for the sake’ of historical or political emancipation.  
66 AP: 460. 
67 Ibid.  
68 AP: 470.  
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that is, for history’ reveals a direct link to Benjamin’s inauguration of history in acts of weak 
messianism.69  
Examining this link to Arendt’s writing, I want to unpack Benjamin’s emphasis on the 
plurality of messianism and its occurrence across multiple generations. Indeed, this transition of 
messianic potential reaffirms Benjamin’s rejection of sovereign omnipotence, further differentiating 
his project from that of Schmitt – or even from more religious projects such as Scholem’s. This is 
important because it signals the ongoing project of history, both in a sense that diverges from 
eschatological or utopian narrative of history as ‘completable’ whilst simultaneously holding onto a 
sense of historical movement in the perpetual renewal of meaning. Hence, the historically totalising 
appearance of the Messiah, who ‘completes all history,’ is replaced by Benjamin with weak 
messianism, dispersed across humankind, displacing not only the singularity of the messianic and its 
appearance from without, but allowing it to be read in the context of human history.70 Benjamin’s 
aversion to a narrative of theological redemption is implicit in his claim that the ‘storm of progress’ 
that sweeps the present back into the future blows from Paradise.71 His resistance to this biblical 
tempest, becomes part of his broader resistance to theological narratives of historical salvation. And 
so, it is in opposition to this movement, understood both in terms of historical conformism and those 
ends defined in religious terms that weak or secular messianism is realised.  
Countering the force of history’s tempest, in The Arcades Project Benjamin uses the notion of 
an afterlife in which to develop a critical account of historical understanding. Rather than simply 
pacify the storm then, historical understanding challenges the internal logic of what it means for the 
present to be overwhelmed by this anachronistic force. Deploying a definition of understanding that 
Arendt will adopt in her own reflections on the topic, he writes, that ‘historical “understanding” is to 
be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife of that which is understood; and what has been recognized in 
the analysis of the “afterlife of works,” in the analysis of “fame,” is therefore to be considered the 
 
69 HC: 9.  
70 SW3: 305. 
71 See Löwy, 2005: 66 for a brief discussion of Benjamin’s word choice.  
 148 
foundation of history itself.’72 The ideas that Benjamin introduces here will emerge centrally in the 
next chapter where I take up the implications of historical understanding more closely, particularly as 
they resonate with Saidiya Hartman’s own use of afterlives as a historical theme.73 I point to it here, 
however, to stress the way in which understanding and methods of comprehension, namely historical 
understanding as historical methodology, inform what it means for history to ‘appear.’  
Charging the past with the force of now-time [Jetztzeit] Benjamin articulates how the past, 
having been ‘blasted out of the continuum of history’ comes to assume new meaning in the present.74  
Reviving the meaning of what is ‘past,’ Benjamin’s messianic historian, acting in concert with a 
plurality of others, brings into question the relation between past and present, and in so doing opens 
up to redirection the onward trajectory of present to future. From this, Benjamin’s project can be 
distinguished from attempts ‘to construct visions of a better world of transcendence,’ but as Timothy 
Beasley-Murray shown to ‘reveal the broken nature of the world of history…in anticipation of the 
voice of revolution that will come as destruction.’75 Acting ‘into’ history in this way, Benjamin’s 
appeal for a new image of history is revolutionary in the precise sense that it disrupts the conformist 
continuum that is the linear march from past, to present and on to future. Igniting the present as a 
space of creation, the historical materialist comes to view this moment as that ‘in which time takes a 
stand and has come to a standstill.’76 Rather than signal the collapse of history, this cessation of what 
is coincides with the rupture that prefigures the new beginning of the messianic moment. In the 
context of the climate crisis this rupture captures the historiographical break away from the 
conformist narrative that rejects the colonial origins of the crisis and recognises the tropes of 
racialised exclusion that maintain it.  
Implicit throughout this reading on the afterlife of history is its underlying contingency: the 
claim that history – understood as the onward progression of time – could be otherwise. Bringing this 
 
72 AP: 460. Arendt’s essay ‘Understanding and Politics’ advances a similar claim, positioning understanding as 
the ‘unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile 
ourselves to reality,’ finally attaining a sense of home-being in temporality of one’s life (EU: 308).  
73 Hartman, 2007.  
74 SW4, 395.  
75 Beasley-Murray, 2007: 133.  
76 SW4, 396.  
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contingency into consideration, without denying the violence of its past nor the ramifications of its 
effects, adds to the nuance of Benjamin’s claim that it is not the Messiah who is sought but the 
incompleteness and fragility (or weakness) of the messianic. It is only the latter that legitimizes the 
experience of the oppressed in their oppression and hence is proper to the realisation of judgment. 
Willem Styfals clarifies this point, recalling that Benjamin ‘was not interested in his [the Messiah’s] 
actual coming but in the eternal possibility of his coming, and in this way this possibility influenced 
our perception of time and present.’77 Styfals’ point is that it was not the Messiah as such that was 
central to Benjamin’s thought but the messianic. There is much to gained in emphasising the 
displacement of messianic actuality – which necessarily implies a form of eschatology and hence the 
finitude of historical or even philosophical speculation – in favour of a possible ‘godless’ messianism. 
What might otherwise be thought in terms of a ‘post-theological’ messianism coincides with the 
messianic historiography that I see as operating both in Benjamin’s project and my own inquiry into 
the historical quality of earth-world-history. Indeed, Benjamin’s emphasis on the messianic 
effectively anticipates my own focus on the placedness of being as opposed to the ontologically fixed 
place of being. Where the Messiah and place evince a sense of finitude and completion, the messianic 
and placedness of experience withdraws from totalisation, recalling Heidegger’s language of 
concealment as the perpetual challenge to the unconcealment of worldly action.  
Developing his own sense of an ethical framework in which a challenge to history is made, 
Benjamin’s qualification of messianism as both an ‘earthly’ and a ‘weak’ faculty resonates with the 
earlier exploration of natality in dialogue with Cavarero. Yet here I refer not simply to the weakness 
of the subject who relies upon – or inclines towards – others in the realisation of their messianic 
potential but to the weakness of that scene in which they appear. Where Cavarero moved beyond the 
specificity of the child’s vulnerability to comment on the fragility of plurality more generally and 
develop the geometrical plane of postural ethics as applying to whole communities, Benjamin’s 
qualification of weak equally extends beyond the messianic subject. While in the first instance ‘weak’ 
is used to distinguish the messianic from the Messiah who would complete (and destroy) history it 
 
77 Styfals, 2019: 150.  
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also describes the status of history itself. ‘Weak’ encompasses the way in which history asserts a 
claim over the present: the present is ‘weak’ and vulnerable to this claim. In another sense still, 
messianism is weak insofar as the past remains something that must be actively fought for; in order to 
charge the past with the Jetztzeit of the present, what is ‘past’ must be constantly contested. To see 
more clearly what constitutes the ‘weakness’ of Benjamin’s messianism, it is instructive to examine 
how it manifests in the revolutionary practices of Benjamin’s historical materialist, the one through 
whom political theology finds this critical outlet. This is particularly important given the centrality of 
political theology and messianism to the project of resisting the organising violence of the climate 
crisis. In the following two chapters I will name this violence ‘History’ and ‘Future,’ re-appropriating 
the finality inscribed in the capitalisation of each word to indicate the exclusionary logic by which 
they operate. Understanding how weak messianism challenges the unfolding of violence will thus be 
central to the overcoming of History and Future in Chapters Five and Six respectively.   
The role of the historical materialist is central to the way that Benjamin develops messianism 
as a historical construct. He describes their task in third thesis of ‘On the Concept of History’ as the 
recitation of history without distinguishing between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ events. Acting in accordance 
with the principle that nothing should be lost to the tide of history, the historical materialist calls forth 
the redemption of humankind, which is to say a humankind for whom ‘the past has become citable in 
all its moments.’78 Bringing the role of the historical materialist into perspective, Benjamin writes in 
The Arcades Project that ‘for the materialist historian, every epoch with which he occupies himself is 
only prehistory for the epoch he himself must live in.’79 In opposition to ideas of an eternal return 
imagined earlier in the figure of an historical ouroboros, he continues: ‘there can be no appearance of 
repetition in history, since precisely those moments in the course of history which matter most to [the 
historical materialist], by virtue of their index as “fore-history,” become moments of the present day 
and change their specific character according to the catastrophic or triumphant nature of that day.80 
The revolutionary intervention of the historical materialist is ‘the interruption of the eternal return and 
 
78 SW4: 390. 
79 AP: 474. 
80 Ibid.  
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the coming of the most profound change. It is a dialectical leap, outside of the continuum, first 
towards the past and then towards the future.’81 Arendt makes this point in her reflections on the 
position of truth in politics, arguing that ‘even if we admit that every generation has the right to write 
its own history, we admit no more than it has the right to rearrange the facts in accordance with its 
own perspective; we don’t admit the right to touch the factual matter itself.’82 Building on Arendt’s 
contribution to Benjamin’s theses in ‘On the Concept of History,’ I take each to be offering a 
historical methodology of messianism, and with this an ethical account of what it is to engage with the 
claims made by the past on the present.   
Löwy marks the strength of the affinity between messianic redemption and the links between 
generations, a link that I want to imagine in terms of ‘intergenerationality,’ by noting that: 
‘messianic/revolutionary redemption is a task assigned to us by past generations. There is no Messiah 
sent from Heaven: we are ourselves the Messiah; each generation possesses a small portion of 
messianic power, which it must strive to exert.83 From standpoint of a generation, the past is made 
present through the imaginative storytelling of the historian, who makes present the past in its present 
meaningfulness. Opening up a critical distance between past and present in which the necessity to 
collapse one into the other is brought into question, the historical materialist becomes an arbiter for 
historical thought’s critical potential to unpick the threads that have sutured certain events outside the 
history book of humankind. When Arendt describes refugees as the vanguard of their people, she 
echoes the sentiment that Benjamin ascribes to the act of messianic intervention.84 Excluded to the 
periphery of history, Arendt insists that ‘those few refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to 
the point of “indecency,” get in exchange for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is no 
longer a closed book to them.’85 The ‘indecency’ of the outspoken refugee marks the collision of civic 
rights of nationhood, of rights assigned to those in place within the framework of national sovereignty 
with the ‘fore-right’ of placedness within earth-world-history. Indeed, when Arendt goes on to 
 
81 Löwy, 2005, 87. 
82 BPF: 234.  
83 Löwy, 2005: 32.  
84 On the status of the refugee as vanguard see, Agamben, 1995; Horst and Lysaker, 2019; Salih, 2013.  
85 JW: 274.  
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account for the deprivation of the latter as ‘the deprivation of a place in the world which makes 
opinions significant and actions effective,’ she provides the divine paradigm through which a 
messianic claim to rights will coincide with a claim to placedness.86  
Here a clear link opens up with the project of thesis in terms of the indecent truth that scholars 
like Jason W Moore herald as central to the historical narrative of the climate history. In Moore’s 
case, he appeals to a narrative of the climate crisis that will function as an ‘uncomfortable story with 
uncomfortable facts.’ He positions this need for discomfort in opposition to what he describes as 
‘comfortable stories with [albeit] uncomfortable facts’ that typically organise histories of the climate 
crisis: petrochemicals, atom bombs, coal and energy transformation.87 Indeed, it is precisely by 
recognising the uncomfortable history of the climate crisis that it becomes possible to inquire into the 
conditions of its appearance – amongst them the exilic condition (Part III). Arendt puts this point 
succinctly when she describes the crisis in terms of an opportunity ‘to explore and inquire into 
whatever has been laid bare by essence of the matter.’88 To locate a crisis as emerging from the 
collision of past and present effects an interrogation of those practices holding onto presence as the 
afterlife of history, which dissemble history’s potential to be read otherwise.  
Benjamin makes a similar point in thesis XVII of ‘On the Concept of History’ regarding the 
historical materialist for whom ‘thinking involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest 
as well.’89 Assuming greater proximity to the constellation earth-world-history, Benjamin goes onto 
describe the implications of thinking’s arrest, writing: 
 
Where thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives 
that constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad. In this structure he 
 
86 OT: 388.  
87 Moore echoes this sentiment later on in his essay. ‘While there is no question that environmental change 
accelerated sharply after 1850, and especially after 1945, it seems equally fruitless to explain these 
transformations without identifying how they fit into patterns of power, capital and nature established some four 
centuries earlier.’ (2019, 596).  
88 BPF: 171. 
89 SW4: 396.  
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recognises the sign of a Messianic arrest of happening, or, to put it differently, a revolutionary 
chance in the first for the oppressed past.90  
 
The Messianic arrest coincides with the reorganisation of the present and the emancipation of the 
future from the onward thrust of historical conformism. As it strikes at the core of the agonism of 
earth-world-history, messianism reveals the potential as yet still concealed therein.   
 
4.3 Weak Messianism of the Natal Faculty 
Surveying the claims just made, that political theology invites a critical re-examination of the laws 
that structure society and assumes a revolutionary force in the weak messianism of the historical 
materialist to disrupt those laws, I have made a case against the necessary synonymy between 
theology and religion. Namely, insofar as theology is invested in a praxis of critique and the pursuit of 
a justice that is not organised by the omnipotent presence of a mediating godlike figure but inclines 
away from eschatology towards historical emancipation, it departs from the logic of religiosity. It is 
precisely this move towards the theological as critique in contrast to the mere secularisation of 
religious law that allowed Benjamin to develop the revolutionary historical faculty of weak 
messianism. Revolutionary in its investment in the plurality of humankind, weak messianism forms 
part of history’s encounter with the fullness of its past.91 It is the radicality of this secular force, 
radical in its capacity to inaugurate the new and redeem those moments lost to history and hence to 
judgment also, that reappears in Arendt’s faculty of natality. 
Holding onto this secular radicalism as it pertains to both Benjamin and later Arendt 
circumvents the misreading that sees within natality a form of faith inextricable from religion. 
Critiques such as that levelled by Dana Villa that an ‘amorphous religiosity’ has been attached to 
Arendt’s writing are thus resolved in advance.92 In other words, insofar as Arendt’s writing is viewed 
 
90 On presence of the term ‘constellation’ as a temporal figure in Benjamin’s thought see McFarland, 2012. 
91 SW4: 390.  
92 Mavis Louise Biss describes Villa’s concern as related to ‘his conception of religion, according to which 
transcendence and faith are necessarily bound up with optimism and a longing for certainty’ (2012: 767). And 
so, while I agree with Villa’s criticism of religious conceptions of Arendt, insofar as they join together the 
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in proximity to theology as a Benjaminian pursuit of historical justice and not theology as the 
preservation of religious law, her ‘faith’ in action is grounded in the secular ontology of political 
theology.93 Recognising this distinction, in my messianic reading of natality I am able to maintain 
Villa’s position on Arendt: that ‘we should not see [her faith in action] as a semireligious worship of 
the human capacity for initiation.’94 As what in fact transpires is to the contrary: Arendt’s faith in 
action coincides with her rejection of that which can be thought in terms of teleological scripture.  
Where political theology serves Benjamin in his imperative to expose the mediative violence 
with which the law operates, both as an object of legality and as a threshold on the conditions for 
historical appearance, in Arendt’s writing it reappears in the unpredictable spontaneity with which 
natality bursts into the world. Maintaining a claim to historical revolution as intrinsically messianic, 
Benjamin rejects the thesis that what is past has been forsaken, appealing instead to the weak 
messianism of every generation as a potential harbinger of revolution. This same sense of 
generational potential is felt in Arendt’s writing, not least in her description of natality as a 
miraculous (and necessarily intergenerational) event but explicitly in her reflections on the ‘second 
birth.’ Described in The Human Condition as that moment when ‘with word and deed we insert 
ourselves into the human world,’ in the second birth ‘we confirm and taken upon ourselves the naked 
fact of our original physical appearance.’95 Having already made clear in Chapter Three, the first 
section of Part II, the ways in which natality is conditioned by its paradigmatic organisation within an 
ethics of vulnerability, dependence, and place, here I want to read the force of natality’s realisation as 
latently messianic. Once again resisting the equation of messianism with theology as the study of a 
mediate godlike figure, an equation which I have already rejected and challenged above, my argument 
regarding the messianism of natality is guided by that same investment in the pursuit of historical 
justice and the undoing of claims to historical conformism.  
 
theological elements of her writing with these distinctly un-Arendtian ideas of eschatology or historical finitude, 
I nevertheless agree with Biss that Villa is too quick in collapsing the distinction between religion and theology.  
93 Villa, 1996: 269. On the intersection of Arendt’s writing with theology see, Chacón, 2012; Gordon, 2007; 
Kahn, 2012; Kiess, 2016; Moyn, 2008.  
94 Villa, 1996: 270.  
95 HC: 176.  
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The necessity to engage history’s oppressed not simply ‘for the sake’ of attaining judgment 
for the few, but as the fulfilment of that original ethical basis on which the fact of being rests is a 
position held by both Benjamin and Arendt. Where Benjamin rejected the violence of the law but saw 
within the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ a qualitatively different kind of injunction in regard to 
action, the interplay between weak messianism and the claim of the past’s oppressed inaugurates a 
similar reframing of the groundwork on which the logic of historical appearance is engaged. Indeed, it 
is by virtue of the redemption of the oppressed as realised in weak messianism that something like the 
ethical conditions (themselves guidelines for action) outlined by Adriana Cavarero as inherent to the 
condition of human natality are realised. When Arendt thus describes the responsibility to understand 
what transpired under European totalitarianism, she assigns this task to humanity as a whole.96 For 
Arendt then it is not simply the isolated figures of victim, witness and oppressor who are implicated in 
the worldly renewal that must be undertaken after violence, it is an injunction that is imposed on the 
plurality of humanity. This argument hinges in part on the claim that while it was the specific body of 
the victim that was desecrated under totalitarianism, it was the plurality of humanity that was 
diminished.97  
And so, as I return to the ethical implications of natality, latent as they are in the worldly 
renewal that is the restoration post-war of human dignity, I depart slightly from Benjamin.98 Where 
Benjamin saw the messianism of historical materialism as inhering the potential to realise a Marxist 
revolution, an allegiance that enabled him to ‘side with revolutionaries in whose anarchistic violence 
[he] recognised traces of a divine law-destroying violence,’ my project remains far more indebted to 
the question of history, and with it earth-world-history, as the product of natality.99 And yet, it is this 
common affinity to history as the objective concern of both messianism and natality that organises the 
central claim that natality is latently messianic. Recalling the conditioning quality of earth-world-
history in the appearance of natality, I want to suggest that its role in the formation of a right-to-
placedness corresponds with the guidelines for action that Benjamin located in the commandment 
 
96 EU: 131.  
97 OT: xi.  
98 OT: 629.  
99 de Wilde, 2011: 366.  
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‘thou shalt not kill.’ The problematic that Benjamin sees in the commandment as resounding in each 
decision to act, reappears in the ethical force of earth-world-history. Part of this force is inherent to 
the right-to-placedness that I discussed in Chapter Three. In the context of natality’s realisation of 
action, this force appears as the capacity of natality to disrupt its placedness in earth-world-history by 
acting ‘into’ the past to redeem the placedness of those previously denied historical appearance, an act 
which coincides with the realisation of Benjamin’s weak messianism. While the anachronistic 
redemption of that right-to-placedness, the transgression of which has already occurred, has already 
been shown to serve as the guiding injunction for Benjamin’s historical materialist, who redeems the 
past in order to actualise a Marxist revolution, I want to highlight the centrality of that same 
imperative to the natal actor as well. Indeed, the necessary intersection of past and present which is 
explicit in Benjamin’s account of both historical materialism and weak messianism and invoked in the 
claim that ‘like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic 
power, a power to which the past has a claim,’ reappears in my reading of natality’s own realisation in 
action.100  
While natality clearly evinces a new beginning and can thus be read as an interruption to 
history, the degree to which this occurs in dialogue with something like redemption of an oppressed 
past is less apparent. Though Arendt is emphatic that natality inaugurates new beginnings and 
signifies a break with tradition, and hence discloses something like that ‘an-archic’ beginning 
described by Peg Birmingham, that this rupture occurs in the process of renewing a relationship with 
the past is less easily discerned.101 Indeed, to remain indebted to thinking the past would seem to 
undermine what is so central to natality in the first place. The need for a clarification thus arises in 
regard to the messianism of natality. Does the messianism of natality refer to its capacity to 
inaugurate new beginnings, evident in the unconcealment of earth-world-history through original, 
placed action, or is natality a latently messianic force in the Benjaminian sense of redeeming 
something in the past and, in this way, acting as a catalyst in the renewal of history? Rather than allow 
what I see as in fact a false distinction regarding natality to emerge; namely, as either mere renewal of 
 
100 SW4: 390.  
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the old or rupturing of tradition tout court, I want to turn to Anne O’Byrne’s reading of natality’s 
‘syncopated temporality’ and show an alternative understanding of the way in which natality is 
always already that which appears as past.102 Before I do so however, I want to briefly clarify the use 
of messianic language in Arendt’s writing on natality.  
 
Despite the sustained proximity that Arendt has to both biblical images of the messianic in the birth of 
Jesus and to more secular notions such as the ‘miraculous’ event of human birth, she never explicitly 
enjoins natality to a form of messianism.103 And yet, her use of biblical imagery is more than just 
gestural. Where Cavarero called attention to Arendt’s reference to the Gospels as a misattribution, 
Frederick Dolan recalls this moment as pivotal to Arendt’s emancipation of birth from a theological 
religiosity to something more akin to Benjamin’s hermeneutics of political theology.104 What 
Cavarero thus read as a misattribution ‘of great effect,’ Dolan considers a form of silent ‘editorship’ 
in which Arendt edits the Gospels ‘in order to avoid attributing divine, otherworldly status to the child 
who has been unto us so that it represents the possibility of redemption in “this” world.’105 Casting off 
the otherworldly or divine intervention that cloaks the Christian text, Dolan in fact sees Arendt’s 
editorial work as preserving a form of Jewish worldliness that maintains messianism as a subject of 
human affairs. Read in this way, Arendt’s work shares Benjamin’s sensibility that messianism is a 
fundamentally human potential, rendered through the work of a plurality that ‘receives’ the messianic 
as it responds to the claims of intergenerationality.  
Extending Benjamin’s reflections on messianism and political theology to include Arendt’s 
faculty of natality presents a unique insight into the way in which action, the activity ‘ontologically 
rooted’ in natality, intersects not simply with the immediacy of plurality but the plural conditions at 
play in earth-world-history.106 Recalling that earth-world-history is not simply antecedent to natality 
but is itself the locus of action, the constellation attests to the impossibility of ascribing an ‘origin’ to 
 
102 O’Byrne, 2010: 101-106.  
103 HC: 246-7. Despite this reticence on Arendt’s behalf, several inquiries into the messianism of natality and 
Arendt’s writing more general have been undertaken. See Biss, 2012; Gottlieb, 2003.  
104 ICR: 108. 
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the scene in which action appears. It both always already was and yet only is by virtue of its renewal 
in natality. Arendt thus describes the web woven of human realities that appear in the constellation as 
coming ‘into existence through the addition of infinite improbabilities.’107 As one improbability 
among many, each action reorients and reframes the ontological meaning of that web, unconcealing 
something within earth-world-history and reorienting what it means to relate to place. Given the 
antecedence of earth-world-history, every act of natality is thus in some way an engagement with 
what is past. Yet more pressingly, natality belies a form of messianism given its own belatedness, its 
own resistance to immanence. It is the delayed disclosure of the meaning of natality, which appears in 
Arendt’s conviction that history is only ever comprised of beginnings which continue to begin and 
hence defy claims to immanent totality or completion, that O’Byrne incorporates into her reading of 
natality’s ‘syncopated temporality.’  
O’Byrne explores the ‘belatedness’ of natality in connection to the plurality upon which it is 
contingent. Highlighting the interplay between the actor and those who recognise the force of natality 
as such, O’Byrne effectively anticipates the scene of ethical relationality so central to Cavarero’s 
reading of natality at the moment of birth. Where Cavarero emphasises the role of the (m)others as 
establishing the conditions of asymmetrical dependence, O’Byrne’s reading hinges on the temporality 
of this scene, arguing that while being born is an event for the family into which the baby arrives, 
‘only later did it come to be my birth’ in the sense proper to the one who is born.108 Rather than 
remain bound to the materiality of this event, O’Byrne draws this argument out in relation to the 
historicity of action, the ‘only later’ recast as its delayed meaning. What thus emerges as the 
‘syncopated temporality’ of natality then allows her to complicate the fixity of action’s (or natality’s) 
origin, thereby introducing a sense of temporal plurality. The meaning of natality, if it can be termed 
in such axiomatic and singular terms is simultaneously the product of those ‘first’ and ‘second’ births 
 
107 PP: 112. At the same time Arendt stresses the pre-existence of the world, writing that ‘to be alive means to 
live in a world that preceded one’s own arrival and will survive one’s own departure (LMT: 20). On the level of 
temporality, Arendt’s position invokes something akin to Said’s contrapuntal time and the necessary 
intersection of difference within time itself (Said, 2000: 191).  
108 O’Byrne, 2010: 103.  
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that Arendt describes. The resonance of action departs doubly from the event of birth, its meaning 
refracted through the two natal conditions of plurality and time.  As O’Byrne writes: 
 
The temporality of natality is such that I am with others before I can grasp who I am and who 
I am as a finite being. The origin from which I am removed is certainly mine, but it also 
belongs in an important sense to others. Our coming to be is therefore never a singular or 
solitary emerging into being; it is always, from the very start, a matter of plurality.109 
 
The connection O’Byrne draws between natality and plurality is explicit. Yet what sits beneath her 
argument is the transformative function in regard to being as the meaning of natality is belatedly 
recognised. The reverberations of this moment which extend from the past (the moment of natality) 
out into the present necessarily implicate natality in what was antecedent both to that initial sense of 
rupture and its ongoing meaning.  
 O’Byrne brings this point into sharper relief in a way that yields greater meaning for the 
current reading of natality’s realisation as the unconcealment of earth-world-history. Turning to face 
the moment of birth’s retreat from immanence, O’Byrne clarifies what it is that is sought in 
attempting to understand the meaning of natality’s disruptive appearance. As she writes, ‘it is not a 
matter of encountering the nothing [prior to my appearance], but rather, and precisely, of 
encountering the when-I-was-not-yet.’110 This confrontation with the not-yet assumes far greater 
weight when it is not limited to the subjectivity of experience but read as belonging to history itself. 
What figures in this instance as the ‘not-yet’ is now something far more expansive than the 
immediacy of the self, as what is now under consideration in this encounter is the state of history prior 
to the appearance of what is now considered – like the one who is born – to have a natural claim to 
appearance. What the syncopated temporality of action as the content of history reveals is an 
encounter with the movement of history itself. Understood in this way, every realisation of natality, 
which is to say the belated encounter with natality, is an encounter with its prior absence. Holding on 
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to O’Byrne’s original nuance, absence here is not the same as the void of historical emptiness but the 
when-this-was-not of history. Without reducing natality to a form of apophatic historicism, of clean 
breaks between ‘then’ and ‘now,’ natality aligns with the agonistic space that Arendt understands as 
the present.  
 Arendt describes the present through a retelling of Kafka’s parable ‘HE,’ in which the 
unnamed eponymous protagonist contends with the conflicting forces of past and future.  
Anticipating Cavarero’s geometrical retelling of natality, Arendt describes the disruptive present as a 
moment of collision or a gap in time that orients away from the march of history. Cast anew as the 
‘diagonal force of history’ here natality ‘breaks away from the two forces both unlimited as to their 
origins, the one coming from an infinite past and the other from an infinite future’ and establishes a 
new historical orientation.111 This agonistic clash, beyond its resemblance to the strife of Heidegger’s 
earthly unconcealment, indicates the messianic in Arendt’s writing. This conjunction of past, present, 
and future in the affirmation of action is messianic in the precise sense that it complicates the linearity 
of those temporal forces that emerge in the ontological complexity of earth-world-history.  
 Returning to the ‘not-yet’ of O’Byrne’s natality, to act into history and begin anew is to 
recognise that from which one departs. In turn, as natality assumes its meaning belatedly, to 
understand earth-world-history as simultaneously withdrawing from view and being brought into 
appearance is to recognise the movement of history and the co-implication of past, present, and future. 
When the recognition of natality as the right-to-placedness confronts the ‘rightlessness’ of denials to 
place that occurred in history it coincides with that messianic potential that Benjamin inscribed in 
each generation to redeem the narratives of those oppressed by history. Holding onto the agonistic 
encounter of natality and its absence what comes into consideration is precisely that messianic pursuit 
of Judgment Day that Benjamin saw as so central to the project of the historical materialist. The 
anachronistic or belated realisation of the right-to-placedness and hence the natal appearance of those 
historical others previously ignored, takes place in every instance when the integrity of plurality is 
brought into question. What is thus implicit in the limited histories that organise the appearance of the 
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climate crisis, which I will address in detail in Chapter Five, is the sustained negation of rights on 
which they hinge, namely the fore-right that is the right-to-placedness. Not only does this right impart 
a claim to literal place but to the narratives that give texture and meaning to place, namely to the 
intersection of place and history in the ‘storybook of mankind.’112  
Refusing to tell the history of this crisis – and indeed any crisis – in the fullness of its 
appearance, what is fractured is not only the state of reality, which cannot claim to be woven out of 
the plurality of temporalities and individuals who constitute history, but the very logic of rights as 
well. In other words, without the realisation of each claim to the right-to-placedness what is 
diminished is both the integrity of rights and that place, earth-world-history, to which each right 
attests. The challenge that Benjamin mounts in his appeal to historical impartiality and weak 
messianism and that Arendt builds upon through her insistence that history must engage the open 
belatedness of natality’s beginnings, is precisely against the force of conformity that denies the 
fullness of history. That this right-to-placedness is so often recalled after the temporality of 
appearance as such, namely as the redemption of history’s past (although conceivably ongoing) 
oppression is indicative of natality’s capacity to enact a messianic transformation of earth-world-
history. In other words, not only does the condition of natality – as explained by Cavarero – establish 
a set of ethical paradigms that inform the meaning of action, the actualisation of natality in action 
exerts the kind of dialectical challenge intrinsic to Benjamin’s thesis on messianism.  
 Where belatedness comes to serve as one of natality’s defining temporal features this also 
challenges the specificity with which the ‘origin’ of the natal moment can be thought. While a clear 
instance of the origin is presupposed in the literal event of birth, as O’Byrne explains, the meaning of 
natality cannot be contained in this event alone. And so, even when Arendt, drawing on Kafka’s 
parable claims that a clear historical origin can be discerned in that gap in time that is occupied by 
humans who exist as historical forces, she cannot claim that the meaning of beginning is fixed to this 
moment. Insofar as natality is contingent upon a necessary plurality, and plurality itself is refracted 
through the distinct temporal experiences of each individual, natality betrays its own syncopation. 
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Equally important here is the worldliness of this temporality; despite its apparent endlessness natality 
does not transcend the human world, rather it exists in memory and the fragility of human 
togetherness.113 Holding onto the revolutionary break held within this moment thus becomes its own 
form of messianic realisation; of sustaining the new in spite of those forces that seek history’s 
atrophy. In a sense then, the temporality of natality resonates with the perpetual move of earth-world-
history away from unconcealment. The meaning of action – where action relates here both to 
revolutionary breaks in history and to those miraculous appearances that each individual makes in the 
world – is then a form of revelation in the precise sense of Heidegger’s language of unconcealmeant. 
What thus figures as an agonistic disruption coincides with the opening up of the present, the 
declarative moment of natality now percolating throughout time and place.114   
Cleaved to the moment that slips between the original appearance of natality as conditioned 
within that constellation of earth-world-history (principally its organisation within an ethics of placed 
plurality) and its disclosure in action, weak messianism illuminates this moment as the intersection of 
past, present, and future. Much like the ‘flash’ that coordinates Benjamin’s intervention into what is 
‘past,’ the weak messianism of natality recalls the original anarchy of its own ontological 
entanglement. Assuming the double sense that Peg Birmingham describes as the ‘an-archic principle 
of natality,’ natality is both the origin of rights and the meaning that comes from being born-in-place, 
to which I also add that it is the faculty through which that right and meaningful placedness are 
actualised.115 The immediacy with which Arendt connects action to the disclosure of worlds and the 
creation of historical conditions is supplemented by the original earthliness that underpins the very 
ground of natality. And yet, it is her affinity with Benjamin’s disruptive history that structures the link 
between the messianism of action and the agonistic strife of earth-world-history. This resistance to a 
linear development of the constellation resonates with Arendt’s repudiation of Hegelian standards of 
historical progression in favour of disruptive beginnings. Villa captures this challenge to Hegelian 
criteria as summed up by the maxim from Cato: ‘the victorious cause pleased the gods, but the 
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defeated one pleases Cato.’116 Central to this rejection of Hegel is the fragility inscribed in the 
products of natality, the vulnerability of worlds to ruin, of history to the decay of memory and the 
earth to its qualification under ideological regimes like totalitarianism.  
Here again the various valences of Benjamin’s original identification of messianism in terms 
of its ‘weakness’ resound. And so, as I approach the close of this chapter and in anticipation of the 
historical inquiry into those oppressive histories that deny the right-to-placedness within the context 
of the climate crisis, I want to return to those themes of political theology and a praxis of critique 
without the centrality of an omnipotent figure. Having already noted Villa’s antagonistic relationship 
with the theological dimensions of Arendt’s work, which he persists in overlaying with religious 
connotations, the proximity with which he establishes her writing to Benjamin’s recalls the force with 
which messianism operates as a form of worldly redemption. In Villa’s words then:  
 
Her “faith in action” does not rest on the futile desire to resurrect the agora in contemporary 
society; rather, it reflects a continuing wonder at the fact that political action persists in the 
various “defeated causes” our political historians relegate to the dustbin of history.117 
And again, like Benjamin, Arendt reclaims that weakness as part of the condition for political action, 
establishing a direct link between the fragility of human affairs and the integrity of history’s full 
meaning.118  
 
Bound by fallibility, weakness, and mortality, Arendt’s invocation of the miraculous or messianic 
beginnings of which humans are nevertheless capable serves as a provocative alternative to the 
possibility of theistic redemption. Without knowledge of history’s end – an openness that shadows the 
present as both an omen and a blessing – Arendt evinces a sense of the world that persists as a space 
of creation.119 What is implicit to this openness, however, is the necessity to re-engage the question of 
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worldliness. The theological thus arises as the methodological introspection of a world that revisits its 
presumptive origin without losing faith in the absence of historical finality. Indeed, it is precisely the 
infinitude of history that exerts a claim over the present, and over every act of natality, which is 
always already inscribed in the movement of history and thus called upon to respond to its movement. 
The intersection between Arendt and Benjamin’s work – already apparent in this common investment 
in the disruption that beginnings pose to the linearity of history – assumes a critical force as the 
integrity of history’s normative framework is emancipated from the idea of a mediated or prescribed 
end. Whilst for Benjamin the emancipation of history occurs as the theological intervention of 
historical materialism, which redeems history’s ‘detritus’ and exerts a divine violence over the iron 
grip of existing legal-orders, Arendt relies on natality as an instance of an-archic, theological 
beginning. Mavis Louise Biss describes Arendt’s introduction of natality’s temporality as taking place 
‘in time without positing an end to time or history.’120 The centrality that natality assumes as a 
category in political thought thus occurs insofar as it ‘shapes an anti-apocalyptic, anti-individualistic 
and this-worldly version of redemption.’121  
Forgoing the messianic depth of natality which reveals itself not only in those moments of 
crisis when the need to begin is essential but in each instance of action insofar as the activity of being 
is constantly in a state of evolution, is to lose what is intrinsic to natality itself. Part of this latent 
messianism is apparent in the ‘belatedness’ of being, the fact that each life comes to be in a world that 
was already in existence and hence is always called upon to respond to a world ‘behind’ it. When 
Arendt describes in terms of the ‘newcomers who are born into the world as strangers,’ she points to 
the syncopated temporality of existence.122 Taking up the charge in the following chapter to respond 
the belated meaning of the world, unexamined in the blind movement that is history’s conformist 
claim to progression, I engage both the messianic currents of Arendt and Benjamin’s writing and the 
need to think the interarticulation of both plurality’s subjects and plurality’s temporality. Recognising 
that what is present as present is the suspension of history and the moment before the now slips into 
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the future, this chapter will affirm the agonism of Kafka’s ‘HE’ and, if not disrupt, at minimum call 





















Chapter Five: The Anthropocene or History as Exile 
 
Every generation confronts the task of choosing its past. Inheritances are chosen as much as 
they are passed on. The past depends less on “what happened then” than on the desires and 
discontents of the present. Strivings and failures shape the stories we tell. What we recall has 
as much to do with the terrible things we hope to avoid as with the good life for which we 
yearn. But when does one decide to stop looking to the past and instead conceive of a new 
order? When is it time to dream of another county or to embrace other strangers as allies or 
to make an opening, an overture, where there is none? When is it clear that the old life is 
over, a new one has begun, and there is no looking back?1 
- Saidiya Hartman  
 
The image of the ‘flash’ appeared in the previous chapter as the spectre of hope that, seized upon by 
the historical materialist, would account for an act of historical disruption. As Walter Benjamin 
writes, ‘the past can be seized only as an image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability, 
and is never seen again.’2 Grasping hold of the past in this way an attempt is made to ‘wrest history 
away from conformism,’ rupturing its onward movement and opening ‘history’ up to recreation.3 In 
this turn away from conformity, the tropes of messianism that pervade both Benjamin’s account of 
critical history and Arendt’s political faculty of natality appear. Throughout Part III, I aim to 
‘operationalise’ the messianic force of natality, showing how history can once again be redeemed as 
the ‘storybook of mankind’ capable of realising the claim that ‘plurality is the law of the earth.’4 
Locating this ‘flash’ in the context of the Anthropocene and the violence of its colonial origins, this 
chapter is coordinated following Benjamin’s 1920-21 essay ‘Critique of Violence.’5 Emboldening 
Benjamin’s threefold reading of violence as law-making, law-preserving and finally, law-destroying, I 
rely on the words of Saidiya Hartman, Christina Sharpe and Kathryn Yusoff to give texture to the 
materiality of violence in the Anthropocene.  
In part, furthering the exegesis of Benjamin’s writing that I began in the previous chapter, it is 
equally their work on which I rely in order to unpack the complex history of the climate crisis. 
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Seemingly in dialogue with Benjamin’s investment in the ‘tradition of the oppressed,’ Hartman 
invokes a methodology of engaging with the ‘after-life’ of the past, Sharpe develops a rhetoric of 
thinking in ‘the wake,’ and Yusoff challenges the forgotten ‘pre-history’ of the present.6 Building on 
structural readings of violence, perhaps clarified most recently in the work of Judith Butler, I will use 
the term History to name these acts of violence.7 Henceforth, History serves as the name for that law 
forged in the logic of colonialism and slavery and preserved in the violence of settler-colonial claims 
to place and the status of capitalism after slavery. History, which names the first exilic space that I 
explore in Part III, is maintained in the ongoing exploitation of the other, whose claim to place is 
undermined by History which insists upon their exclusion, a mode of dispossession that I understand 
as a form of ‘present absence.’  
More emphatically, History serves as the index for those forces which calcify the agonism of 
earth-world-history, fixing time and place, producing the ontological hollow space Earth-World-
History. As a site of exclusion, History is the force of exile that assumes a normative presence in the 
Anthropocene. Overwhelming the present as a space of original creation, History thereby assumes 
presence as a narrative of exclusion, overriding claims to placedness and the diverse origins of earth-
world-history. History, then is the story of the Anthropocene that forgets the history of colonialism 
and slavery that is the bedrock of its foundation. History not only emanates from exile, insofar as it is 
normalised as a praxis of domination, it maintains a hold to exile.8 Where Benjamin locates a tradition 
of the oppressed who oppose conformism, I argue for a similar antagonism between the exilic and 
History. Disrupting the physicality of exile, the account of the exile that I develop foregrounds the 
inability to ‘dwell’ historically.9 Imagined in the introduction using the examples of the convergence 
of Australia Day and Invasion Day or the formation of Israeli statehood and the Palestinian nakba, 
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the truth of history’s violence is denied, is a new form of violence that enforces silence over those who may 
continue to appear ‘in place’ but cannot appear in either memory or the formation of history. See n.44 in the 
introduction for a survey of literature on these subjects.  
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historical exile appears in the context of the climate crisis in the refusal to tell the impartial and 
colonial history of its origin. Rendered exilic by the force of History which insists upon the telling of 
‘comfortable stories with [albeit] uncomfortable facts,’ in this chapter I endeavour to remain bound by 
the need to develop an uncomfortable story with uncomfortable facts.10 Arendt engages in a related 
endeavour when she declares that the price of being at home on earth after the unearthliness of 
totalitarianism coincides with being at home in the 20th century. For this return from exile, Arendt’s 
writes that is an ‘interminable dialogue with the essence of totalitarianism’ must be undertaken.11 It is 
the cognate task of engaging the History of the climate crisis that I undertake here, recognising this 
dialogue as the new price of being at home in this century. 
Staged over three sections, this chapter advances a reading of the Anthropocene informed both by 
Benjamin’s reflections on history discussed in the previous chapter and his 1920-21 essay ‘Critique of 
Violence.’12 Further clarifying Benjamin’s writing through the introduction of my own motifs of exile 
or the exilic condition and the earlier development of natality’s messianic force, the threefold critique 
of violence outlined in Benjamin’s essay on violence organises the structure of this chapter. Where 
Benjamin interprets violence in terms of its law-making, law-preserving, and law-destroying function, 
I attach an analogous reading in relation to the establishment, maintenance and later, resistance to, the 
exilic logic of the Anthropocene. While I will begin with a description of what exile means before 
turning to interpolate the meaning of the exilic in the execution of Benjamin’s threefold critique of 
violence, I want to emphasize at the outset that to be an exilic subject is to be a victim of violence. 
Moreover, it is important to clarify that although Benjamin names the ‘law’ as the object of violence, 
his argument transcends the frame of legality: the law operates as an extra-legal framework that 
coordinates modalities of realising placedness. The law, in a meaning specific to this chapter, is the 
exilic condition imposed by History as exile.13 Employing a vocabulary that resonates with this 
 
10 Moore, 2017: 595.  
11 EU: 323.  
12 SW1: 236-252.  
13 Elsewhere the term ‘exile’ has been used to define the status of climate change refugees. Sujatha Byravan and 
Sudhir Chella Rajan identify ‘climate exiles’ as those who will lose ‘their ability to remain well-functioning 
members of political societies in their own countries, of through no fault of theirs’ (2015, 21). The invocation of 
place that is at play here, the loss of society, as well as the allusion to historical responsibility, highlights a 
currency between the two uses of the exilic status. See, Byravan and Rajan, 2006; 2015. 
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project, Sharpe’s inquiry into to enduring legacy of slavery describes the way in which ‘slavery was 
not singular; it was, rather, a singularity – a weather event or phenomenon likely to occur around a 
particular time, or date, or set of circumstances…in what [she calls] the weather, antiblackness is 
pervasive as climate.’14 Here, I would argue that antiblackness and settler-colonialism are pervasive as 
History. In addition to these liminal impositions over modes of coming-into-place in earth-world-
history, this History also operates a quite literal violence in the guise of planetary instability and 
extreme weather. 
 
5.1 Walter Benjamin and Exile: Made, Preserved, Destroyed 
While History remains the objective source of violent tension in my argument, I concede that 
destroying its claim to normativity will not reverse the Anthropocene, nor its manifestation in the 
literal violence and extremity of the climate crisis. And so, before I unpack the meaning that 
Benjamin attaches to his threefold reading of violence and how it parallels the violence of History, I 
want to pause to consider what it means to locate this violence in the context of exile, in part extended 
introduction, this section has the merit of highlighting the nuances of Benjamin’s reflections on 
violence and how they pertain to the exilic spaces of the Anthropocene.  
Borrowing from Edward Said’s reflections on the temporally disjointed life of the exile, John 
Barbour describes exile as ‘a way of dwelling in space with a constant awareness that one is not at 
home. The exile is oriented to a distant place and feels that he [sic] does not belong where he lives. 
Exile is also an orientation to time, a plotting of one’s life story around a pivotal event of departure 
and a present condition of absence from one’s native land.’15 The life of the exiled is marked by the 
impossibility of return, for while the literal ground of exilic homeland may persist as place, any notion 
of return must contend with those claims made by history. In other words, the homeland is not merely 
spatial but temporal as well, to return would thus presuppose a movement back in time to the 
homeland pre-invasion, pre-destruction and pre-historical. The exile is marked by this specific 
 
we are proposing would be built upon 
well-established, 
14 Sharpe, 2016: 106 (emphasis added).  
15 Barbour, 2007: 293, (emphasis added).  
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orientation to history, where past and future collapse as spaces in which dwelling is possible. Unable 
to dwell within the constellation of earth-world-history, in which place comes into being as a 
temporalized experience, the exilic experience erodes the plurality of that space, marking place as a 
site of erasure (Earth-World-History). Yana Meerzon further clarifies the muteness of exile which 
‘dignifies a displacement and a falling out of time phenomenon.’16 When the homeland of the exiled 
ceases to exist, the exilic subject assumes an existence outside of time and place, outside of earth-
world-history.17   
 The irredeemable exilic homeland, its temporal status as ‘no-longer,’ does not, however, 
preclude the exilic subject from re-entering the plurality of earth-world-history. Indeed, for Said, 
‘what has been left behind [in the experience of exile] may either be mourned, or it can be used to 
provide a different set of lenses.’18 The proximity between exile and memory, insofar as what is 
remembered of the past coordinates what it means to be an exile, also opens up space in which to 
determine how the future might be imagined. Implicated in a plurality of temporalities, the exilic 
subject can be described in terms that Said borrows from the study of music as possessing a 
‘contrapuntal’ awareness of reality.19 To view the world ‘contrapuntally’ is to approach it through a 
lens that is tuned to a plurality of visions, in which old and new ‘environments are vivid, actual, 
occurring together.’20 Achille Mbembe invokes a similar modality of thinking through multiplicities 
via the concept of fugitivity. Applied to the experience of slavery, he describes the way in which ‘the 
captured subject must actively engage in a relation of multiple doubles and multiple selves. He or she 
must develop an extraordinary capacity to become imperceptible and unassignable, to continually 
shift from one self to its alternate, to inhabit the tiniest of cracks and fissures.’21 The dwelling place of 
Mbembe’s captured subject echoes the ‘tiny fissures’ in which Benjamin locates redemption from 
catastrophe.22 Drawing together the condition of placedness with the emancipatory potential of the 
 
16 Meerzon, 2017: 25.  
17 The extra-terrestrial and perhaps extra-historical qualities of Sputnik discussed in Chapter One resound here.  
18 Said, 2000: 23.  
19 Said, 2000: 191.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Goldberg, 2018: 212.  
22 SW4, 185. 
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oppressed, I want to introduce in the two chapters of Part III a praxis of challenging the state of exile. 
Read through the constellation earth-world-history in its exilic state, I show resistance to be formed 
through the attainment of a contrapuntal and fluid claim to dwelling.  
Paralleling Said, Mbembe describes the way in which he works with the archive: ‘to mourn 
what is lost in a way that does not dwell in the trauma.’ Refusing the eternal return of violence, he 
assumes a mode of mourning that, following Benjamin ‘[puts] together once again the debris and the 
fragments of that which has been broken and [tries] somewhat to provide them with a space of rest,’ 
finally creating a sense of Arendtian plurality as he renders ‘the world habitable for all, again.’23 
Intrinsic to this form of dwelling is resistance both to a politics of lament or nostalgia and to the 
normativity of History’s exilic force. The connection between exile and beginning is echoed in 
Gershom Scholem’s account of messianism, which he argues is ‘exercised almost exclusively under 
the conditions of exile.’24 While Scholem speaks to the specificity of Jewish history, the resonance of 
his words can be felt even here in the context of the Anthropocene. While exile dissembles the 
plurality of voices that dwell in earth-world-history, insisting upon the normative homogeneity of 
History, the exilic persist in History’s marginalia, their voices colouring and giving depth to History’s 
shadows. Creating space to hear these experiences, to deconstruct History in their wake is the project 
of law-destroying violence, the redemption of the tradition of History’s oppressed (Chapter 5.4).  
 In her account of slavery, Saidiya Hartman describes the status of the slave as one ‘torn from 
kind and community, exiled from one’s country, dishonoured and violated,’ such that the slave 
becomes archetypal as ‘the outsider.’25 Invoking a temporal displacement, she goes onto describe the 
slave as ‘the perpetual outsider.’ Examining this sustained exclusion, Hartman’s inquiry into slavery 
operates in precisely this space of temporal delay. She thus argues in terms that I want to reframe 
through the law-making and preserving violence that Benjamin develops that ‘if slavery persists as an 
issue in the political life of black Americans, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone 
days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperilled and devalued by 
 
23 Goldberg, 2018: 215.  
24 Scholem, 1995: 2.  
25 Hartman, 2007: 5, emphasis added.  
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a racial calculus and political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. The is the afterlife of 
slavery.’26 Elsewhere in the same text, she alludes to the exilic condition of appearing in absence 
when she writes that ‘the slave is always the stranger who resides in one place and belongs to 
another.’27 It is this dislocation in place that defines what it means to live in the afterlife of exile, the 
present of the exilic condition. I referenced Benjamin’s discussion of the ‘afterlife’ in the previous 
chapter, but it is the historical specificity that Hartman gives to it in this citation that I want to centre 
as definitive of ‘afterlives’ from here onwards.28 Indeed, it is this afterlife that parallels the extra-
legality of Benjamin’s violence and its ‘after life’ as History. 
 In these extra-legal acts of law-destroying violence, the exilic resist History. In the 
Anthropocene this resistance coincides with the naming of that Historical violence in the events of 
colonialism and slavery. In other words, ‘beyond denoting a new geological era, the Anthropocene 
encompasses a broader set of questions,’ one of which pertains to the enduring legacy of historical 
structures.29 Assuming the historical narrative of the Anthropocene that begins with the invasion of 
the Americas as my point of departure, the questions that arise here encompass not only the 
redistribution of flora and fauna and hence the immediate environmental impacts of this moment but 
also the processes of human violence put in motion.30 And so, what I see as developing out of the 
original violence of the Anthropocene coincides not only with the violence that Hartman sees as 
radiating from the hulls of slave ships but with the violence of Benjamin’s law-making.  
Operative beyond the limits of the legal decree, Benjamin sets up a relation between violence 
and the extra-legal frameworks of normativity that assume structural functions akin to the law. 
Understood by Sharpe in terms of the racialised ground that normalises the murder and subjugation of 
African American bodies, these extra-legal yet largely still state-sanctioned instances of structural 
 
26 Hartman, 2007: 6, emphasis added.  
27 Hartman, 2007: 87. 
28 AP: 460.  
29 Schlosser, 2020: 3.  
30 It is worth remembering, of course, that Columbus’ departure from Spain was made possible by the exilic 
exclusion of Spain’s Jewish population in the 1492 Alhambra Decree. Columbus begins his diary charting his 
travel across the Atlantic by writing: ‘Thus, after having turned out all the Jews from all your kingdoms and 
lordships, in the same month, your Highnesses gave orders to me that with a sufficient fleet I should go to the 
said parts of India...’ (Olson and Bourne, 1906: 90).  
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violence assume a particularly insidious form in the so-called ‘slow violence’ identified by Rob 
Nixon. Nixon’s slow violence ‘of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space [as] an 
attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all,’ coincides with the ripples sent forth 
through history by the geological impacts of colonialism.31 Captured in the image of the slave ship, 
whose ‘wake,’ or track through water, assumes a centripetal force, Sharpe deploys the language of 
‘wake work’ to think the history that ‘ripples’ outwards from the supposed singularity of the event.32 
The amplification of this ‘wake’ attests to the reach of Nixon’s violence, coalescing with Benjamin’s 
preservation of the law in the renewed claims to settler-colonialism and the ongoing exile of 
indigeneity. Resonant here is Glenn Coulthard’s definition of settler-colonial relations as 
‘characterized by a particular form of domination; that is, it is a relationship where power…has been 
structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to 
facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.’33As 
the structural force of violence assumes a normative claim over history in the state-sanctioned 
exposure of certain bodies to the literal violence of the Anthropocene – perhaps most starkly in 
instances of extreme weather – this second mode of violence, or ‘slow violence,’ marks the loss of 
earth-world-history as a space of production, showing instead its subsumption to the violence of 
Historical normativity. In other words, if the spaces of dwelling become spaces of exile – either the 
literal incorporation of exilic forms in the corporeal vulnerability of bodies to weather or the historical 
exile of limited historical perspectivism – the ontological agonism so central to earth-world-history is 
lost.34   
The scope of Benjamin’s violence to operate beyond the limits of the legal institution is 
apparent in this move away from the supposed legality of violence to the extra-legal perversion of 
earth-world-history. Benjamin himself attests to the extra-legal scope of violence when he declares 
 
31 Nixon, 2018: 2. David Archer invokes a similar tempo of the climate crisis in the language of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide’s ‘long tail’ (2009).  
32 Sharpe, 2016: 2.  
33 Coulthard, 2014: 6-7.  
34 Poignant examples of the former are felt clearly in the city of New Orleans but extend to incorporate the 
slums exposed to toxic waste and the Pacific Islands whose survival is brought under question by increasing 
sea-level rise. See: Davis and Todd, 2015; Pulido and de Lara, 2018; Sealey-Huggins, 2018; Vaha, 2015; 
Woods, 2017; Yusoff, 2018.    
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that ‘all violence is either law-making or law-preserving.’35 Butler similarly advances a claim 
regarding violence that ‘without disputing the violence of the physical blow,’ shows its persistence in 
the guise of social structures or systems.36 Rather than obfuscate the status of the law, what Benjamin 
points to with this claim is the extra-legal force of the law. Namely, it operates beyond the immediacy 
of the legal institution, perhaps most clearly in the insidious forms of structural violence that persist as 
the denial of indigenous presence (and the unceded sovereignty of this prior claim to place). Indeed, 
my concern here is with precisely the extra-legal laws of historicism, operative in the limited histories 
that recreate Arendt’s frustration at the refusal ‘to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of 
the Achaeans.’37 In other words, it is precisely that violence of colonialism and slavery at the origin of 
the Anthropocene that I argue goes onto assume a status of ‘law-preserving violence’ in the exilic and 
limited histories of the Anthropocene.  
And yet, Benjamin locates a third form of violence: the divine act of law-destroying violence. 
Exerting an uncanny prescience, Benjamin describes the ‘epoch founding’ function of divine 
violence, hinting at the possibility of historical redemption in the impartial narratives of the 
Anthropocene’s inaugural moment. Here again the allusion to Scholem’s exilic messianism, of the 
new beginning emerging out of (or perhaps in spite of) exile, can be felt. Described in terms of the 
‘abolition of state power,’ divine violence coincides with the anarchic capacity of Benjamin’s weak 
messianism.38 Indeed, where Benjamin describes the latter as endowed in each generation, he gives an 
account of divine violence as ‘not only attested by religious tradition but also found in present-day 
life.’39 Operative beyond the bounds of religion, divine violence foregrounds the messianic force of 
historical materialism. In the context of the climate crisis, divine violence can be heard in the appeals 
to decolonise the Anthropocene.40 In the final section to this chapter I will unpack the force of this 
argument.  
 
35 SW1: 243.  
36 Butler, 2020: 2.  
37 BPF: 51.  
38 SW4: 390. See also; Eddon, 2006; Mosès, 2009. 
39 SW1: 250.  
40 Birch 2016; Davis and Todd 2017; Estes 2019; Gilio-Whitaker 2019; Weizman and Sheikh 2015. 
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Advancing the argument that colonialism is an ‘invasion come to stay,’ naming the colonial 
origins of the Anthropocene opens up space for a discussion about the way in which the 
Anthropocene can function as a form of violence insofar as it perpetuates and renews neo-colonial or 
settler-colonial claims to place.41 It is this renewal that is the preservation of the law (History) through 
violence. What Toula Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos refer to in terms of the ‘being of 
the occupier,’ namely the demand to assert presence over the unceded sovereignty of indigenous 
peoples thus becomes analogous for the way in which violence is exercised in the maintenance of the 
Anthropocene.42 In other words, what each refusal to read the history of the Anthropocene in 
recognition of the forms of colonial exile that precede it attests to, is the dependence of normativity, 
in this instance that of settler-colonialism, on a form of violence. This amounts firstly to a violence of 
bodily dispossession as bodies are denied physical appearance and, secondly, to the denial of 
appearance ‘in history,’ through the refusal of historical impartiality. Moving forwards with this 
claim, in section 5.3 of this chapter I enter into sustained dialogue with Hartman and Sharpe as a way 
of unpacking the resonance of History’s violence. My aim here is to show how the racialised origins 
of the Anthropocene have incorporated an exilic force that coincides with their respective projects of 
thinking in the ‘afterlife’ or ‘the wake’ of the past. Further clarified through Benjamin’s discussion of 
law-preserving violence, my claim here is that History is operative as the preservation of colonial 
violence. Contrasted with a critical historiography that recognises the tradition of the oppressed, 
within the context of the Anthropocene, History operates to dissemble colonialism. Enfolding Kathryn 
Yusoff’s appeal to History’s ‘voidings,’ or those excluded from historical appearance, throughout this 
section, I highlight the way in which the normative force of colonial violence is manifest in the law-
preserving violence of the climate crisis. Yusoff sees this violence as intrinsic to the methodologies of 
history that she calls ‘white geology,’ a violence of methodology that operates as an extension of a 
colonial project of racial exclusion.43 
 
41 Wolfe, 2006: 388. 
42 Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 2014. 
43 Yusoff, 2018. 
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Turning to Benjamin’s appeal for an anarchic and divine violence, that is, violence that 
operates against the logic of instrumentality, in the concluding section I ask if the critical 
historiography of projects like Yusoff’s, that read history ‘against the grain,’ is capable of dismantling 
the structures of violence that pervade the climate crisis.44 Following the exegesis of Benjamin’s 
divine violence provided by Luis Guzmàn, this section will uncover an intersection between divine 
violence and modes of resisting History’s exilic force.45 Without reducing the tradition of the 
oppressed or bodies of exiles to a status of means, this conclusion navigates the complex presence of 
the oppressed without re-interpolating them into a system of ends-oriented violence. And so, in this 
closing section I invoke the acts that perform a messianic intervention against the force of History to 
disrupt the exilic condition that distinguish contemporary experiences of dwelling in order to reaffirm 
the original antagonism of earth-world-history as a locus of perpetual renewal. Here I raise the 
question as to whether Benjamin’s appeal for a divine violence to counterpose the preservation of 
law-making/preserving violence might exist within the emancipatory spaces opened up by 
decolonialism. The intersection of the divine and the messianic is maintained in reference to those 
attempts to decolonise the Anthropocene and expose the racialised borders by which it operates.  
 
5.2 Law-Making Violence: A History of Exile 
In one of the few instances in which Hannah Arendt’s political framework has been applied to 
considerations of the climate crisis, Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen concludes his discussion by arguing against 
the relevance of thinking eco-destruction in terms set out by Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus.46 Deployed 
by Walter Benjamin in his essay ‘On the Concept of History,’ the angel appears in the service of 
historical critique.47 Moving backwards into the future, Benjamin describes the angel as forced to look 
 
44 Yusoff, 2018. ‘Against the grain’ is Benjamin’s description for the project of historical materialism, SW4: 
392.  
45 Guzmàn, 2014.  
46 Invocations of the Angelus Novus as a resource to engage the climate crisis, as well as Benjamin’s historical 
materialism do, however, appear with a degree of consistency in literature on the climate crisis. See, Ford, 2013; 
Latour, 2010; Menely, 2014. On Arendt and the climate crisis see; Chapman, 2007; Hamilton, 2016; Ott, 2009; 
Voice, 2013; Whiteside, 1998.  
47 SW4: 392.  
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upon the detritus that piles at its feet.48 In opposition to this violence, the historical materialist seeks 
out a ‘flash’ that might permit a reorientation away from the angel’s backward trajectory.49 Relying 
on this image, Hyvönen argues that despite the wreckage of the climate crisis that now piles at our 
feet, the status of the angel cannot be ascribed to the climate crisis.50 Here, the angel is absent – or at 
least, it is for Hyvönen. Part of his rejection of the angel relies on his reading of the Arendtian 
conviction that beginnings are always possible, hence his claim: ‘although we are forced to witness 
the piling up of debris…we have not lost the capacity to change the world.’51 Elsewhere his argument 
hinges on the need to ‘restructure collective existence.’52 In essence, then it is Arendt’s twofold 
political conditions of natality and plurality that, Hyvönen argues, could prove instrumental – without 
pursuing instrumental ends – to solving the various existential threats brought to light by the crisis.  
While the force of Hyvönen’s claim is immediate and points to a recovery of those conditions 
that will be essential to rethinking the political, elsewhere in the article he writes: ‘there’s little sense 
in speaking of a singular Anthropocene that has one definition and one origin.’53 Perhaps more so than 
his rejection of the angel, it is here that our arguments diverge, because it is precisely through the 
heralding of a singular Anthropocene in possession of one historical origin, that I argue plurality and 
natality come into being as forces capable of reckoning with the violent wreckage of the climate 
crisis.54 Pursuing a radically different track to Hyvönen then, my approach to the Anthropocene is 
 
48 Ibid. 
49 SW4: 390.   
50 Rob Nixon includes a haunting epigraph to his book Slow Violence: Environmentalism of the Poor, in which 
‘Lawrence Summers, then president of the World Bank, advocates that the bank develop a scheme to export rich 
nation garbage, toxic waste, and heavily polluting industries to Africa’ (2018, 1). Regrettably, this serves as just 
one piece of evidence in the growing economy of waste and destruction that the Anthropocene produces. 
Elsewhere, evidence can be seen in the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, increasing ‘wars on waste’ and the 
destruction of homes and buildings in floods, fires, and landslides. See, Boetzkes, 2010; Hird, 2013; Huang, 
2017.  
51 Hyvönen, 2020: 260.  
52 Hyvönen, 2020: 259 
53 Hyvönen, 2020: 257 
54 Although the force of this claim appears to contradict previous discussions on the status of the origin in this 
project, principally in my claims that the origin cannot be reduced to a single moment but must be read within a 
constellation of temporal relations, I do not think that the insistence on recognising a historical origin in the 
context of the climate crisis undermines the force of this position. Insofar as the ‘origin’ of the Anthropocene as 
I define it here, is itself the product of a system of historical frameworks already in practice and, in turn, 
continues to belatedly assume meaning in the ongoing unfolding of the climate crisis, it aligns with the 
irreducible quality of Benjamin’s origin as contingent to an enduring stream of becoming.  
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determined in relation to its capacity to be read as having one origin.55 First identified by Paul Crutzen 
and Eugene Stoermer in 2000, the ‘Anthropocene,’ marks the geologic shifts inaugurated by human 
activity.56 While Crutzen and Stoermer locate the inauguration of these shifts in the year 1800, ‘as the 
moment when methane and CO2 brewed by the gargantuan machines of the Industrial Revolution 
began to influence the earth’s climate,’ a significant tranche of Anthropocene theory now exists 
challenging this date and arguing for an earlier periodization.57 And so, making an epochal departure 
from Crutzen and Stoermer, I follow stratigraphic readings advanced by Mark Maslin and Simon 
Lewis that locate the Anthropocene in the hulls of transatlantic ships and settler-colonialism, moving 
back in history by a stretch of over 300 years to the arrival of Columbus into the Americas in 1492.58 
What thus serves as the historical origin of the climate crisis is at its very core an affront to Arendt’s 
claim that ‘plurality is the law of the earth.’59 
Where Hyvönen underplays the implications of identifying the moment from which this 
particular present of the climate crisis unfolds, I remain invested in Arendt’s claim that thinking must 
remain bound to the incidents and events of reality otherwise it ‘is liable either to become altogether 
meaningless or to rehash old verities which have lost all concrete relevance.’60 In other words, it is the 
singularity of the Anthropocene’s organising event, its beginning in the violence of colonialism and 
slavery, that must coordinate thinking today, and it is this form of original violence with which 
climate politics must contend. Implicit here is a move away from trends of ‘wilful blindness’ that 
permeate other engagements with the climate crisis, which refuse to acknowledge the violence of 
 
55 I recognise the complexity of this position and the careful nuance and scientific evidence that it demands. I 
aim to address these requirements throughout this chapter as I rely on both stratigraphic readings of atmospheric 
carbon levels and decolonial histories of settler-colonial invasions. My intention is thus not to contest the 
scientific basis on which Mark Maslin and Simon Lewis found their hypothesis regarding the colonial origins of 
the Anthropocene but to explore the philosophical implications of their claim.  
56 Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000.  
57 Schlosser, 2020: 3. For an overview of atmospheric carbon levels at the time of colonisation in 1492 and the 
geological ramifications see, Dull et al, 2010; Lewis and Maslin, 2015; 2018; Nevle and Bird, 2008; Nevle, 
Bird, Ruddiman and Dull, 2011. For decolonial interpretations of the Anthropocene as it pertains to this 
particular dating, see Baldwin and Erickson, 2020; Davis and Todd, 2017, Lewis and Maslin, 2015 
58 and Maslin, 2015; 2018.  
59 LMT: 19.  
60 BPF: 6.  
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ideological conditions that create and dissemble its organising logic.61 Central to this investment in 
the concrete is an acknowledgement of the Anthropocene’s origin in the colonisation of the so-called 
‘New World.’ For not only did this moment coincide with the arrival of European settlers into the 
Americas, but it also brought with it the ideological destruction of indigenous livelihoods, implicating 
the ‘New World’ in an irreversible and foundational violence. The unfolding violence of the climate 
crisis is thus staged as a series of ongoing encounters between oppressor and oppressed, coloniser and 
coloniser, possessor and dispossessed.  
Extended rehearsals of the ‘origin debate’ in the field of Anthropocene studies have 
complicated what it means to think in terms of ‘one definition and one origin.’ Beyond the temporal 
conjectures regarding the origin of the Anthropocene, the limits of what is understood as the 
‘Anthropocene’ continue to be tested as new names countering its apparent anthropocentrism are 
proposed. Whether it is the so-called capitalocene explored by Andreas Malm and Jason Moore to 
address forces of capital, the plantationocene that marks the intersection of dominating land and 
humans, or Donna Haraway’s chthulucene which emphasises the interaction of species; each denotes 
the sentiment of ‘entanglement’ that Dipesh Chakrabarty deems definitive of this particular ‘now of 
human history.’62 Identified by Chakrabarty in his own exploration of the Anthropocene’s resonance 
and implications, the invocation of entanglement aims at complicating and deconstructing the same 
ideological boundedness that gives rise to the specificity these accounts. Rather than revisit the 
various hypotheses that inform these narratives, I instead follow the stratigraphic readings of earth 
systems undertaken by Maslin and Lewis. Their contribution to Anthropocene studies moves away 
from the narratives of industry and technology pervasive of other ‘origin stories’ – the ones that 
Moore describes as ‘comfortable stories with uncomfortable facts’ – Industrial Revolution and 
Atomic Age being the most notable, to one that is marked by the events of colonialism and slavery.63  
 
61 Yusoff, 2018: 10. Growing appeals to decolonise and indigenise the climate crisis are evidence of attempts to 
challenge the refusal to recognise the forces that operate within the climate crisis. See: Davis and Todd, 2017; 
Tuana, 2019; Whyte, 2017; Yusoff, 2018.  
62 See; Chakrabarty, 2009; Haraway, 2015; Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2016.  
63 Moore, 2017: 595.  
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Positing one of the earliest origins to date, Lewis and Maslin locate the origins of this new 
epoch in 1610, the year in which the consequences of colonisation in the so-called ‘New World’ 
appear in stratigraphic record. They describe the methodological process of their work in the 
following way: 
 
Defining the beginning of the Anthropocene as a formal geologic unit of time requires the 
location of a global marker of an event in stratigraphic material, such as rock, sediment, or 
glacier ice, known as a Global Stratotype Section and Point (GSSP), plus other auxiliary 
stratigraphic markers indicating changes to the Earth system. Alternatively, after a survey of 
the stratigraphic evidence, a date can be agreed by committee, known as a Global Standard 
Stratigraphic Age (GSSA).GSSPs, known as ‘golden spikes’, are the preferred boundary 
markers.64 
 
The ‘golden spike’ of 1610 is one with immediate political ramifications, ones from which Maslin and 
Lewis do not shy away. Renamed the ‘Orbis point’ in reference to the Latin word for world and the 
inauguration of a new world-system coordinated by global interconnection, 1610 ‘implies that 
colonialism, global trade and coal brought about the Anthropocene.’65 As if responding to Arendt’s 
recognition that the questions raised by science cannot be answered by scientists alone, Maslin and 
Lewis acknowledge their hypothesis as ‘an act with consequences beyond geology.’66 It is here that 
the prescience of Benjamin’s critical historiography reveals itself.  
  Walter Benjamin did not discuss the historical resonance of colonialism, nor did he concern 
himself with the systemic problems it inaugurated. And yet, bringing him into discussion of the 
historical structures of colonialism, particularly as it evolves into the normative framework 
underpinning the climate crisis is a task easily drawn from his writing. Beyond his preoccupation with 
historical materialism as ‘shot through with splinters of messianic time’ and so inclined towards the 
 
64 Lewis and Maslin, 2015: 173.  
65 Lewis and Maslin, 2015: 177.  
66 HC: 3; Lewis and Maslin, 2015: 171.  
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rupture of historical linearity, it is Benjamin’s concern with the violence of the law that indicates his 
proximity to the question of colonial history.67 Indeed, the overlap between the law-making violence 
of settler-colonialism, the ‘invasion come to stay,’ and the state-sanctioned violence of neo-colonialist 
law-preservation indicate the aptness of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ to the question of 
colonialism.68 In turn, the intersection of violence and History, insofar as the dispossession of 
indigenous people occurs both physically and historically – they are present neither in place nor in 
historical record – points to the force of Benjamin’s subsequent critique of history outlined in the 
previous chapter.69  
Maslin and Lewis put into relief the lived specificity of those oppressed by the production of 
the Anthropocene: 
 
Besides permanently and dramatically altering the diet of almost all of humanity, the arrival 
of Europeans in the Americas also led to a large decline in human numbers. Regional 
population estimates sum to a total of 54 million people in the Americas in 1492, with recent 
population modelling estimates of 61 million people. Numbers rapidly declined to a minimum 
of about 6 million people by 1650 via exposure to diseases carried by Europeans, plus war, 
enslavement and famine.70 
 
With this account any lingering fears that the term ‘Anthropocene’ does not account for the power 
differentials that coordinate the climate crisis are remedied.71 Given the bodily immediacy of this 
violence, a rebuttal is made to the supposed abstract class of sexless, genderless ‘anthropos,’ that 
might otherwise assume the central role in considerations of the Anthropocene. Produced in the very 
literal violence of colonisation, these axes of power – and oppression – are exposed, what is thus 
 
67 SW4: 397.  
68 Wolfe, 1999. For a similar discussion, see also; Sharpe, 2016: 102-108.  
69 The sustained exclusion of indigenous lives from history is evident not least in the limited histories of the 
Anthropocene or statehood but persists in the literally in the example of missing indigenous women. The 
Canadian National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls serves as ongoing 
testament to this.  
70 Lewis and Maslin, 2015: 175.  
71 See Malm, 2013; Moore 2015; Haraway 2016; Mirzoeff, 2014. 
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achieved is a qualification of the ‘revolutionary fight’ in which Benjamin inscribes his historical 
materialist.72 Moreover, the ‘name’ of the law that must be destroyed in this fight assumes form in 
relation to the practice of settler-colonialism and its dependence on human exploitation.  
 The centripetal force of this event, which Maslin and Lewis qualify in terms of its ongoing 
geological power, highlights the law-making function of this moment. Mbembe similarly describes 
this moment in global history as portending a ‘planetarization of the world,’ invoking Sylvia Wynter’s 
depiction of 1492 as inaugurating a ‘new world view.’73 Yet even beyond the geographical 
reverberations of the colonial event, it assumes a status in history that perpetuates the original claim 
of occupation. David Lloyd describes the relationship between the settler and the original contingency 
of their arrival in terms of the calcification of a legal framework that echoes Benjamin’s extra-legal 
law-making violence:  
 
The settler remains perpetually on guard, poised for real and imaginary resistance behind an 
‘iron wall’ whose institutionalisation preserves the attitude of an initial colonising minority 
within the very structures of the state. Rather than gaining confidence and therefore openness 
to the potential for change and accommodation as it gains power and security, the settler 
society undergoes a gradual hardening of its defensive psychic and institutional structures 
over time. Rather than expanding democratic freedoms and inclusivity, the more it 
appropriates in the name of security and development, the more deeply it becomes 
militarised, and the more it shapes draconian laws and restrictions on the rights of the 
colonised.74 
 
Indeed, as the globe is reorganised by the networks of transatlantic trade throughout the sixteenth 
century, humans uprooted from their claims to place in Africa and transported across the globe in the 
 
72 SW4: 396.  
73 Wynter, 1995.  
74 Lloyd, 2012: 69. For a similar discussion see Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos on the ‘being of the 
occupier,’ (2014). 
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slave trade, a new rendering of earth-world-history is brought into play, one that inclines towards the 
ideologically fixed Earth-World-History.  
As noted, Sharpe describes centripetal function of violent origins through the image of the 
slave ship, which leaves a ‘wake’ in the water, a disturbance that ripples outwards, rewriting the 
topography of water and implicating others beyond the original scene of violence. Andrew Benjamin 
similarly reflects on this expansive force in violence, noting that ‘violence is not just an individual act. 
It is worldly in part because while sanctioned by the world that world is configured to deny its victim 
a place within it. Taken together this is the event of violence.’75 Maintaining a worldly force then, the 
violence of the Anthropocene origin incorporates the flows of movement already in existence. For 
Yusoff, this rewriting of global cartography builds upon the construction of ‘[b]lackness as a 
historically constituted and intentionally enacted deformation in the formation of subjectivity, a 
deformation that presses an inhuman categorization and the inhuman earth into intimacy.’76 The 
inhuman proximity, seemingly produced as the marginalia earth-world-history’s rewriting under the 
planetarization of the world, becomes fundamental to the practices of extraction that make 
colonialism possible. Hence, it is not merely the coincidence of inhumanity in the pursuit of global 
order by which colonialism emerges but the very incorporation of the former as definitive of what it 
means both to realise and maintain colonialism at a global scale. The object of violence is thus not 
merely those whose presence marks the counterforce to settler-colonialism, namely the presence of 
the indigenous, but those who are already rendered mute and instrumental to this project.  
Beyond the economic ‘entanglement’ of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean, and Europe at 
this time, and here I rely on Chakrabarty’s use of the term as invoking a predicament which demands 
a response from within a plurality, what is equally underway is a momentous shift in the transfer of 
flora and fauna.77 As Maslin and Lewis explain what is commonly known as the Colombian 
Exchange, ‘the cross-continental movement of dozens of…food species…domesticated animals… 
and human commensals (the black rat, to the Americas) plus accidental transfers…contributed to a 
 
75 Benjamin, 2016: 161.  
76 Yusoff, 2018: 9.  
77 Chakrabarty, 2009.  
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swift, ongoing, radical reorganization of life on earth without geological precedent.’78 Indeed it is 
these two paradigm shifts together, the reshaping of ecosystems and the death of so many indigenous 
lives, that appear posthumously in stratigraphic record as a dip in carbon production. It is this dip to 
which Maslin and Lewis respond, locating it as the point of departure for the Anthropocene.  
Responding to Maslin and Lewis’ hypothesis, Heather Davis and Zoe bring into view the 
corporeal depth of the ‘evidence’ that supports their claim. Rather than abstract from the deaths of 
indigenous Americans and the theft of Africans, they speak in terms of the ‘fleshy philosophies and 
fleshy bodies [as] precisely the stakes of the Anthropocene.’79 Nancy Tuana echoes this point, 
describing ‘the circulations of race in the Anthropocene [as having] fleshly lives and lineages.’80As 
these bodies assume presence in the perversion of the oneness of earth-world-history, they echo the 
discussion of the death camp from earlier chapters. Whilst I will not claim that the uprootedness that 
preceded totalitarianism and that ongoing uprooting that is sustained in the violence of the climate 
crisis are the same, it is worth noting that each operate to subvert the basis of rights at the same time 
that claims to place are rendered mute. Where totalitarianism uprooted its victims from their place 
within the world, imposing a ‘placeless’ status that coincided with the loss of rights, colonialism 
exercises its power as a similar negation of place.81 Echoing this point, when Giorgio Agamben 
imagines arrivals at concentration camps, he enjoins an account of the subject who, robbed of the 
story of their worldly being, of an identity that is based ‘in’ history, is reduced to mere matter. He thus 
writes that, ‘if one was a Jew in Auschwitz or a Bosnian woman in Omarska, one entered the camp as 
a result not of political choice but rather of what was most private and incommunicable in oneself, 
that is, one’s blood, one’s biological body. But precisely the latter functions now as a decisive 
political criterion.’82 I invoke this moment, of the camp inhabitant’s loss of history and their reduction 
 
78 Maslin and Lewis, 2015: 174.  
79 Davis and Todd, 2016: 767.  
80 Tuana, 2019: 11.  
81 In a way what I am pushing against here are claims that the European Holocaust ‘targeted humans alone.’ 
Returning to my claim that to be human is to be in place in the constellation earth-world-history, to target 
humans in their abstract specificity implies a challenge to their being-in-place. Although I don’t want to collapse 
the distinction between the invasion and occupation that is settler-colonialism and the ghettoization of 
communities during totalitarianism, I do want to complicate the implication of ‘placelessness’ in the idea of 
‘humans alone.’ See Estes, 2019, 89-90, TallBear, 2016. 
82 Agamben, 2000: 122.  
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to a life denied earthly purpose and hence the potential to enter into the constellation of earth-world-
history as the locus proper to their being, to demonstrate an overlap between the common modes 
through which genocide – racial or colonial – operate. 
 While a clear resonance can be felt here with Agamben’s examination of the homo sacer, 
rather than advance Agamben’s largely disembodied account of the subject upon whom violence is 
perpetrated with impunity, I turn to other invocations of it, highlighting its corporeal specificity. 83 In 
‘Refusing Blackness-as-Victimization: Trayvon Martin and the Black Cyborgs’ Joy James and João 
Costa Vargas provide an example of the homo sacer in situ. They write: 
 
What happens when instead of becoming enraged and shocked every time a Black person is 
killed in the United States, we recognize Black death as a predictable and constitutive aspect 
of this democracy? What will happen then if instead of demanding justice we recognize (or at 
least consider) that the very notion of justice . . . produces and requires Black exclusion and 
death as normative.84 
 
Denise Ferreira da Silva similarly resists falling into the logic of Agamben’s homo sacer to exemplify 
the violence to which racialised bodies are exposed, particularly in the context of murder by police. 
Here she describes the ethico-juridical entity that is the murdered Black body as ‘an effect of the very 
grammar that governs modern ethical and juridical texts, which guides legal decisions, the framing 
and function of legal institutions, as well as critical legal thought.’85 Sharpe further compounds this, 
drawing us back to the language of earth-world-history, proclaiming the state-sanctioned legal and 
extra-legal murders of Black people in the USA (although we see this beyond national borders and 
attaining particular extremity in the ‘slow violence’ of the climate crisis) as ‘the ground we walk 
 
83 Agamben, 1998. Rather than persist with the abstract identity of Agamben’s homo sacer, part of my project of 
critical history relies on giving space to those rendered exilic by History. While I cannot assume to speak for nor 
name those exiled by the organising events of the Anthropocene, I want to try and  think in dialogue with their 
‘afterlives’ and those who continued to be persecuted in their place.  
84 James and Vargas, 2012: 193.  
85 Ferreira da Silva, 2017: 276.  
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on.’86 The claims at play here bring us back to Benjamin’s law-making violence as the coincidence of 
legality, extra-legality and the construction of race.  
 Yusoff goes further still in her reading of race and the fracturing of placedness that it names, 
arguing that ‘the racial categorization of Blackness shares its natality with mining the New World, as 
does the material impetus for colonialism in the first instance.’ Radically inverting the expansive 
opening that natality signals in the writing of Arendt, here ‘natality’ emerges as the foreclosure of 
Arendt’s original politics of plurality and spontaneity. Yusoff goes onto connect the idea of Blackness 
with the ‘displacement and eradication of indigenous peoples [who] get caught and are defined in the 
ontological wake of geology.’87 Borrowing from Sharpe’s political lexicon, Yusoff’s allusion to 
‘wakes’ highlights the normative force of colonial History, or, as I would want to understand it here, 
the collapse of earth-world-history. The calcification of claims to place under colonialism, which 
recalls not only the dispossession of indigenous peoples but, as Yusoff demonstrates the construction 
of race more generally, coincides with the undoing of earth-world-history as a space of original 
agonism. Yusoff puts this in terms drawn seamlessly from the constellation:  
 
The human and its subcategory, the inhuman, are historically relational to a discourse of 
settler-colonial rights and the material practices of extraction, which is to say that the 
categorization of matter is a spatial execution, of place, land, and person cut from relation 
through geographic displacement (and relocation through forced settlement and transatlantic 
slavery).88 
 
This displacement operates not least in the context of geography and hence a form of spatial 
displacement but within the context of time, appearing here as a way of negating the originality of 
natality as a disruptive yet placed event (both in time and space). Where Arendt gives an account of 
natality as creating ‘the condition for remembrance, that is, for history,’ what depictions of history 
 
86 Sharpe, 2016: 7. In Lose Your Mother (2007) Hartman makes direct reference to the notion of bare life as she 
discusses the valence of ‘staying’ in the afterlife of slavery. See, 2007: 86-88.  
87 Yusoff, 2018: 2.  
88 Yusoff, 2018: 13-4.  
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like this make clear is the complete erasure of natality as a realisable faculty and hence the exilic force 
that operates within earth-world-history.89   
 Beyond its original fracturing of place and claims to be-in-place, processes of colonialism 
demonstrate the intrinsic violence that is the inability to be in any properly human sense. That is to 
say, without the ability to fulfil the potential inscribed within the project of being-in-place in earth-
world-history what is lost is the very meaning of being. This point was articulated in the previous 
chapter in reference to Arendt’s claim that a life without speech is literally dead to the world, 
incapable of fulfilling the earthly purpose of being within the complex matrix of earth-world-
history.90 When Arendt describes the status of the slave in this regard as ‘aneu logon, deprived, of 
course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense,’ 
she recalls this point and gestures towards the original violence that is the construction of a life 
marked by its inability to be heard.91 Hartman elicits a similar reading of slavery when she describes 
the violence witnessed by Frederick Douglas of his Aunt Hester’s beating. Accounting for ‘one of the 
most well-known scenes of torture in the literature of slavery,’ Hartman describes the way in which 
Douglas ‘establishes the centrality of violence to the making of the slave and identifies it as an 
original generative act equivalent to the statement ‘I am born.’’92 Even beyond this original violence it 
is Douglas’ inability to locate his birth in history that betrays the exilic condition of slavery. Held 
within Douglas’ admission, ‘I have no accurate knowledge of my age, never having seen any 
authentic record of it…I was not allowed to make any inquiries of my master concerning it. He 
deemed all such inquiries on the part of a slave improper and impertinent, and evidence of a restless 
spirit,’ is a threshold imposed over who or what is permitted to contribute to ‘history.’93  
Where Mbembe describes this form of the slave’s exile beyond history by their oppressor as a 
condemnation to live and denial of recognition as co-human, he maintains that the slave ‘nevertheless 
remained [an] active subject.’94 Throughout this experience the work of production continued and 
 
89 HC: 9.  
90 HC: 176.  
91 HC: 27.  
92 Hartman, 1997: 3.  
93 Hartman, 1999: 1-2.  
94 CBR: 2.  
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Douglas ‘never stopped desiring freedom.’95 Drawing on this life-giving desire, Douglas thus 
maintained a claim to the anarchic potential to begin.96 Hence, although Douglas exists beyond the 
violence of History, his exclusion from History signals its refusal to admit impartiality. It is precisely 
the violence of this exclusion, the insistence on Douglas’ relegation to the peripheral ‘non-History’ 
that points to ‘something rotten in the law’ of History.97 Baldwin makes a similar argument when he 
describes the way in which the violent denial of historical impartiality undermines History’s claim to 
integrity. Hence, when he writes that ‘in the case of the Negro the past was taken from him whether 
he wanted to or no,’ the effects of this theft and historical exile rebound of the oppressor.98 Hence, he 
observes, ‘our dehumanization of the Negro then is indivisible from our dehumanization of ourselves: 
the loss of our own identity is the price we pay for our annulment of his.’99 
 In a later text on the histories of black women, Hartman speaks to a shared exclusion from the 
normative force of History. In reference to these women, whose narratives are ‘written from nowhere, 
from the nowhere of the ghetto and the nowhere of utopia,’ Hartman locates a spatial void which, in 
parallel to Douglas’ temporal exclusion, reveals the exilic presence to which the oppressed speak.100 
Positioned both inside and outside the structural normativity of society, the enslaved and the 
colonised emerge as the historically – and racially – specific condition of Agamben’s exposed homo 
sacer. Naming them in this way concretizes the law that Benjamin’s later account of divine or 
anarchic violence will seek to destroy. Moreover, insofar as we remain with this body in its 
construction as ‘other,’ in its being raced, a mode of resistance is then enacted against the violence 
that would otherwise render it mute and exiled from the constellation earth-world-history. The 
processes of erasure that Davis and Todd locate in settler-colonialism, as erasing both earth and world 
show how the lives of indigenous peoples were deemed external to the constellation earth-world-
 
95 Goldberg, 2018: 212. 
96 Mbembe concludes Critique of Black Reason with a discussion of the ‘desire for life’ as a resource for the 
redemption of politics and culture. This coincidence of desire with a life-giving potential will form a central part 
to the conclusion of Chapter Six where I read it in tandem with Arendt’s ‘life-giving oases’ of love and 
friendship. See PP: 201-205.  
97 SW1: 242. 
98 Baldwin, 2017: 30.  
99 Baldwin, 2017: 26.  
100 Hartman, 2019: xiii.  
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history. Davis and Todd are thus led to an account of the Anthropocene in terms of a ‘severing of 
relations between humans and the soil.’101 Elsewhere, Eyal Weizman shows the equivalence with 
which ‘native people, who were seen as part of the natural environment, were displaced along with 
the climate or killed.’102  
In the context of the Anthropocene, this amounts to the fracturing of its claim to historical 
impartiality. Indeed, it is precisely this loss of historical impartiality that realises what Yusoff calls 
‘white geology,’ the racialised practice of scientific reasoning.103 The synchronicity with which land 
is colonised, humans entered into slavery, and race constructed coalesce as the febrile ground from 
which the seeds of the climate crisis are sown. Or, as Ghassan Hage surmises, the ‘practice of racial 
and ecological domination have the same roots.’104 Looking now to the preservation of these 
processes, I turn to the centripetal effects of this moment, thinking alternately in terms of Benjamin’s 
law-preserving violence and the climate crisis.  
 
5.3 Preserving Violence: In the Wake of History’s Exile  
If, as Benjamin tells us, ‘origins are eddies in the stream of becoming,’ the particular origin of the 
Anthropocene forms part of the insidious invasion of colonialism into the structural framing of 
modern history and reality. What occurs here is then not only an act of violence but the realisation of 
violence as law that will that persist in diminishing the earthly potential of the racialised other as they 
are drawn into ‘scenes of subjection.’105 Arendt was well aware of the foundation of modern America 
on this divisive construction. Rather than recognising this violence as exerting a structural force, 
however, Arendt focused on the establishment of American independence from the ruling British. 
Unfortunately, this renders her celebration of the ‘spirit of the laws’ inaugurated at this moment 
complicit with the affirmation of a particularly sinister and violent law-making violence. Unable to 
grasp the meaning of settler-colonialism Arendt was incapable of seeing the violence that would serve 
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as the ground of the nation she esteemed so highly. Her essays on civil disobedience display 
particularly uncomfortable evidence of this; she writes: ‘the reason [Tocqueville] could predict the 
future of Negroes and Indians for more than a century ahead lay in the simple and frightening fact that 
these people had never been included in the original consensus universalis of the American 
republic.’106 Ayça Çubukçu makes the violence of Arendt’s reading explicit: ‘not only were African 
Americans and Native Americans excluded from the original consensus universalis, arguably, their 
enslavement, slaughter, and dispossession through violent acts of settler colonialism were constitutive 
of the revolutionary republic that Arendt so praised.’107 Arendt’s failures to critically engage, and to 
assume her own injunction to think, are disappointing, since they suggest an image of Arendt at odds 
with her praxis of expansive politics and embrace of worldly being.108   
 In stark contrast to Arendt, Martin Luther King’s words speak truth to the spirit of laws that 
emerged as foundational to the United States. Instead of Arendt’s reflections then, which lend 
themselves more readily to a defence of the US police service which emerged out of the need to 
protect and enforce slavery and colonialism, King’s words provide proof that Benjamin’s ‘flash’ of 
Historical oppression has been recognised: 
 
Our nation was born in genocide when it embraced the doctrine that the original American, 
the Indian, was an inferior race. Even before there were large numbers of Negroes on our 
shores, the scar of racial hatred had already disfigured colonial society. From the sixteenth 
century forward, blood flowed in battles of racial supremacy. We are perhaps the only nation 
which tried as a matter of national policy to wipe out its indigenous population. Moreover, we 
elevated that tragic experience into a noble crusade. Indeed, even today we have not permitted 
ourselves to reject or to feel remorse for this shameful episode. Our literature, our films, our 
drama, our folklore all exalt it.109  
 
106 Arendt, 1970: 90.  
107 Çubukçu, 2021, 42.  
108 For a critical review of Arendt and race, see: Belle, 2014.  
109 King, 1963: 33. Regrettably, the United States is not the only nation whose foundation was premised on the 
attempt to ‘wipe out its indigenous population.’ On the genealogy of the US police service and its relationship to 
slavery and indigeneity see, Bass, 2001; Vitale, 2017.  
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The immanent connection between violence and place, as the destruction of communities coincides 
with the desecration of land, recalls the implication of colonialism with the wholeness of earth-world-
history. The normative force of racist doctrines such as colonialism assume presence not only as they 
render the topography of the environment anew but as they force out the relational worldliness of 
indigenous people and the historical claim to appearance of those who, like slaves, are forced into this 
new iteration of place. 
What occurs beyond the immediate spaces of oppression is the simultaneous failure to 
develop a meaningful ontology of being on the behalf of the occupier. The scene of violence thus 
incorporates both oppressor and oppressed. Hence, as ‘the Atlantic gradually became the epicentre of 
a new concatenation of worlds, the locus of a new planetary consciousness,’ it incorporated a 
perversion of earth-world-history.110 Baldwin makes precisely the same point when he writes that ‘all 
of the Western nations have been caught in a lie, the lie of their pretended humanism; this means that 
their history has no moral justification, and that the West has no moral authority.’111 Forgoing the 
fullness of history what is rendered immoral is the pretence of History’s claim to humanism. 
Dissembling the agonism that unfolds in acts of original relation with that constellation, earth-world-
history becomes a source of exile (Earth-World-History). Disfigured by force and recast as an 
iteration of fixed ontological specificity, the Earth-World-History of colonial logic, for instance, a 
normalization of exclusion, the perpetual exile of slaves and indigenous people from their homes, 
become the basis of its expansion. While Arendt’s fears for loneliness and worldly alienation strike a 
chord here, as does Heidegger’s emphasis on the homeless status of human beings, by remaining with 
the structurally violent dimension of this account of earth-world-history in the Anthropocene, I hope 
to highlight the Benjaminian dimension of this history.112  
 Davis and Todd describe Kyle Whyte, of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, as providing an 
account of the Anthropocene in which it is exposed as ‘the deliberate enactment of colonial processes 
that refuse to acknowledge specific and locational relations between humans, the land, and our other 
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kin.’113 Connecting this interpretation of the Anthropocene to the messianic force of Benjamin’s 
historical ‘flash’ allows for a rethinking of that original refusal. As Whyte himself writes, ‘industrial 
settler campaigns erase what makes a place ecologically unique in terms of human and nonhuman 
relations, the ecological history of a place, and the sharing of the environment by different human 
societies.’114 Robbed of specificity and radically undermined as a locus of original relationality, the 
space that Whyte describes diverges from the matrix of irreducible forces that coalesce as the 
constellation earth-world-history. What transpires instead is the calcification of space and the 
normalization of something like a lack in relation to the original claim to be-in-place. The insidious 
erasure of that constellation that informs the ontological weight of being-in-place establishes a sense 
of ‘present absence.’ The constitutive violence of colonialism premised insofar as it is premised on 
the negation of the indigeneity creates this paradoxical space in which the law of colonial presence is 
inextricable from the exclusion of the indigenous body.  
 David Lloyd describes the condition of absent presence in terms through which the exilic 
condition of the climate crisis can be interpolated, hence: 
 
This peculiar condition of being absent even when all too present, or of presence manifest in 
absence, of being outside even when all too much inside, however metaphysical it may 
appear, is one that both follows the spatial logic of ethnic cleansing and occupation as 
material phenomena and conforms to the logical space of the exception, that space where the 
constitutive force of law or state is manifested in its suspension.115 
 
The spatial logic of this violence inheres in the preservation of Benjamin’s law-making violence 
which assumes an omnipotent presence as the dissembling of earth-world-history as a locus of 
original ontological antagonism. What instead becomes pervasive within the sense of place described 
by Lloyd and Said is the liminal threshold of exile. Namely, that the anarchic law of this constellation 
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is precisely not something akin plurality, but instead the prescription of certain forms of legality. In 
‘On the Concept of History,’ the hegemonic presence of this framework emerges in the operation of 
historical conformism.116   
 The insidiousness of exile, which persists as the negation of the place necessary for the 
formation of world and history, in other words, the negation of the claim to exercise the ontological 
potential inscribed in earth-world-history assumes a conditioning presence when it assumes what 
Benjamin refers to in the context of law-preserving violence, a ‘threatening violence.’117 What 
distinguishes Benjamin’s presentation of law-preserving violence in terms of the threat recurs in 
Foucault’s depiction of the panopticon where the constant possibility of being watched figures an 
instance of imminent violence.118 In the ‘Critique on Violence’ Benjamin develops this through the 
distinction of threats in relation to objects of deterrence.  
 
And its threat is not intended as the deterrent that uninformed liberal theorists interpret it to 
be. A deterrent in the exact sense would require a certainty that contradicts the nature of a 
threat and is not attained by any law, since there is always hope of eluding its arm. This 
makes it all the more threatening, like fate, which determines whether the criminal is 
apprehended.119 
 
As the threat assumes a normative status in the structural formation of society it exercises a claim 
over the capacity of certain individuals to incorporate themselves within a plurality. Suspended 
outside of the social framework of earth-world-history as the locus of action, what is gradually eroded 
is the valence of place as the ground that precedes action. What Arendt will refer to in terms of 
uprootedness or alienation and Heidegger in terms of a pervasive homelessness is remedied by the 
unqualifiable claim to place that each individual maintains.120 Namely, that insofar as a person is, they 
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are in place. Arendt puts this bluntly when she writes that the ‘earth is the quintessence of the human 
condition,’ or that wherever people go they may form a polis or political community.121 In other 
words, insofar as being in place coincides with being, the possibility to reject the dispossessing exilic 
structures of History through an anarchic claim to place is possible. I will return to this potential in the 
concluding section.  
While the ‘law’ in Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ is not reducible to legality, its 
preservation is perhaps most clearly attested to in the structures of state-sanctioned violence. Sharpe 
explores the endurance of this violence within the context of systemic of racism, which straddles the 
division between legality and extra-legality. She writes: 
 
the condition in the post–Civil War United States of the formerly enslaved and their 
descendants; still on the plantation, still surrounded by those who claimed ownership over 
them and who fought, and fight still, to extend that state of capture and subjection in as many 
legal and extralegal ways as possible, into the present. The means and modes of Black 
subjection may have changed, but the fact and structure of that subjection remain.122  
 
In another section of this same text, Sharpe describes the ‘gratuitous violence that occurs at the level 
of a structure that constitutes the Black as the constitutive outside.’123 Benjamin’s critique of historical 
conformism can be found in these words, as violence assumes a structural force and draws the present 
into a reality steeped in the exclusionary logic of the past. Claiming a similar proximity to Sharpe’s 
word is Nixon’s account of ‘slow attritional violence.’124  Dispersed across time and space, slow 
violence forms in inverted parallel with the exilic subject, as one pervades History the other is 
removed. Competing to occupy place within that same matrix of earth-world-history, the victim of 
 
Heidegger’s discussion of homelessness is similarly woven throughout his writing. It appears firstly in the 
context of Dasein in Being and Time as a way of describing the anxiety or inescapable existential condition of 
life (BT: 188-189). It attains to a singular clarity in discussions of the inauthenticity of dwelling in his post-war 
writings, see PLT: 158-159.  
121 HC: 2;199.  
122 Sharpe, 2016: 12.  
123 Sharpe, 2016: 28. 
124 Nixon, 2018: 2.  
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slow violence is erased from presence. This erasure assumes a critical poignancy in the climate crisis 
in the example of small island nations, whose claim-to-placedness is literally denied by rising sea-
levels. Having named the law that is preserved as the violence of the climate crisis, namely the 
History of settler-colonialism, I conclude by exploring the conditions for Benjamin’s destruction of 
the law in divine violence.  
 
5.4 Divine Violence: Destruction of History’s Law  
Recalling Hyvönen’s twofold appeal for a ‘collective existence’ and renewed faith in the human 
‘capacity to change the world’ from the introduction to this chapter, I conclude by returning to these 
ideas. What emerges in equal force at this junction is the provocation from Hartman that served as an 
epigraph to this chapter; namely, when is it time to dream?125 Charging this question is the 
ineliminability of the climate crisis, the irreversible fact of its presence and the necessity to think 
place as always now determined by that condition. Developing a divine or messianic destruction of 
the law that is History thus becomes a project prefaced by the recognition of exactly this ineliminable 
irreversibility. Recreating the tropes of Benjamin’s intersecting historical generations, perhaps most 
of all in the language of generations whose coming was expected and on whose appearance the past 
has a claim, I rely here on Sharpe’s ‘wake work’ which operates in the overlap between past and 
present, mapping ‘the ways that the past haunts the present.’126  
Serving as a critical point of departure for Sharpe is Saidiya Hartman’s identification of the 
present as the ‘after-live of slavery’ in which ‘lives are still imperilled and devalued by a racial 
calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched years ago.’127 Sharpe describes her 
incorporation of Hartman’s imagery in own development of ‘a black studies in the wake [which] 
would inhabit this knowledge [of after-life] as the ground from which we theorize.’128 Putting into 
abeyance the ground of the homo sacer, which History posits as normative, Sharpe and Hartman 
recentre the Historical periphery. Where Sharpe and Hartman’s work becomes particularly apposite to 
 
125 Hartman, 2007: 100. 
126 Sharpe, 2014: 60.  
127 Hartman, 2007: 6.  
128 Sharpe, 2014: 60.  
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the task at hand is in the critical light into which it brings the racialised origins of the Orbis point of 
the Anthropocene. Less an abstract historical moment, Maslin and Lewis’ hypothesis reveals the 
stubborn intersection of earth, world, and history and the necessity to rethink the violent origin of the 
present. Once again then, the convergence with Benjamin is apparent. If the origin of the climate 
crisis lies within the law-making violence of colonisation and maintains presence through the law-
preserving violence of neo-colonial practices, the divine violence that would disrupt this claim to 
normative order would be the messianic intervention into history that exposes the present as ‘in the 
wake.’ 
 In the previous two sections, I have sought to think in the presence of the exilic subjects of 
the climate crisis. Reappearing in Kathryn Yusoff’s writing as history’s ‘voidings,’ both the ‘voided’ 
and the exiled serve as a rejoinder to the limited perspective of History’s ‘we.’ It is this ‘we’ that 
assumes presence as the narrator of History. Moreover, it is the preservation of exile as a form of 
domination, a continuation into the present that is apparent in Yusoff’s use of the present continuous 
voidings that serves as an imperative to counter the normalisation of this exclusionary violence. When 
Yusoff thus challenges the ‘we’ of history she begins the task of resistance that aligns with anarchic, 
law-destroying violence in order to confront the apparent givenness of the present. Unable to answer 
the question, ‘who are you who writes history,’ Yusoff calls upon a plurality of historians, whose 
experiences give texture to the unfolding constellation of earth-world-history so under threat by the 
homogenising force of the Anthropocene’s History. Picking up on the language of History’s exilic 
force, Yusoff’s appeal might be read as calling on historians, the practitioners of Historical 
resistance. It is precisely this task, one that notes the distinction of the Historian and historian that 
Australian scholar Jane Haggis evinces, responding to her own encounter with Australian colonial 
History, from a position that ‘[refuses] ‘Historian’ and [claims], perhaps ‘historian,’ writing always 
from the particularity of some one’s history, a history never external to the narrator or the narrated.’129 
Haggis sees within such a history (history) an ‘ethics of entanglement: of partiality and 
incompleteness,’ marking the proximity of her historiography to the redeemed ‘voidings’ of Yusoff 
 
129 Haggis, 2014: 168.  
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and to the relational inclinations of Adriana Cavarero’s that intercut through natality’s vulnerable and 
plural generations. 
Like Haggis, whose rejection of History’s violence of exclusion entails the acknowledgement 
of ‘the partial situatedness of [white Australia’s] knowledge making and its products,’ Yusoff orients 
away from the false claim to historical completeness by bringing into presence those rendered, as 
Benjamin so calls them, History’s ‘detritus.’ 130 What thus appear as Yusoff’s ‘voidings’ constitute 
both a form of anarchic historicism that reorients the linearity of history away from the normative 
claim to violent conformism towards what Yusoff calls an ‘altered thinking’ of the present or what 
Sharpe understands as ‘wake work.’ Recovering the messianic force of natality from the previous 
chapter, in this concluding section I demonstrate the anarchic potential of this altered historical 
thinking to destroy the violence of History. Hence, it is here that I enact the Baldwinian sentiment that 
‘we are our history’ and have a responsibility for the manner in which we appear.  
 In his recent monograph, Joel Alden Schlosser highlights the need for a complex 
historiography of the Anthropocene. Much like Yusoff, he appeals for a complication of precisely that 
homogenous claim to the plural ‘we.’ Speaking to Yusoff’s project then, he describes the fallibility of 
History’s ‘we,’ noting that ‘often “we” excludes many of those most affected by the centuries of 
exploitation and domination that have culminated in the present climate crisis.’131 He goes onto to say 
that while the Anthropocene involves all of ‘us,’ exactly who comprises that ‘us’ is rarely interrogated 
or brought into the necessary dialogues that take place regarding the Anthropocene. If the trouble with 
History’s ‘we’ is its liminal claim to participation and the qualifications implicit in its structure, one 
resolution would seem to exist in those ‘voidings.’ And yet, part of what makes the project of 
historical impartiality so problematic is the tropes of exploitation that pervade both the production of 
voids and the subsequent redemption of voids in the service of reconciliation. In other words, the 
exilic condition of History cannot be destroyed simply by inverting the status of the so-called detritus 
that underpins it.  
 
130 Haggis, 2004: 8.  
131 Schlosser, 2020: 17. ` 
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 Recognising History as their oppressor, those deemed exilic to the constellation of earth-
world-history resist by claiming presence, not merely in place but in history as well. That is to say, in 
opposition to the silence of brute violence, the exiled persist in courage and humour to sing in the face 
of oppression and claim space within the construction of history.132 In the context of the battle at 
Standing Rock, for instance, Nick Estes describes the communities as coming together in what was as 
‘a struggle over ancestral lands wrongly stolen through violence and guile.’133 Emphatically, it is 
about ‘more than stopping a pipeline.’134 These acts of environmental resistance emerge as central to 
the laying bare of those structures of History. What is thus exposed is the extent to which this, and 
other instances of environmental destruction, are never simply acts against land but always already 
acts against indigenous peoples and in that way, premised upon the exposure of these bodies to that 
violence. Caught alongside the violence of indigenous claims to presence is the simultaneous 
treatment of Black bodies positioned as instrumental to these processes of extraction. As these plural 
forces of violence coalesce, they reveal environmental destruction and minority oppression as two 
sides of the same coin. Inés Valdez gives a description of these moments as disruptive ‘because they 
counter historical accounts of progress that obfuscate knowledge’ – ‘that knowledge’ being the 
ontological openings occurring in the wake of History’s earth-world-history.135 Operative in these 
exilic spaces is Benjamin’s political impulse: ‘to expose the wreckage of history, to stay with it to 
make whole what has been destroyed and awaken the dead.’136 Awakening the dead thus becomes the 
guiding injunction that will serve as resistance to the linear force of History’s violence. And yet, it is 
clear that to approach the dead in this way, in the service of redemption, would recreate the systems of 
violence organised by the logic of means and ends against which this resistance pits itself. The 
paradox of Benjamin’s turn to history thus lies in the inability to reappropriate the dead and the 
oppressed as means in order to overcome History.  
 
132 It is worth noting that Arendt positioned violence as always mute, unable to speak and enrich the plurality of 
the world, see; HC, 26; Arendt, 1972.  
133 Curley, 2019.  
134 Estes, 2019: 2.  
135 Valdez, 2020: 101.  
136 Ibid.  
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 Luis Guzmàn provides one of the clearest articulations of the paradox of violence that 
Benjamin works through via the concept divine violence. He describes this initially as follows: 
 
If one believes that violence is necessary to overcome certain situations of oppression and 
injustice on Earth, and yet that it is never justifiable (since as a means to an end its 
justification is dependent on a specific end that cannot avoid, to preserve itself, reproducing 
the conditions that were to be eliminated), then one finds oneself in a paradox.137  
 
In the context at hand this translates to the paradox of recreating the oppressed in a new class of 
instrumentality, re-perpetuating claims to bodily ownership where the objective aim is the supposed 
redemption from oppressive servitude. In other words, redemption from the History of colonialism 
and its preservation in the normativity of settler-colonialism cannot be attained via the appropriation 
of History’s oppressed as handmaiden. As Guzmàn puts it, the main trait of divine violence ‘is that it 
is not a means to an end; it is not exercised “to.”’138 What this means in relation to the Anthropocene 
is a complication of what it means to decolonise a normativity that operates not only at the level of 
Historical violence but extends to consume the entirety of the planet. The singular need for divine 
intervention in this context thus departs both from the need to break the hold of settler-colonial law 
whilst also recognising that this law has an irreversible claim over earth-world-history: we cannot not 
live in the time of the Anthropocene, even where that Anthropocene diverges from its inaugural 
foundation in violence.  
 Another paradox emerges in the context of the divine violence sought in relation to the 
normative violence of the Anthropocene. The law cannot be destroyed as the empirical condition for 
living. The Anthropocene may be decolonised, critical histories retold against the force of History, the 
exilic condition of the dead redeemed, and the violence of its preservation remedied, but the empirical 
fact of its presence will persist. Decolonising the Anthropocene will not destroy the climate crisis, nor 
will it reverse it. And yet, that does not mean that the need to decolonise the Anthropocene 
 
137 Guzmàn, 2014: 50.  
138 Guzmàn, 2014: 51.  
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disappears. It remains incumbent upon the historical present to reorient its relationship with the past 
and assume an understanding of being in the present that takes the fact of the Anthropocene as its 
necessary point of departure without succumbing to the logic that once organised its appearance. Out 
of Standing Rock, Estes tells us that ‘there is no separation between past and present, meaning that an 
alternative future is also determined by our understanding of the past. Our history is the future.’139 
Davis and Todd provide their own vision of what decolonising the Anthropocene would look like: 
 
We hope to have shown that by dating the Anthropocene to colonialism we can at least begin 
to address the root of the problem, which is the severing of relations through the brutality of 
colonialism coupled with an imperial, universal logic. Through this, we might then begin to 
address not only the immediate problems associated with massive reliance upon fossil fuel 
and the nuclear industry, but the deeper questions of the need to acknowledge our embedded 
and embodied relations with our other than-human kin and the land itself. This necessarily 
means re-evaluating not just our energy use, but our modes of governance, ongoing racial 
injustice, and our understandings of ourselves as human.140   
 
Is this what Benjamin evinced in his project of divine violence? Does the naming of the law that 
violence preserves achieve the destructive force of divine violence? Moreover, does the 
acknowledgement of relationality signal the anarchic beginning of which divine violence is capable? 
Answering these questions is made possible via a return to Guzmàn.  
 Guzmàn denotes four qualities of divine violence: ‘the possibility of its occurrence, the 
impossibility of its recognition as such by humankind, the lack of urgency for of said recognition, and 
the invisibility of its expiatory power.’141 Drawn from three dense sentences in the last paragraph of 
the ‘Critique of Violence’, Guzmàn dedicates the bulk of his exegesis to working through the meaning 
of these qualities. The first, the innate potentiality of divine violence, echoes Massimiliano Tomba’s 
 
139 Estes, 2019: 14-5, emphasis added. 
140 Davis and Todd, 2017: 775.  
141 Guzmàn, 2014: 51.  
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temporal reading of divine violence; namely, that it occurs in a moment of suspension, as a rupture 
from a given temporal order. This is what is exposed as necessary in the normative temporality of the 
climate crisis, where it follows the linear march of History and imposes an exilic logic on the 
unfolding of time, a divine intervention of this would reorient and impose a rupture. Where Tomba 
sees this suspension as ‘a matter of ethics,’ Guzmàn gives a reading that positions this suspension as 
contingent to the realisation of justice.142 On this he writes: 
 
Why can’t it be fulfilled or actualised? Because it would cease being justice or divine 
violence. It would fall into the field of instrumentality, into an economy of means-end, sucked 
into the cycle of mythical violence. A violence that destroys law to found a new law on its 
ruins falls into the orbit of the cycle of mythical violence. It would need to justify itself, 
thereby exemplifying once again the “problematic nature of law.”143 
 
In other words, divine violence resists being caught in the snares of fulfilment which would amount to 
the perversion of its inclination towards justice. In the context of the climate crisis, divine violence 
must resist the instrumentalization of oppression and the subsumption of experience into a means-end 
paradigm. Which is merely to say that something like climate justice defies fulfilment insofar as it 
remains a question of agonistic renewal. Located within the constellation of earth-world-history and 
the problematic of relational ontology, the object of judgment’s consideration constantly renews, 
exposing the task of attaining judgment as infinitely demanded.  
 This leads onto Guzmàn’s second quality: ‘the impossibility of divine violence’s recognition 
as such by humankind.’ Rather than obfuscate what it means to act in terms of divine violence, this 
quality reinforces the temporal ‘not-yet’ of divine violence’s relation to judgment. The further 
specification that it is humankind who remain incapable of recognising divine violence when it occurs 
reinforces its inscription within the agonistic constellation earth-world-history. Put otherwise, this 
might be better understood in terms of the plural forces that coalesce in the appearance of worldly 
 
142 Tomba, 2017: 579.  
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reality. Simply because divine violence and the destruction of the law is not recognisable by 
humankind, it doesn’t follow that this has not occurred. Guzmàn extrapolates this further in the 
account he provides regarding divine violence’s third dimension: the lack of urgency for said 
recognition. Echoing the perpetual possibility of the law’s destruction, Guzmàn explains the lack of 
urgency in terms that parallel the temporal delay of divine violence. Mirroring Arendt’s own 
description of natality which only assumes its status as spontaneous rupture belatedly, divine violence 
lacks the transparent urgency that would make it immediately comprehensible. Indeed, such an 
immediacy would fall back into the means-ends orientation of instrumental or law-preserving 
violence. Anarchic beginnings such as those attested to by natality, messianism, and divine violence 
defy presence, they persist retrospectively – although upon recognition they fall into the trap of law-
making violence – or as something to be anticipated. In both instances, what is clear however, is that 
divine violence suspends the unfolding march of time, it subverts the course of History and enjoins 
historical presence.    
 The final of the four qualities, the invisibility of divine violence’s expiatory powers, reaffirms 
the intersection of the preceding three qualities. Yet, here this invisibility in relation to the expiatory 
force of divine violence reaffirms the expansive and anarchic project of divine violence in relation to 
judgment. Namely, that while divine violence is motived by the pursuit of justice, it does not impose a 
liminal threshold on what this would constitute. Guzmàn’s account of this is particularly moving and 
clarifies the problematic of responding to the climate crisis: 
 
We can catch a glimpse of divine violence: it is fulfilled, in its appearance as mere possibility, 
say, at the beginning of a revolution. It is actualised as ideal, as possibility, lying like a 
shadow just beyond our reach. Its value lies in how it feeds the desire and impulse for 
transforming the current world-historical conditions of existence into a more just and equal 
society. It takes place not in the bloody, physical manifestation of mythical violence exercised 
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at particular historical junctures, but in the purity of the thirst for justice that leads humans to 
attempt to change their conditions.144 
 
Played out in the context of the climate crisis, each affirmation of land rights or indigenous 
sovereignty, each piece of wake work or altered thinking of the past, reveals itself as an appearance of 
divine violence, insofar as each of these instances brings the normative order of History into question. 
It is this thirst for justice that is heard in the battle cries of those fighting the development of the 
Dakota Access pipeline. Of course, that divine violence is actualised as ideal and as possibility does 
not mean that these demands for justice can be dismissed, their negation somehow registered as equal 
to their status ‘just beyond our reach.’  
Divine violence appears in the fight against the exilic condition of the climate crisis as the 
persistent claim to be-in-place, the claims of those denied presence in earth-world-history which, 
given its internal antagonism, remains an unrelenting task. Insofar as every claim to dwell in place, 
recalling the Heideggerian term from Chapter One for the activity proper to the oneness of earth-
world-history, is a claim to dwell, an assertion of presence, every reaffirmation of that constellation 
can be thought in terms of the divine and anarchic beginning of being-in-place.145 This much is clear 
via a clarification of action that borrows from the messianic tropes of natality, every action ‘into’ the 
world reorients the conditions for what it means to dwell. Rather than conform the normative order of 
these conditions, as in the overwhelming normative claim of settler-colonialism History, dwelling in 
earth-world-history is a mode of resistance.  
 
Speaking to her responsibility as an ‘historian of the multitude,’ Saidiya Hartman describes the way in 
which she is ‘forced to grapple with the power and authority of the archive and the limits it sets on 
what can be known, whose perspective matters, and who is endowed with the gravity and authority of 
historical actor.’146 Although Arendt displays her own form of violence regarding the archive as she 
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reads in the history of the United States not the violent foundations of settler-colonialism and 
History’s normativity but the ‘spirit of the laws’ of revolution and beginning, I nonetheless contend 
that read through the knowledge of indigenous presence, Arendt’s politics of natality attains a new 
force. Enriched by this dialogue, or perhaps simply, to follow Hartman, ‘forced to grapple with the 
power of the archive,’ natality assumes new weight as initium. Precisely in this sense, Arendt’s 
politics and the texture of reality to which that politics attest become more complex. In a sense proper 
to this project, the constellation of earth-world-history is brought once again into a state of 
Heideggerian ‘unconcealment.’ At the same time, however, naming the violence of History as not 
simply as a physical threat to land and place, but an ontological threat to legitimacy of being-in-place, 
the climate crisis is now exposed as the crisis of History. Drawing out the voids of History, 
recognising the tradition of the oppressed, living in the wake and the afterlife of this violence has all 
coalesced in the identification of this particular crisis. In Chapter Six, I move to realise a second 
instance of natality in the context of the climate crisis, framed here against the History’s unchecked 
progression into Future.  
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Chapter Six: The Future  
 
Following my discussion in the first half of Part III of the way in which history exerts a 
violent force over the present, a violence that I named History, in this chapter I shall explore the 
violence that infiltrates the present from the future. Contrasted with the lingering claim to presence in 
the supposed ‘no-longer’ of a violent past, the anachronistic ‘not-yet’ of the future is depicted in this 
chapter as the Future.1 History and Future name the spaces of exilic violence that I argue assume a 
normative status in relation to the climate crisis. In Chapter Five this normative claim over the present 
was depicted in relation to the historical structures of colonialism and slavery. Read through Walter 
Benjamin’s triadic account of violence, these structures were depicted firstly as the law-making 
violence inaugural to the climate crisis before developing into the law-preserving violence of settler-
colonialism and racialised capitalism. Denying the claim to placedness that is intrinsic to each 
realisation of being in action, this exilic violence undermined the integrity of earth-world-history as 
the locus of dwelling.  
As history assumes an exilic relation to place, the very setting in which to realise those 
twofold political conditions of natality and plurality is lost. Locating within this violence something 
that operated in Benjamin as the ‘rottenness of the law,’ I posed a challenge in the form of Benjamin’s 
third account of violence: the anarchic history of law-destroying violence. 2 Described in messianic 
terms as the anarchic destruction of the law, divine violence realises a revolutionary change. And yet, 
at the centre of divine violence’s expiatory powers is its actualisation ‘as ideal, as possibility.’3 This 
resistance to concretization is what distinguishes divine violence from the totalizing hegemony of 
History. It is this resistance to pure immanence that opens up the space in which to think an open 
future. Indeed, it is this productive agonism of a future – the future – that will not reveal itself that 
guides this chapter. Moreover, it is the appeal to something like the ‘unconcealment’ that originally 
 
1 The fallibility of this claim to a historical ‘no-longer’ is exposed in Benjamin’s account of history’s afterlife 
(AP: 10) and Sharpe’s notion of history’s ‘wake’ (2007), each of which make apparent the enduring legacy of 
historical violence.  
2 SW1: 242. 
3 Guzmàn, 2014: 58.  
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distinguished earth-world-history that will be central to the development of a praxis that challenges 
the exilic violence of Future.  
 The identification of the Future significantly broadens the implications identified in History. 
Where the latter marked the exilic conditions that emanate from the violent structures of settler-
colonialism and racialised capitalism that were first and foremost inaugural to the climate crisis and 
continue to organise its preservation, the Future represents a fluid interplay of three distinct forms of 
violence. Disentangling the way in which the Future imposes an exilic condition over the present, I 
turn to the depiction of fate in Greek mythology as the Moirai, the three sisters who are represented as 
the personification of fate. My analogous reading of the Moirai is intended to simultaneously 
complicate and clarify the way in which the future of the climate crisis appears in the present. This 
reading responds not only to the material or earthly implications of the climate crisis in the future but 
also to the way in which it reduces politics to a realm of instrumentality. Consequently, part of this 
nuanced reading of the Future is what allows for the development of its exilic dimension, insofar as 
the threats posed by the climate crisis are depicted not simply in planetary terms but in relation to the 
activity of dwelling in earth-world-history. Continuing my account of the climate crisis and the 
violence it imposes as an ontological violence that threatens the experience of dwelling sets up the 
space in which to think something like an ontological emancipation akin to the project of history. 
Exploring the Moirai forms the first half of this chapter, with the second addressing the project of 
making future.   
 Holding on to this mode of expression, of ‘making future,’ in Chapter Five ‘making history’ 
coincided with the emancipatory potential of telling history otherwise, of thinking with Christina 
Sharpe ‘in the wake’ of the past or with Walter Benjamin in thinking history ‘against the grain.’4 Each 
of these nuanced approaches to historiography challenges the exilic violence of History, and lays 
claim to the past as a homely space. Rather than figure as a politics of lament or nostalgia, what was 
brought into effect was something akin to the Heideggerian ‘unconcealment’ of earth-world-history. 
What thus served as the object of unconcealment here was the ontological depth of the past. Similar to 
 
4 SW4: 392; Sharpe, 2016.  
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earth-world-history, however, this concealed past is never merely past but always already coloured by 
the present, the past assuming meaning as it is seen through the lens of ‘now-time.’ If ‘making 
history’ can thus be figured as a praxis of dwelling in time and drawing on the strife of what is in one 
sense ‘no-longer’ and yet nevertheless present in the traces of history, ‘making future’ can be thought 
in similar terms as a project of the unknown. For Arendt notions of the ‘unknown’ appear in her 
discussion of action in The Human Condition, in terms of the ‘who/what’ distinction. Where the latter 
refer to ‘qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings’ that may be hidden or displayed, ‘who’ a person is 
can never be told in advance but depends on the sense-making condition of human plurality.5 If 
‘what’ a person is coincides with the reductive ground of their immanent being, ‘who’ they are is a 
locus of concealment. Although Arendt applies this distinction to the realm of action, in the second 
half of this chapter I read the ‘who/what’ distinction into the unconcealment of earth-world-history. 
Returning to the original Heideggerian tropes from Chapter One then, in this chapter I develop a 
praxis of unconcealment that draws on the ‘who’ of an unknown future. Complicating this praxis 
further still, it is not simply in dwelling that I come to understand ‘making future’ but in the 
antagonistic experience of love.  
 As others writing on the topic of love observe, not least in relation to Arendt’s work, it has a 
‘swampy’ quality that can make it a difficult theme to explore.6 Shin Chiba, whose discussion of 
Arendt’s engagement with love is one of the few insightful commentaries on both love and its role for 
Arendt, teases apart its complexity and provides a rich diagnosis of its ‘aporetic tension.’7 It is 
precisely this aporia of love’s antipolitical and political core that he draws out of Arendt’s 
antagonistic discussion on the theme and that I reaffirm in my discussion of love’s potential to ‘make 
future’ in a world threatened by the apolitical threats of exilic violence. Neither a condemnation nor a 
panacea-like solution, my approach to love turns on the capacity to see within Arendt’s formulation 
‘amor mundi’ a love for the world that maintains the original agonism of Heidegger’s earth-world 
encounter. Coordinated around this potential for worldly disclosure and the unconcealment of earth-
 
5 HC: 179.  
6 Fletcher, 1996. On those exploring the role of love in Arendt’s writing see: Barthold, 2000; Martel, 2008; 
Tamboukou, 2013; Tatman, 2013.   
7 Chiba, 1995.  
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world-history, I develop an account of love that is distinct from the subject-oriented force of passion. 
My defence of love’s political force is drawn from Arendt’s tightly woven essay, ‘Introduction into 
Politics.’ Although there are many instances where the aporetic tension of love appear in her writing, 
particularly her final book The Life of the Mind: Willing, it is in the essay that she describes love as a 
‘life-giving resource.’8 This invocation of life, particularly in contrast to the essay’s earlier discussion 
of the ‘desertification’ of the world, lends itself to the theme of making future. Against the exilic 
threat of a totalizing and empty Future, the life-giving depth of love uncovers the unknown depth of 
living (or dwelling) in relation to the future of earth-world-history. The emphasis that I place on the 
tropes of concealment and the unknown in the second half of this chapter as I develop a praxis of love 
as dwelling in earth-world-history distinguishes it from other accounts of love in times of planetary 
instability, perhaps most of all that of Bruno Latour.9 Indeed, the antagonistic depth of love-as-
dwelling that I develop here is so radically different from theories such as Latour’s that I want to 
resist bringing them into a common discussion. The ‘love’ that I thus discuss in this chapter lends 
itself more to Heidegger’s praxis of dwelling than it does to its semantic doubles in work of Latour 
and others.10  
 Returning to the image of the Moirai, I want to outline in brief the three iterations of the 
Future that they signify. Known as Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, the Moirai are described in 
Hesiod’s Theogony as giving ‘mortal men evil and good to have.’11 And while they clearly represent 
the personification of fate, my invocation is not intended to suggest a form of fatalism. Indeed, in the 
Eumenides the Moirai are described as distributing fate justly.12 Apportioning both good and evil, the 
 
8 PP: 203.  
9 The distance I maintain from Latour emerges in the object-oriented force of his appeal (1996; 2012). Namely, 
the centrality of a monstrous technology that Latour locates as the necessary object of love is inapplicable here. 
In place, my argument hinges on the necessary objectlessness of love, that it assumes form in its orientation 
towards the concealment of earth-world-history and is thus conditioned by a necessary opacity or resistance to 
immanence.  
10 Michael Hardt begins to develop an account of love that resembles that at play here (2011, see; Schwartz, 
2009). Based around some of Marx’s reflections on love in relation to money and property, Hardt aspires 
towards a notion of political love that operates a basis of solidarity and community bonds. While the 
implications of his argument lend themselves to my discussion insofar as they evoke a sense of Arendtian 
plurality, my concern is with the agonism of unconcealment as the ‘object’ of love and locus of political 
relationality. Given this emphasis on the disclosure of earth-world-history in love, Martin Hägglund’s 
discussion of love as sense-making comes closer to my own discussion (2019).  
11 Hesiod, 2009: 30.  
12 Aeschylus, 965.  
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Moirai give texture to life and colour its events. The first of the sisters, Clotho is depicted as the 
‘spinner’ of life’s mother thread. In the context of the Future, I recast Clotho as Future-Clotho; the 
pure continuation of History’s uninterrupted storm. Born in the inaugural violence of the climate 
crisis, Future-Clotho names the future that is the unchecked continuation of History. Read through 
Benjamin’s reflections on the catastrophe of history, Future-Clotho is the status-quo; she ‘is not an 
ever-present possibility but what in each case is given.’13 Uninterrogated, Future-Clotho represents an 
earth-world-history to come in which the emancipatory project of history has failed, and the status-
quo of carbon intensive living, resource exploitation, and unchecked capitalism is maintained.  
 The second of the Moirai is Lachesis. Lachesis has the task of assigning each life its thread. 
Known thus as the ‘allotter,’ Lachesis decided the individual destiny of each person. In the context of 
the climate crisis, Future-Lachesis refers to the claim made on politics by the forces of planetary (and 
hence political) necessity. Imagined as a ‘yoke of instrumentality’ Future-Lachesis exerts a totalizing 
force over the present, transforming politics from its depiction in Arendt’s writing as synonymous 
with freedom to an activity of survival. Structured around the intersecting axes of nature/people and 
capitalism/non-capitalism, Future-Lachesis reduces political action to a realm of reactive 
instrumentality. Although Future-Lachesis can indeed realise the revolutionary politics of something 
like history, insofar as she can personify the decarbonised action necessary to planetary stability, what 
she nevertheless makes apparent is the reduction of political action to the demands of the climate 
crisis. In this precise sense then, she is the exilic condition personified. Insofar as she is not fatalism 
but the realisation of brute realism, Future-Lachesis is the recognition that the conditions of the 
climate crisis are irreversible and must lay claim to political action if the planet is to remain habitable. 
What Future-Lachesis thus signifies is the loss of natality’s spontaneity insofar as necessity has taken 
reign.  
 The third sister of the Moirai is Atropos whose task it was to decide how and when each life 
would end. Here I invoke Future-Atropos as the amorphous image of a planetary future foretold. Most 
favourably depicted as the earth of 1.5 degrees of global warming, the limit set by the Paris Climate 
 
13 SW4: 184-5.  
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Agreement, Future-Atropos also names a planet of 2, 3, and 4 degrees of warming.14 Assuming 
presence in the prophetic models of global warming, Future-Atropos is the insistence that each action 
in the present can be enfolded into an image of the future. If Future-Lachesis threatens to erode the 
possibility of natality in the present, it is Future-Atropos who undermines natality as having claim to 
future unpredictability. In the context of the climate crisis, Future-Atropos represents the claim that 
every action can be reduced to a calculation. Not only does she embody the foreclosure of planetary 
unpredictability, Future-Atropos invokes the speculative political futures described by others in the 
conquest between different ideologies. Articulated most thoroughly by Joel Mann and Geoff 
Wainwright, whose political futures are coordinated around various Lachesis-like configurations of 
planetary sovereignty/anti-sovereignty and capitalism/communism, Future-Atropos incorporates 
images of earth-world-history as both a realm of planetary instability and political ideology.15  
 Against all these forms of Future each of which exerts an exilic force over the present insofar 
as they undermine the futural quality of dwelling and threaten to wholly undermine the political 
conditions of natality and plurality, which depend on exactly that link to an unpredictable posterity, is 
my argument in Chapter 6.4 that love is future-making.  
 
6.1 Future-Clotho 
The first sister of the Greek Moirai, Clotho was tasked with spinning the thread of each life. In the 
context of the climate crisis, Future-Clotho is similarly positioned before the unfolding of life in the 
inaugural moments of the Anthropocene. In the context of the climate crisis, her presence at the origin 
of what comes to be the exilic condition renders her appearance somewhat prophetic. Unlike her 
sisters who colour life and give meaning to appearance, Future-Clotho names in advance the direction 
in which history moves. Her immovable rigidity and subsumption to the logic of History positions her 
in parallel with Benjamin’s discussion of catastrophe: both exist as status quo. And yet, the violence 
of Benjamin’s catastrophe and Future-Clotho is never merely limited to what is already prescribed as 
 
14 See Allen et al, 2018; Savaresi, 2016. On overstepping the limits of the Paris Agreement see, Held and Roger, 
2018; Ivanova, 2016; Mahapatra and Ratha, 2016. On the reorientation the Agreement poses to politics, see: 
Dubash, 2019; Falkner, 2016. 
15 Mann and Wainwright, 2018.  
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oppressed, rather both assume a centripetal function, forever growing and drawing more and more 
under their reign. To the degree that Future-Clotho cloaks earth-world-history as a locus of 
unconcealment and ontological agonism, she reflects the limits advanced by Achille Mbembe in the 
‘becoming black of the world.’16 
Mbembe’s depiction of ‘becoming black’ radically extends understandings of the present crisis as 
catastrophic. Hence, where others such as T J Demos describe the way in which ‘it is the 
uninterrupted, accident-free, normal running of the fossil economy’ that underpins the planetary 
crisis, Mbembe challenges the very meaning of ‘normal running’ to recognise the way in which this 
normalization of planetary violence (what I understand as the exilic condition) is an all-encompassing 
and ever-expanding violence.17 Developed out of his discussion on the history of slavery – the same 
history that coordinates the exilic violence of History in this project – Mbembe’s argument hinges on 
the claim that ‘the systematic risks experienced specifically by Black slaves during early capitalism 
have now become the norm for, or at least the lot of, all of subaltern humanity.’18 Rather than negate 
the specificity of this violence, Mbembe exposes its present normalisation. And so, when he further 
clarifies what he sees as once definitive of the term “Black” – that it demarcated a condition of 
dispossession imposed upon certain individuals – as extrapolated into a general worldly condition, he 
makes a claim about what it means to inhabit what I am calling earth-world-history under Future-
Clotho.  
Mbembe’s initial depiction of the slave as imprisoned within the ‘dungeon of appearance’ echoes 
Arendt’s argument that the slave is reduced to their mere physicality.19 Unable to disclose themselves 
and enter into a plurality in which the natality of each individual is made and recognised as 
meaningful, the condition of the slave is that of speechlessness. At a more metaphysical level, the 
condition of the slave, what Mbembe calls the ‘becoming Black’ and what I define in spatial terms as 
the ‘exilic condition’ is the condition of being present in absence. What Mbembe urges his reader to 
understand as the ‘becoming Black of the world’ is the way in which the slave is dispossessed ‘of the 
 
16 CBR 
17 Demos, 2012: 37.  
18 CBR: 4.  
19 CBR: 2.  
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future and of time, the two matrices of the possible.’20 It is this, perhaps more than the general 
subordination of whole communities to an apolitical status that strikes at the centre of what it means 
to live in the anachronistic wake of Future-Clotho. The violent mark that is left by a Future that lays 
siege to the potential to think the futural-inclination of being undermines the very premise of dwelling 
as unconcealment.21 Robbed of an image of the future as the realm of the unpredictable, Future-
Clotho levies an impasse between action and its unpredictable ends.  
As the immanent and uninterrupted continuation of History, coordinated between the intersecting 
axes of settler-colonialism and racialised capitalism, Future-Clotho is the realisation of Frederic 
Jameson’s infamous lament that it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism.22 Perhaps more acutely then, Future-Clotho signals a crisis of the imagination, a crisis in 
the limits of thinking to imagine beyond the ideological bounds of colonialism and capitalism. What 
is telling about this failure of the imagination, a failure that Arendt describes in terms of a ‘crisis,’ is 
the way in which it reveals a particular current of nihilism. Namely, that even in the clarity afforded in 
the act of naming of History and Future-Clotho as the source of exilic violence in earth-world-history 
– what Arendt refers to in relation to the crisis as the exposition of the façades that dissemble reality – 
another future cannot be imagined.23 In this moment, as hope is relinquished and the becoming black 
of the world accepted as natural law, the crisis becomes a disaster. Arendt identifies this transition as 
the moment in which judgment is forsaken.  
Recalling Benjamin’s language of historical messianism and the fulfilment of Judgment Day only 
once the ‘past has become citable in all its moments,’ the forfeiting of hope signals the forfeiting of 
judgment itself.24 The coincidence of hope and judgment hangs on the role played by the future in the 
present. Relinquished as a space of unknown creation, judgment on the creation of the future is 
forsaken. Hence, for Arendt, ‘a crisis becomes a disaster only when we respond to it with preformed 
judgments, that is, with prejudices. Such an attitude not only sharpens the crisis but makes us forfeit 
 
20 CBR: 5-6.  
21 BT: 321-324.  
22 Jameson, 1994: xii.  
23 BPF: 174.  
24 SW4: 390.  
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the experience of reality and the opportunity for reflection it provides.’25 Without reflection on the 
coming and going of the world, without, that is, a sense that the world might change, despair becomes 
the handmaiden of judgment’s decline. This forfeiting of reality encapsulates the dispossession of 
freedom that occurs in the becoming black of the world.  
Tracing the historical fault line of colonial desire around which the becoming black of the world 
unfolds, Mbembe describes the way in which this desire ‘to divide and classify, to create hierarchies 
and produce difference’ puts into motion conditions of lived difference in modernity. The continued 
reduction of appearance to physicality and the invention of race ‘to signify exclusion, brutalization, 
and degradation,’ assumes a prophetic claim over the future.26 And so, in an apparent evocation of 
Future-Clotho, Mbembe describes the way in which ‘Black…the word has its own weight, its own 
destiny.’27 That ‘Blackness’ assumes a normative force is further clarified in his argument that the 
designation Black yields a name he did not chose, but one that was inherited because of the position 
he occupies in the world.28 This invocation of the world and the place of subjects within it points to 
the synonymy between oppression and placedness and the fracturing of that claim to be-in-place as 
central to what it means to be dispossessed. As he develops the way in which Blackness imposes a 
spatial limitation, in which ‘to be Black is to be stuck at the foot of a wall with no doors,’ he invokes 
the images of the exilic condition that necessitate the present absence of the oppressed. In the climate 
crisis, to be exiled from the clearing that opens up in each act of dwelling in earth-world-history 
inheres both the refusal of the right-to-placedness and the denigration of earth-world-history itself. It 
is this loss of meaning that clarifies the distinction between History as crisis and Future (or at least 
Future-Clotho) as disaster. In the former, the potential of redemption persists in the capacity to read 
history ‘against the grain’; in the latter what is given up is the groundwork of hope on which anarchic 
beginnings depend.   
While Mbembe sees a path of resistance against the becoming black of the world in the 
recognition of human plurality, which he describes as a ‘community of singularities and difference,’ 
 
25 PP: 171.  
26 CBR: 6.  
27 CBR: 151. 
28 Ibid.  
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Future-Clotho, as both a planetary and an ontological threat, a threat to both the integrity of place and 
the condition of placedness itself, consistently challenges this claim.29 In other words, even as the 
‘frenzied codification of social life according to norms’ that is the becoming black of the world is 
challenged, what remains is the literal wreckage of its wake. In the climate crisis what History and 
Future-Clotho insist upon is the ineliminable presence of planetary instability: bushfire, drought, 
ocean acidification, glacier retreat and cyclone. And so, while both History and Future-Clotho can 
indeed be challenged via appeals to the law of earthly plurality and the recognition of placedness as a 
claim legitimately shared amongst all dwellers of earth-world-history (the coincidence of rights and 
earth-world-history was explored in Chapter Three), whether this claim can bring about the rupture 
necessary for a messianic intervention in which the status of earth-world-history is recast from one of 
exile to one of agonistic home-making remains unclear.  
 
6.2 Future-Lachesis  
Future-Lachesis significantly broadens the exilic condition imposed by Future-Clotho. Although 
Lachesis remains exemplary of the way in which narratives of planetary apocalypse are imposed on 
the future, what she embodies is the forfeiting of spontaneity in the present. With this loss of 
natality’s spontaneity what Future-Lachesis embodies is the exilic condition. Known as the ‘allotter’ 
of life’s events, Lachesis determines the content of the mother thread spun by her sister Clotho. 
Before this thread of life is cut off by Atropos, Lachesis gives texture to its appearance, determining 
the individual destiny of each thread. In Plato’s Republic the people are described as going before 
Lachesis in whose lap lie the lots and patterns of each life.30 Tasked with assigning each life its 
contents, in the context of the climate crisis Future-Lachesis allots a ‘yoke of necessity,’ undermining 
the scope of freedom as she reduces action to a praxis of survival. Limiting action to a domain 
determined almost exclusively by the planetary demands of the climate crisis, Future-Lachesis 
represents the thresholds that prevent the fulfilment of natality and plurality.  
 
29 CBR: 158. 
30 Plato, 2013: 10.617.  
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Framed as the mythological embodiment of the exilic condition then, Future-Lachesis puts into 
relief the implications of living in the wake of History and Future-Clotho. Although not by necessity a 
destructive figure – at least not insofar as she can aspire to projects of decarbonisation and 
revolutionary politics – what Future-Lachesis reveals is the limited potential of action under the exilic 
condition to enact those unpredictable new beginnings so intrinsic to the twofold faculties of natality 
and plurality. In other words, if the structural forces that maintain the climate crisis are, as was shown 
in Chapter Five, settler-colonialism and racialised capitalism, what Future-Lachesis ‘allots’ in the 
present is the necessary recourse of action to these intersecting axes. And so, while this claim over 
action is not in and of itself problematic, insofar as action must contend with these forms of systemic 
violence if history is to be realised and judgment redeemed, what becomes problematic is the degree 
to which politics is made to serve only life’s necessities.31  
Hinged between a nihilistic form of fatalism and brute realism, Future-Lachesis poses a direct 
threat to Arendt’s claim that the meaning of politics is freedom. The specific form of exilic violence 
that thus unfolds in the context of Future-Lachesis is one that is determined by the unfreedom of life 
under necessity. Again, it is this negation of human potential that Arendt identifies in the labour of the 
slave, whose activity is bound by a form of instrumentality. As entry into the Arendtian polis required 
(at least for Arendt) ‘mastering the necessities of life,’ entry was thus prohibited for slaves who 
remained defined by precisely those necessities.32 Closely connected to the becoming black of the 
world, Future-Lachesis normalises a mode of slavery in which servitude is recast as instrumentalism. 
The exilic violence of Lachesis is thus felt in the disjunction with which it meets Arendt’s claim that 
the meaning of politics is freedom.33 Namely, in Future-Lachesis there is no freedom or politics, there 
is only submission to laws of necessity. For Arendt this eventuates to something like the law of the 
desert: life in an alienated world in which the meaning of politics has been divorced from the activity 
of freedom and the spontaneity of natality.34 Indeed, in such a world the very idea of politics is 
 
31 Arendt uses this description of ‘serving only life’s necessities’ to describe the life proper to the slave, see HC: 
314.  
32 HC: 37.  
33 PP: 108 
34 PP: 190.  
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chimeric, for what is at play in such a desert is the mere act of species survival and no claim to the act 
of dwelling. Devoid of meaning, life under Future-Lachesis is life determined a priori by the demands 
of seeking stability under conditions of planetary instability.  
Evidence of the demands of Lachesis can be seen in the organising binaries around which 
responses to the climate crisis are currently formed. As outlined in two recent monographs on theories 
of environmental futures, I want to position the central framework around the axes of nature/people 
and capitalism/non-capitalism.35 In the context of the so-called ‘conservation debate’ I turn to Bram 
Büscher and Robert Fletcher, who effectively outline what I further qualify as an instance of 
Lachesis’ ‘yoke of planetary necessity.’36 Although this debate warrants greater nuance, at its core 
Büscher and Fletcher identify two recurrent trends: on the one hand, the ‘neoprotectionists’ who argue 
that ‘separation between people and nature is needed to stave off a collapse of all life-supporting 
ecosystems,’ a separation that is commonly envisaged as the division of the planet into a ‘human half’ 
and a ‘natural half.’37 On the other hand, ‘new conservationists’ who aim to go beyond nature-people 
dichotomies, arguing that ‘instead of pursuing the protection of biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, a 
new conservation should seek to enhance those natural systems that benefit the widest number of 
people, especially the poor.’38 While the first invokes images of Edenic oases amidst human worlds 
ravaged by violence, the latter effects a realisation of Heidegger’s technological worldview: the earth 
as exploitable ‘standing-reserve.’39 In the context of environmental philosophy, traces of these 
binaries emerge in what Paul Voice identifies as a disciplinary impasse: ‘stuck in an unproductive 
opposition between anthropocentric and biocentric views [in which] it seems that either one rejects 
the anthropocentric thesis of nature as utility [neoprotectionists], or accepts some version of the 
biocentric thesis and reject utility as a justifiable approach to nature [new conservation].’40 
 
35 Büscher and Fletcher, 2020 and Mann and Wainwright, 2018.  
36 For an overview of this debate see Büscher and Fletcher, 2020; Brockington et al., 2008.   
37 Lele goes on to point out that ‘Unsurprisingly, the “half” of the earth to be put under “protection” happens to 
be largely in the Global South, which has led to heavy criticism of the proposal as both unjust and ineffective 
(2020: 51). See also: Büscher et al., 2016; Wilson, 2016; Wuerthner et al., 2015. 
38 see; Kareiva et al., 2011; Lorimer, 2015; Mansfield et al., 2015. 
39 Heidegger, 1977. Elements of Heidegger’s argument regarding the management of nature reappear in the 
context of conservationism, see Marris, 2011. 
40 Voice, 2013: 182. See also Iturbe, 2019.  
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In Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s parallel inquiry into the status of the future, they present a 
series of evolving binaries that moves between capitalism/non-capitalism and planetary 
sovereignty/anti-planetary sovereignty.41 Framing the future through a more nuanced lens, Mann and 
Wainwright aim to weave together political economics with ecological arrangements. The varying 
dichotomies that they develop reflect a second, more simplistic instance of the planetary yoke that I 
ascribe to Future-Lachesis in terms of the debate about the Green New Deal (GND). Closely 
connected to the first axis of nature/people by virtue of the inextricable link between economic 
growth and destruction of the natural world, this second axis incorporates questions regarding 
decarbonisation and economic degrowth (Mann and Wainwright’s non-capitalism).42 Solutions such 
as the GND counter appeals for ‘green transformations’ of capitalism. In place, they insist on the 
exposition of capitalism as the violent structure with which climate policy must contend.43 Yet, even 
within the apparent radicality of these transformations, capitalism endures in the form of so-called 
‘eco-capitalism’ – this was the danger identified above by Voice.   
As Elisa Iturbe writes, even ‘environmental projects such as those appearing in the work of 
Buckminster Fuller, the pages of Whole Earth Catalog, or the writings of eco-anarchist Murray 
Bookchin openly attacked the environmental damage wrought by capitalist society…nonetheless 
championed a carbon fuelled technoscape that they thought would lead to post-labour abundance. The 
underlying conditions of carbon energy were left uninterrogated and undisturbed.’44 It is precisely this 
subsumption of ‘radical’ environmental thought to the logic of capital that exposes the degree to 
which capital itself has ‘exiled’ alternative political imaginaries, rendering the disentangling of 
climate action from capitalism seemingly impossible. Proponents of the GND call this alternative the 
‘faux Green New Deal’ given its failure to critically examine the underlying structures of the climate 
crisis. Akin to the politics of the new conservationist who advocates planetary ‘care’ as a means 
towards capitalist ends, eco-capitalism is evidence of the insidious way in which Future-Lachesis has 
 
41 Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 29.  
42 See; Barbier, 2010; Pettifor, 2019; Schwartzman, 2011.  
43 For some like Pollin, continued economic growth is central to environmental strategy, see; Pollin, 2018.  
44 Iturbe, 2019: 19.  
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rendered political theory exilic, unable to respond to the call of earth-world-history to think and act 
otherwise.  
 Though distinct in terms of their organising framework, both the conservation debate and the 
capitalist/non-capitalist argument progress an instrumentalist argument regarding political action. 
Framed as the fundamental axes around which politics must be coordinated if it is to ensure either the 
continuation of the capitalist structures in place – a future that would simply perpetuate the 
mythological violence of History and Future-Clotho – or the mitigation of planetary violence through 
a reappraisal of the structures that coordinate dwelling, both iterations of Future-Lachesis expose the 
reconfiguration of politics as the locus of necessity. Advocates of the GND makes the case that ‘in the 
twenty-first century, all politics are climate politics,’ a declaration that, while radical, also exposes the 
ineliminable necessity of political instrumentality.45 Arendt anticipated such a transformation of the 
political in her identification of the rise of the social. Described as the transformation of the polis by 
the demands of the private, namely the demands of necessity, Arendt saw the rise of the social as 
coinciding with the subsumption of action to labour. Voice provides an account of the movement 
from private to public, as one of ‘supersizing’ the principles that govern life in the private, thus 
producing a social realm in which political action is subordinated ‘to the imperatives of 
consumption.’46 This transition from the necessity of biological life to the ‘imperatives of 
consumption’ marks Arendt as an early critic of the cultic demands of neo-liberal capitalism.  
Although the products of labour are necessary to the fulfilment of a proper human life, in 
which work and action are also realized, the subject who is reduced to labour is the slave, invoking 
once again Mbembe’s account of the becoming Black of the world. In the context of modern politics, 
Arendt recasts the slave as the animal laborans, for whom life is ‘imprisonment in the ever-recurring 
cycle of the life process…forever subject to the necessity of labour and consumption.’47 Exposing the 
dangers of political instrumentalism and the threat of servitude, Arendt’s argument about the status of 
the animal laborans hinges on the fact that it can be imposed on others. Which is merely to say that 
 
45 Aronoff et al, 2019: 3.  
46 Voice, 2013: 181.  
47 HC: 236.  
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the status of the animal laborans is always marked by a threatening violence and the potential 
imposition of servitude. In other words, while action and the disclosure of the self coincide with the 
fulfilment of a properly human life, engaging oneself in the activity of labour is not requisite to this 
realisation: it can be forced on another.48 Arendt’s division of the vita activa, while it thus stipulates 
that action must be performed by the individual if they are to assume a life proper to the being of 
being human, makes clear that labour need not be performed by all. Indeed, part of her division 
between the private and the public presupposes that, in the former, violence could be imposed on 
others in order to make them labour, hence the violent relationship between the slave-master and the 
enslaved. By contrast, in the public polis all individuals are greeted with equality, having overcome 
the liminal conditions for entry which presume the attainment of sufficient living conditions such that 
those more profound faculties of natality and plurality can be fully realised.  
While Arendt attempts to ensure the integrity of the political domain by emphasising those 
conditions for entry, which confirm the intrinsic equality of all members insofar as they are not 
wanting in any immediate or biological sense, this leaves the private open to the very real threat of 
violence. Arendt is thus led to a position that equates the subjection of the individual to the laws of 
necessity – as in the slave or the animal laborans – with the logic of violence. As she writes, ‘because 
all human beings are subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence toward others; violence is the 
prepolitical act of liberating oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of the world.’49 Having 
established this fixed distinction between the prepolitical necessities for freedom and political 
freedom itself, Arendt saw the rise of the social in which the limited demands of the private exceeded 
what she saw as the properly political pursuits of the polis as the destruction of politics as such. While 
Arendt’s condemnation of the social as the locus in which private concerns are displaced into the 
public realm is typically read as an affront to feminist appeals to ‘make the private public’ and hence 
in tacit complicity with more masculine conceptions of the political, the rise of environmental 
concerns or responses to the climate crisis reveal the prescience of her threefold reading of the vita 
 
48 LMT: 19.  
49 HC: 31.  
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activa as comprised of labour, work, and action.50 While what is brought into consideration in the 
climate crisis is the ineliminable necessity of thinking the immanent and biological demands of life, 
this demand cannot go on to assume primacy over the integrity of politics as a locus of plurality, 
novelty and agonism. In such a scenario what is lost is the unpredictable spontaneity that coincides 
with the realisation of natality and plurality in political action.  
 The subject of much rehearsal, Arendt’s hierarchically structured division of human activity 
portends a set of conditions which are prerequisite to politics, and hence, so too to freedom. To be 
free, that is, to appear before others within a polis means to not ‘be subject to the necessity of life or 
to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule nor to be 
ruled.’51 Arendt’s remarks here are uncannily attuned to the threats to freedom imposed by the climate 
crisis. Perhaps more than at any other time, the crisis makes stark that humanity is subject to the 
singular necessity of ensuring that the earth remains habitable. In Chapter Three I made this necessity 
explicit in relation to the right-to-placedness that is co-present in the condition of natality. And while 
the varying responses to the climate crisis advocate ‘freedom’ as an organising goal, my caution 
regarding their realisation pertains precisely to their instrumentalization of freedom.  
Pope Francis’ 2015 ecological encyclical Laudato Si` made precisely this link between the 
current governance of the climate crisis and the erosion of human freedoms. Responding not simply to 
the unfreedom of living at the precipice of climate instability, Francis identified an insidious condition 
of unfreedom that corresponds to the generalisation of Mbembe’s becoming Black of the world or the 
normalisation of the exilic condition. In the encyclical’s conclusion Francis named the obstacles to 
radical climate action as the systemic structures of Benjamin’s mythological violence: 
 
We lack the leadership capable of striking out on new paths and meeting the needs of the 
present with concern for all and without prejudice towards coming generations. The 
establishment of a legal framework which can set clear boundaries and ensure the protection 
 
50 See; Dietz, 2002; Pitkin, 1998; Zerilli, 2005. Arendt does actually engage questions of domestic labour 
consonant with the feminist claim that the personal is political in a short book review, ‘On the Emancipation of 
Women’ (EU: 66-68).  
51 HC: 32. 
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of ecosystems has become indispensable; otherwise, the new power structures based on the 
techno-economic paradigm may overwhelm not only our politics but also freedom and 
justice.52 
 
Francis’ condemnation of modern politics coincides with their inability to realise the anarchic force of 
Benjamin’s divine violence and redeem freedom.  
This point becomes clearer still through Arendt’s clarification that political freedom is a 
‘spatial construct.’53 Developed in her reading of the Athenian polis as the public space of politics, as 
contrasted with the private realm of necessity, for Arendt, to assume space, or to act upon the 
placedness of being, is to be free. Drawn from the Greek depiction of the private as corresponding to a 
state of deprivation, Arendt’s account of life lived exclusively in the private domain was of one 
denied the fulfilment of those conditions proper to the being of being human. The realisation of the 
latter was made possible only once the private was overcome and the latent (and nascent) potential of 
the self to enact natality realised. Arendt reinforces this point by positioning a life lived only in the 
private in the same terrain as the slave who was refused entry to the polis and the barbarian who was 
incapable of establishing a polis.54 The tropes of separation or imprisonment that accompany the 
images of the slave and barbarian anticipate the exilic condition of Future-Lachesis. What is critical to 
recall however is that Arendt’s slave is not incapable of political action, they are not ‘aneu logon,’ 
which is to say, they are deprived ‘not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech 
and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each 
other.’55 In much the same way, those rendered exilic by History or the yoke of planetary necessity 
are not incapable of speech, the political action par excellence, they are rendered mute by a world that 
has eroded the very condition of spontaneity.  
 The difficulty of reconciling with the presence of Future-Lachesis is that unlike her sister 
Future-Clotho who stands at the forefront of earth-world-history shouting out a prophetic destiny for 
 
52 Francis, 2015: 53.  
53 PP: 119.  
54 See HC: 38-49.  
55 HC: 27.  
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humanity drawn from the violent origins of the climate crisis and who can be challenged in the 
revolutionary and messianic acts of the historian, Future-Lachesis cannot be overcome. Thus, while it 
is conceivable to think in terms of ‘a’ destiny told by Clotho, one that is either the continuation of 
History, principally in terms of the perpetuation of a carbon intensive capitalist economy, or not; 
Lachesis and the necessity to think in terms of a form of political instrumentality is undeniable. 
Indeed, if the future is to be redeemed as a locus of action in which earth-world-history might once 
again be figured in terms of a concealed depth, the ineliminable presence of Future-Lachesis must 
assume an organising function. While the ideological force of Future-Clotho threatens the prevention 
of those measures necessary for planetary survival, Lachesis, or rather the iteration of Lachesis that 
assumes a critique of capital as essential, assumes a status akin to that of the pharmakon. Both a 
poison and a cure, Lachesis denies the present its claim to spontaneous beginning while setting up the 
condition for something like the future – the open and expansive correlate of history. Whether this 
recognition of the need for brute realism and political instrumentality now means that action is caught 
in a means-end equation for the liberation of the future is a pivotal question.  
 What is thus critical to remember in discussing Future-Lachesis and what will remain 
pertinent as I turn to engage Future-Atropos is that the yoke of instrumentality to which they affix the 
political institution is not necessarily oppressive in the same way that Future-Clotho is. While the 
latter coincides with the continued oppression of History, Lachesis and Atropos can and may well 
invoke the pragmatic response taken by a society that wants to contend with the reality of the climate 
and redeem the future as a space of potential. Indeed, responding to the climate crisis requires 
precisely such a realism that aligns with pragmatic, instrumental action. Beyond the ontological 
questions of what it means to dwell in an exilic earth-world-history which imposes forms of violence 
not simply through the logic of carbon intensive capitalism and settler-colonialism, there is the very 
real threat of planetary instability. It is clear that the threat of bushfire, drought, cyclones, sea-level 
rise and ocean acidification will require that political institutions assume a praxis of political 
instrumentality. Moreover, what will continue to be necessary is the inclusion of speculative planetary 
futures described by the fluid Future-Atropos in developing these political responses. However, what 
I persist in calling the exilic dimension of Future-Lachesis and what I will show in relation to Future-
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Atropos is that in addition to, or perhaps in spite of this instrumental realism, those conditions of 
natality and plurality to which Arendt understood politics to have meaning as a praxis specific to 
dwelling in earth-world-history must be engaged. Insofar as the climate crisis raises questions that 
‘concern not merely a transformation in politics – more representative proceduralism, for example, or 
more precautionary environmental policy-making, but a transformation of the political’ conditions 
like natality and plurality must remain at the forefront of political thought.56 Mbembe invokes a 
similar argument for a change of the political that incorporates natality and plurality as the conditions 
of earth-world-history dwelling. Reflecting on the status of democracy in modern politics, he laments 
both its anthropocentrism, arguing that ‘we must extend its meaning so democracy can include more 
than just us,’ and its limited historicism.57 Hence, he appeals for a different ethics that incorporates 
remembrance not simply as a praxis of memory but of placed dwelling. Memory thus serves not only 
the condition of plurality but the fact of human earthliness; namely, the fact that ‘there is only one 
world [which] we are all entitled to by our very existence.’58 
 Relinquishing the need to redeem Arendt’s twofold conditions, both of which operate – as 
shown in Chapter Three– in a paradigm of vulnerability, reciprocity and inclined exposure of the self, 
incurs a turn towards the more pragmatic certitude of instrumentality. What is lost at this moment are 
those guiding principles that make politics meaningful as a sphere of human interaction. Without 
natality and plurality and a conception of the political in excess of pure reason, dwelling, the activity 
proper to earth-world-history, is undermined. Hence, even after securing the demands thrust upon the 
animal laborans, Arendt invokes a second realm of activity that fails to fulfil the conditions proper to 
action or dwelling. It is this second figure, even as they respond to something like the ‘yoke of 
planetary necessity’ that nevertheless exists outside the agonistic space of dwelling in earth-world-
history. Arendt’s account of the homo faber, insofar as they respond to the instrumental demands of 
maintaining the world, anticipates the calculative demands on the imagination by Future-Lachesis. 
Indeed, she writes in The Human Condition that ‘homo faber conducts himself as lord and master of 
 
56 Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 28. A similar shift in the status of science is also apparent in the age of the 
climate crisis, see Turnhout, 2018.  
57 Goldberg, 2018: 217. 
58 Ibid.  
 226 
the whole earth.’59 If the pragmatism of Future-Lachesis attempts to resolve the demands of the 
climate crisis by coordinating action along the intersecting axes of nature/people and capitalist/non-
capitalist, then it is this understanding of work as the mastery of earth that is at play. In further 
anticipation of the current collapse of the earth-world-history antagonism that creates space for the 
imaginative unconcealment of meaning, Arendt qualifies the homo faber’s domination of the earth as 
‘by definition bound to result…only after destroying part of God-created nature.’60 The productivity 
of the worker is thus bound up with a type of originary violence. Much like the perpetuation of 
Benjamin’s mythological violence, the work of the homo faber persists in a mode of being that is 
bound in advance to a logic that undermines its productive potential. What is incumbent upon the 
worker is their engagement with the world at large, namely with earth-world-history, in such a way 
that what is sought is not the resurrection of a nostalgic image nor the creation of an ideological 
future. What is needed, to parse Mann and Wainwright, is a change of work as the activity proper to 
dwelling.61 I seek such a change in the sense-making praxis of love at the conclusion of this chapter.  
  
6.3 Future-Atropos  
The cutter of life’s thread, the third of the Greek Moirai, Atropos, approaches the living with her 
‘abhorred shears and slits the thin-spun life’ that binds each soul to the movement of earth-world-
history.62 The status Future-Atropos is perhaps best captured by Albert Pope’s remark that ‘today we 
are living out the future’s past.’ Pope goes onto write that while technically speaking this has always 
been the case, ‘there are moments in history when the present has been overtaken by a future, a future 
so broadly anticipated that it begins to block out the concerns of the day.’63 It is this blinding force of 
a future that is so anticipated that its various manifestations, coordinated around those archetypal 
imaginaries of 1.5, 2, 3, 4 degrees of warming, that has blocked out the light of the present and left a 
shadowy state of exile in its wake. Future-Atropos extinguishes the flame of uncertainty that runs 
 
59 HC: 139.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 28. 
62 Milton, 1874: 63.  
63 Pope, 2019: 145.  
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throughout claims such as that of social historian Eric Hobsbawm who claimed, at the close of the 20th 
century that ‘we do not know where we are going.’64 Future-Atropos thereby makes apparent that 
although the future remains clouded insofar as which degree of action, whether that’s adaptation or 
mitigation, undertaken in the present remains unknown, an image of the planetary future nevertheless 
persists in fluid form.  
Whether the earth remains within the boundary set by the Paris climate accords of 1.5 degrees 
of warming or falls radically beyond this point, at each instance is Future-Atropos: a speculative 
model of sea-level rise, cyclone frequency, or drought extremity. Not only is Future-Atropos an 
ecological image, so too is she evident in political theories of post-capitalism, sovereignty, borders 
and migration. Mann and Wainwright’s political theories of planetary future fall into these exact 
categories. Divided between sovereignty and capitalism, Mann and Wainwright identify four 
iterations of the future to which I alluded in the previous section, they name the final of these 
‘Climate X.’ The only future to challenge the instrumental logic of the others, Climate X is both non-
capitalist and anti-sovereign, as such Mann and Wainwright position it as the ‘ethically and politically 
superior’ alternative.65 In a certain sense then, Climate X is the anarchic image of Benjamin’s divine 
violence, while the others echo the intersecting axes that coordinate Future-Lachesis, X fulfils divine 
violence’s actualisation ‘as ideal, as possibility, lying like a shadow just beyond our reach.’66 
And yet, rather than lament the opacity of Climate X, Mann and Wainwright’s provocation on 
the future of planetary politics concludes hopefully: 
 
Our task is to see the ruins and fragments of our natural-historical moment for what they truly are; 
not to draw up blueprints of an emancipated world, but to reject Leviathan, Mao, and Behemoth, 
while affirming other possibilities. What remains? All we have and all we have ever had: X to 
solve for, a world to win.67   
 
64 Hobsbawm, 1994: 585.  
65 Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 30.  
66 Guzmàn, 2014: 58.  
67 Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 197. 
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Nevertheless, the ambiguity of Climate X risks its being overlooked. In a moment of crisis such as 
that of the present climate-crisis, the opacity of Climate X can be conceived as a limit, something to 
be overcome in pursuit of the more fixed and reliable iterations of the three other climate futures that 
Mann and Wainwright describe. Although each of these speculations is stained with the violence that 
has thus far organised the climate crisis, the exilic logic of sovereignty over the colonised and the 
racialised oppression of capitalism, they claim to provide a sense of security. In that sense, the images 
of Future-Atropos, whether imagined as the political Futures outlined by Mann and Wainwright or as 
the earthly Futures of climatic modelling, overtake the present as a space of creation.  
 What is forfeited with Future-Atropos is the depth of unconcealment in the constellation 
earth-world-history, for implicit within each of these speculative Futures is something like the 
totalization of History. If the ambiguity of Climate X feels like a naïve attempt to break away from 
the grip of Future-Atropos, it is not because of some fallibility in the privileging of the unknown but 
because the task of responding to earth-world-history in the present has been resigned. While this first 
emerges in Future-Lachesis as action is overtaken by the activity proper to the animal laborans cum 
homo faber in the instrumentalization of politics, it takes more concrete form in Pope’s conjecture that 
‘we are living out the future’s past.’ It assumes further prescience still in the lament that what has 
assumed a state of atrophy under the weight of the climate crisis is the imagination. First explored at 
length by Amitav Ghosh as the ‘crisis of the imagination’ and later on by Naomi Klein as the 
presentation of an ‘imaginative asphyxiation,’ the fracturing of the imagination grows out of the 
becoming Black of the world.68 This entropy is not the same as the exilic violence imposed during 
slavery which, in spite of its tremendous violence nevertheless saw the production of profound works 
of the imagination.69 Where the becoming Black of the world coincides with the eradication of the 
imagination is in the unquestioned acceptance of its fate. In other words, the specific danger of the 
becoming Black of the world as it appears today is that it does not refuse this violence but allows it to 
assume an insidious claim over the human condition of being-in-place.  
 
68 Ghosh, 2016; Klein, 2019. These ideas of a gradual erasure of the imagination are captured in the notion of 
the ‘agnotocene.’ Introduced by Bonneuil and Fressoz, the agnotocene refers to the ideological production of 
‘zones of ignorance’ in which the imagination is vanquished (2018: 198). 
69 See Hartman, 1997.  
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Arendt describes the way in which the conditions of the private, those that coordinate Future-
Lachesis and the becoming Black, are overcome via the imagination as a process of liberation. In her 
reflections on judgment, she argues that it is the imagination that enables ‘us to liberate ourselves 
from [these conditions] and to attain that relative impartiality that is the specific virtue of judgment.’70 
Returning to the constellation of earth-world-history, it is via the imagination and the liberation from 
life’s necessities that Arendt can be seen to champion a particular kind of dwelling as dwelling-in-
imaginative-creation. Recalling Heidegger’s language on dwelling as the realisation of being-in-place, 
Arendt writes that ‘this earthly home becomes a world in the proper sense of the word only when the 
totality of fabricated things is so organised that it can resist the consuming life process of the people 
dwelling in it, and thus outlast them. Only where such survival is assured do we speak of culture.’71 
Resisting the reduction of the imagination to a realm determined exclusively by the artistic profession, 
Arendt recalls that ‘each time we talk about things that can be experienced only in privacy or 
intimacy, we bring them out into a sphere where they will assume a kind of reality which, their 
intensity notwithstanding, they never could have had before.’72 Realised anew in each act of 
disclosure, the imagination resounds as one of the modalities through which earth-world-history is 
drawn into unconcealment. The imagination thus accords in this instance with what it means to dwell.  
Returning to Pope’s conjecture that the present is living out the future’s past and Arendt’s lament 
that the absence of imagination coincides with the erosion of dwelling as the ‘doing’ proper to earth-
world-history, Ghosh reflects on the status of the present, asking if future earth dwellers will consider 
our present a time of ‘Great Derangement.’  Employing Heidegger’s language of concealment, Ghosh 
asks if those in the future will conclude that ‘ours was a time when most forms of art and literature 
were drawn into modes of concealment that prevented people from recognising the realities of their 
plight?’73 Developing a critique of the present as undermined by a limited grasp of the imagination, 
Ghosh and others highlight the cracks of possibility through which a future, irreducible to the violence 
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of the climate crisis might exist.74 What their speculations reveal is that insofar as it remains possible 
to think the imagination – even in its apparent absence – the possibility of hope exists.  
It is precisely this possibility, found in the moment of its absence, to which Mann and Wainwright 
attain in their discussion of Climate X. What is sought is something that persists as unknowable. 
Indeed, it is the quality of being unknown, of being beyond reach and hence of soliciting a call to 
search, disclose and unconceal, that serves as the productive challenge to Future-Atropos: hence the 
appeal ‘all we have and all we have ever had: X to solve for, a world to win.75 In the epilogue to her 
essay ‘Introduction into Politics’ Arendt describes precisely such a moment. Revisiting the 
provocation, why is there anything at all and not rather nothing, Arendt turns towards plurality, 
rephrasing the question as ‘why is there anybody at all and not rather nobody?’76 In this move away 
from the objective quality of the world, or indeed of earth-world-history, Arendt clarifies what is at 
stake in times of crisis. Pursuing this line, I want to conclude this final diagnostic section on the exilic 
threats of the Future and Future-Atropos specifically through an analogous reading of Arendt’s ‘who’ 
and ‘what’ distinction.77 
First explored in The Human Condition as a way to give depth to the faculty of action and its 
connection to speech, Arendt makes a distinction between the ‘what’ qualities of an individual – the 
objective qualities they either share or don’t share with all others – and the specificity of who they are. 
It is this latter quality, disclosed in speech and enriching the web of relations that organises political 
community. In the language of concealment, the ‘who’ of someone is brought into unconcealment in 
the space of appearance. To return once again to the image of the slave, ‘who’ the slave is remains 
unexplored, in place they are reduced to ‘what’ they are. Unable to enter into an imaginative exchange 
where ‘who’ the slave is becomes a provocation for the other, the web of relations in which slave and 
oppressor operate becomes hollow. A similar crisis of the imagination takes place in the relationship 
between the present and Future-Atropos. Overwhelmed by the images of a future that insists upon the 
 
74 This space of speculative fiction and thinking the future otherwise operates across the arts, see Demos, 2018; 
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violence of planetary instability and political necessity, imagining ‘who’ this future earth-world-
history might be is diminished. The analogous reading of ‘what’ as Future-Atropos and ‘who’ as a 
more undefined and concealed future, is not simply a poetic mode of recalling that each moment in 
time is occupied by a plurality of people and hence a potential richness in ‘who’ dwells in earth-
world-history at any one time. Rather the point I am trying to make is that earth-world-history itself 
lays claim to a form of ‘whoness.’ ‘Who’ is earth-world-history is disclosed in the acts of dwelling 
that seek meaning beyond the instrumentality of politics inherent to the ideologies of colonialism or 
capitalism while also refusing to live merely on the earth without creating conditions proper to the 
natality of human beings. What is realised in this second act of resistance is the actualisation of that 
original human condition of being born-in-place, in so doing, what is reaffirmed in the pursuit of 
earthly ‘whoness’ is the logic of rights that exist within the right-to-placedness (Chapter Three). 
Without going so far as to give agency to earth-world-history, I do want to make the case here that 
what remains unconcealed within this constellation and what calls those who dwell within it to reflect 
upon their condition of being-in-place echoes Arendt’s distinction between who and what.  
If it can be argued that what it means to live as though Future-Atropos is definitive of living in 
place in earth-world-history parallels Arendt’s account of ‘whatness,’ to enter into a relation in which 
the other is the unknown and earth-world-history acknowledged as unknowable is to realize the 
irreducibility of life to the immanent givenness of its placedness (its ‘whatness’). While life persists 
in-place, it is the immanence of whatness, its always-already disclosedness that distinguishes it from 
the agonistic move between concealment and unconcealment that is its ‘whoness.’ Refusing the 
totality that is Future-Atropos does not then mean denying the reality of the climate crisis in either 
political or scientific terms. On the contrary, for Arendt ‘who’ someone is ‘comes to the fore where 
people are with others and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness.’78 It is 
precisely this togetherness that makes possible earth-world-history as the place proper to the human 
dwelling. In other words, prerequisite to overcoming the exilic condition is reciprocal togetherness – 
this is largely what Mbembe appeals for at the end of Critique of Black Reason.79 And yet, this is not 
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a condition that once met redeems the fragmented existence that is life under exile. Rather, it is a 
perpetual state of being that insists upon a turn towards the unknown. Recalling the state of 
inclination from Cavarero’s reflections on the conditions of being born, the condition of maintaining a 
dwelling place in earth-world-history is that of unknown togetherness.80 Benjamin describes a similar 
scene when he reflects upon the possibility of redemption in the progression of uninterrupted 
catastrophe. Indeed, his claim is that ‘redemption depends on the tiny fissure in the continuous 
catastrophe.’81 It is my contention that the opacity of Climate X, its resistance to a discourse of 
instrumentality or precedence, is such a fissure.  
The claim that the disclosure of earth-world-history from concealment parallels the disclosure of 
the ‘who’ may yet be underdeveloped here. However, the point is not without prior argumentation. 
Arendt herself pursued a similar line in The Human Condition. In a section entitled, ‘The Web of 
Relations and the Enacted Stories’ she contrasts the physical world of things with the intangible web 
of human relations. Although the two are materially distinct, the porous overlapping through which 
each yields meaning suggests something about the depth of placedness irreducible to mere 
physicality. In the text she writes:  
 
[…] the physical, worldy in-between along with its interests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown 
with an altogether different in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin 
exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another.82  
 
Although Arendt attributes an element of the wild to the interweaving of place and action, creating a 
sense of the untamed force of action, it is worth recalling that for Arendt actions are always fragile 
and in need of preservation. The integrity of the polis can be laid to waste if action is not nurtured and 
the fabric of plurality falls apart.83 And so, even when she discusses the irreducibility of the ‘who,’ 
she is careful to insist upon the reciprocity by which it appears. Indeed, she goes so far as to entitle the 
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next section of The Human Condition ‘The Frailty of Human Affairs.’ Here she records that action ‘is 
never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act.’ Once again mixing 
notions of place and action, she goes on to write that ‘action and speech need the surrounding 
presence of others no less than fabrication needs the surrounding presence of nature for its material, 
and of a world in which to place the finished product. Fabrication is surrounded by and in constant 
contact with the world: action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of 
the acts and words of other men.’84 
 These porous accounts of the way in which place and action are made meaningful assume a 
depth beyond that of merely overlapping metaphors. The spatial account that Arendt gives of action 
and the way in which space assumes meaning through the web of human relation reinforce the 
complexity of earth-world-history from earlier chapters whilst incorporating the exilic dimension of 
the Future in which fractured relations coincide with the breakdown of place. At the end of the essay 
‘Introduction into Politics’ when Arendt discusses the worldlessness of the modern world, she 
considers this intersection of place and relationality. In words that seemingly anticipate the current 
climate crisis and the speculative images of Future-Atropos she writes that ‘the withering away of 
everything between us, can also be described as the spread of the desert.’85 The desertification of the 
world that Arendt describes as coeval with a form of worldlessness recalls the earlier discussion of 
Mbembe’s becoming Black of the world and the normalization of the exilic condition. Indeed, she 
goes onto name the experience of acute suffering in a desert-world as occurring because ‘we are still 
human and still intact; the danger lies in becoming true inhabitants of the desert and feeling at home 
in it.’86 It is precisely this danger that Future-Atropos names; the danger of resigning oneself to the 
movement of time. Well aware of the dangers such a resignation would bring into being, Arendt 
suggests a countermeasure in the ‘oases’ that exist in love and friendship, without which we ‘would 
not know how to breathe.’87 Although her discussion is fleeting and not as established as her 
reflections on the miracle of beginning and natality, the redemptive force she ascribes to ‘life-giving’ 
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resource of love is one worth pursuing. And so, while she does little to develop a praxis of love, it is 
the consistency with which references to love appear in her reflections on the decline of modern 
politics that, in spite of its apparent ‘antipolitical’ core, suggest at an alternative meaning. Without 
rejecting Arendt’s suspicion of love’s potential to foreclose the world then, I want to explore the 
aporetic possibility of love’s worldly potential, one which she describes elsewhere as ‘life-giving.’88  
 
6.4 Amor Mundi in/of Crisis 
The theme of love in Arendt’s writing strikes her readers as one of profound antagonism. Her 
infamous condemnation of love as ‘perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces’ in 
The Human Condition contrasts sharply with claims made in the same work that ‘out of a love for the 
body politic’ the public realm of plurality is preserved.89 Arendt’s sustained interest in themes of love 
and amor mundi, or love of the world demonstrate that in spite of the apparent conviction with which 
Arendt makes this point, love cannot be simply reduced to its apolitical status. Indeed, if the 
prevailing focus on Arendt and love remains bound to this one instance what is forsaken is the chance 
to engage a topic that remained a central provocation for Arendt. Rather than accept Arendt’s position 
in The Human Condition, and even here acceptance would mean overlooking those further occasions 
in that same text that complicate and even contradict this equation of love and the apolitical, in this 
section I firstly want to clarify the position of love in Arendt’s writing before moving to situate it 
within the context of dwelling on earth-world-history.  
Arendt’s inquiry into love begins with her 1929 doctoral dissertation on the topic of love and 
Saint Augustine. In contrast to her later references to love, which move seamlessly between the 
condemnatory remarks on love in The Human Condition, to love as responsibility to the oblique and 
ill-defined ‘amor mundi,’ in the dissertation her work is bound up with the attempt to classify love.90 
Hinging between a discussion of caritas and cupiditas, which she respectively understands in terms of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ love, the dissertation develops two general theories of love that inform her later 
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reflections. Framed in the context of the thesis in terms of their object of desire, the ‘goodness’ of 
caritas and the ‘badness’ of cupiditas, arise in connection to the worldliness of the object in question. 
For instance, in cupiditas the lover is continually disappointed in their craving, having bound 
themselves to the impermanence of the perishable world. Yet insofar as cupiditas clings to the world, 
at the same time it constitutes the world, opening up a paradoxical space that must be transcended via 
caritas. By contrast ‘in caritas, whose object is eternity, man transforms himself into an eternal, 
nonperishable being.’91 Arendt locates the strife of these two loves in the fact that while they share a 
common origin in craving desire, cupiditas can never achieve the object of its desire, while caritas 
draws the lover towards a complex and transcendent world. The categorisation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
thus becomes more acute when read in terms of its temporality; the former is limited by its 
perishability while the latter invests in something transcendent – or in a language more appropriate to 
this project, something intergenerational. Continuing the blurring of time and space around which the 
earth-world-history constellation is coordinated, Arendt makes a further spatial distinction between 
good and bad loves; namely, love is bad – and becomes in the context of The Human Condition – 
antipolitical because it collapses the in-between space necessary to the agonism of the world.  
 In the dissertation the unworldliness of cupiditas is connected to its finitude. Where the subject of 
caritas is reassured in their investment in eternity and the absolute future, in cupiditas the lover is 
overwhelmed by craving desire for possession and thwarted by their own mortality. Hence, ‘mortal 
man, who has been placed into the world…and must leave it, instead clings to it and in the process 
turns the world itself into a vanishing one, that is, one due to vanish with his death.’92 It is this 
unworldliness that reappears in The Human Condition: ‘love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-
between which relates us to and separates us from others.’93 Quite another account of love’s 
worldliness is visible in Arendt’s references to amor mundi, which arises as an investment in precisely 
the fragility and incomplete of that in-between space. The trope of caritas then, that it aligns with the 
individual’s desire ‘to belong to something outside himself,’ is transformed into amor mundi and 
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becomes the loving and worldly investment in the body politic of human plurality.94 Rather than 
destroy the in-between, here love serves as an affirmation of that mutable ground. Poised as an 
apparent inversion of one another then, the bad and good tropes of love reappear insofar as they either 
destroy or reaffirm the fabric that knits community together. 
In a letter to Karl Jaspers in 1955 as she was preparing what would become The Human 
Condition, Arendt revealed her plan to name the text ‘Amor Mundi.’ And yet, while she references 
love in passing in the text, the actual notion of amor mundi does not appear, leaving the question open 
as to what amor mundi, which she describes straightforwardly in the letter to Jaspers as ‘love for the 
world,’ actually amounts.95 Indeed, the full reference to amor mundi in the letter draws us further still 
from the antipolitical and unworldly condemnation of love that does actually appear in the book. 
Invoking the critical definition of understanding that she described in the 1954 essay ‘Understanding 
and Politics’ as the ‘unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms 
with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world,’ she writes one year 
later in the letter: ‘I’ve begun so late, really only in recent years, to truly love the world…Out of 
gratitude, I want to call my book on political theory “Amor Mundi.”’96 Again, without drawing too 
much from these remarks, a clear distance can be perceived between the possessive love of worldly 
things and a love born of gratitude for and investment in the world.  
This latter mode of loving is actually invoked in the dissertation on Augustine as the ‘lust of the 
eyes’ which ‘desire to know the things of the world for their own sake.’97 Confusing the metaphorical 
basis from which she thinks this experience of love, Arendt describes the lust of the eyes as a ‘non-
sensual love for the world’ in which the self is forgotten, and the world seen as a quest for 
knowledge.98 And yet, her invocation of the eyes challenges her aesthetic negation and calls on her 
reader to seek meaning in this paradoxical account. To see the world is to be in the world. In much the 
same way, to love the world is to love from a place of being in the world. The necessary limitations of 
 
94 LSA: 18. 
95 Arendt and Jaspers, 1992: 264.  
96 EU: 308; ibid.  
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98 LSA: 24.  
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these positions, of seeing and loving from only one position, which while they can be nomadic or 
insist upon something like the contrapuntal reality of Said’s exilic subject, is that they are always 
already in place.99  
Connections to the placedness of love attain a greater prominence in Arendt’s reference to love at 
the end of her essay, ‘Crisis in Education,’ indeed it this reference that I argue is her most apposite 
definition of amor mundi and one that lends itself to developing a praxis of love as dwelling in the 
exilic earth-world-history of the climate crisis. In the closing remarks to an essay that has already 
drawn on the placedness of being, opening with the claim that ‘the essence of education is natality, 
the fact that human beings are born into the world,’ Arendt recalls the images of reconciliation and 
gratitude that accompanied her earlier remarks in ‘Understanding and Politics’ and her letter to 
Jaspers. Here she writes: 
 
Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to take 
responsibility for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except 
for the coming of the new and young, would be inevitable. And education, too, is where we 
decide whether we love our children enough not to expel them from out world and leave them to 
their own devices, nor to strike from their hands the chance of undertaking something new, 
something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common 
world.100  
 
Invoking responsibility, love, and place, and echoing her earlier appeals to come to terms with the 
world and create it as a space of dwelling for others, Arendt’s account of education serves as a critical 
point of departure for thinking the exilic conditions of the climate crisis.  
The amor mundi to which Arendt alludes at the end of ‘The Crisis in Education’ can be read as an 
extrapolation of Heidegger’s remarks on love in What is Called Thinking? published six years earlier. 
While I don’t anticipate Arendt to have necessarily framed her conclusion as a response to Heidegger, 
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the way in which his thinking permeates her own and her declaration of What is Called Thinking? as 
‘perhaps the most exciting of his books’ distinguish it as a rich source for her own work.101 Read 
together then, an understanding of love as meaning-making, namely as a praxis of meaningful 
unconcealment in earth-world-history becomes apparent. Heidegger’s reference to love is only 
fleeting, drawn from a Hölderlin poem to clarify his inquiry into the meaning of thinking, yet the 
implication of the placedness of being is clear. He cites two stanzas from Hölderlin, which form an 
exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades on the relation between thinking and place. Invoking such 
Arendtian themes as natality, responsibility, and understanding, the Hölderlin poem anticipates much 
of what emerges in Arendt’s writing on amor mundi. 
 
Socrates and Alcibiades 
Why, holy Socrates, must you always adore 
This young man? Is there nothing greater than he? 
  Why do you look on him 
Lovingly, as on a god? 
 
Who the deepest has thought, loves what is most alive,  
Who has looked at the world, understands youth at its 
Height,  
And wise men in the end 
Often incline to beauty.102 
 
The connection between thinking and love is rendered even more explicit in Heidegger’s commentary 
on the poem. Conceding that it admits a ‘curious rationalism,’ Heidegger nevertheless claims that 
‘what the line [who has deepest thought, loves what is most alive] tells us we can fathom only when 
 
101 WCT: back cover.  
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we are capable of thinking.’103 In other words, it is only when capable of thinking that love, not 
simply in a possessive sense, but as a means of understanding what is most alive in the world can be 
experienced. It is precisely this point that Arendt makes in ‘The Crisis in Education.’ 
 To love what is most alive is a provocative statement, not least in the context of the climate 
crisis, an epoch in which finitude and decay – glacier melt, desertification, ocean acidification, mass 
extinctions and mass migrations – predominate. Returning to Arendt however, what is ‘most alive’ is 
the fulfilment of being, namely, the realisation of natality, the faculty in which novelty and potential 
find their grounding. This spirit of anarchic messianism is felt in Heidegger’s writing as the 
authenticity of being. What is most alive in a Heideggerian sense is precisely that mode of being that 
Dasein, in the act of dwelling and yielding meaning from the placedness (the Da of Dasein), 
exemplifies. In both these instances what thus emerges as the ‘object’ of love is the objectlessness of 
moving from concealment towards unconcealment. To love is to engage in the task of thinking that 
Arendt describes as simultaneously in withdrawal from and in the presence of the world.104 For 
Heidegger, whose entire essay explores what it is to think, the synergy between love and thinking 
arises in the shared investment in affirming – through processes of critical unconcealment – what is. 
Indeed, it is Heidegger’s reference to Saint Augustine in one of his letters to Arendt that encapsulates 
this disclosive and worldly dimension of love while at the same time realising this complex of 
thinking. The maxim ‘amo: volo ut sis’ attributed to Augustine by Heidegger in a letter dating from 
1925 would become a pivotal idea in Arendt’s writing, one that captures what it is to love earth-
world-history as a locus of agonistic dwelling and, perhaps moreover, one that accords with a praxis 
of love as future-making.  
 The phrase is first introduced in Arendt’s writing in The Origins of Totalitarianism where she 
proposes it as the dialectical inverse of what occurs under totalitarianism as the other is reduced to 
instrumental value. Already the resonance with the brute instrumentalism of the Future, in particular 
Future-Lachesis can be felt:  
 
103 WCT: 21.  
104 LMT: 74-78; 92-97.  
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This mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given to us at birth and which 
includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt with 
only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the great and 
incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, ‘Volo ut sis’ (I want you to be), 
without being able to give any particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable 
affirmation.105 
 
This pure affirmation of the other, unreasoned and unconnected to their ‘whatness,’ the qualities that 
Arendt described as the ‘gifts, talents, and shortcomings’ of individual, equate loving someone with 
the attempt to – borrowing from Heidegger’s vocabulary – ‘unconceal’ their hidden ‘whoness.’ It is 
this investment in the sense-making of another that recalls Heidegger’s citation of Hölderlin: ‘who has 
deepest thought, loves what is most alive.’ While it is this privileging of ‘whoness’ that Arendt argues 
presages the ‘antipolitical’ dimension of love, which ‘because it is unconcerned to the point of total 
unworldliness with what the loved person may be…destroys the in-between which relates us to and 
separates us from others,’ I suggest that something else entirely transpires when the object of love is 
the condition of being-in-place.106 Here love exists in spite of the reductive ‘what’ qualities that 
impose instrumental ends on being and becomes a way in which to imagine the world otherwise. This 
argument plays out in Arendt’s claim that ‘out of love for a body politic’ the public realm of the polis 
is sustained.107 
 Accepting love as the cohesive force that binds together the political realm, which in the 
properly Arendtian sense is distinct from the instrumental realm that Future-Lachesis embodies, 
presents a direct challenge to the various exilic tendencies of the Future. In the meaningful overlap 
between the exilic condition and worldlessness, love as amor mundi or love of earth-world-history 
provides a productive alternative; insofar as this love is directed towards the agonistic and irreducible 
quality of dwelling, it cannot be confined by the limits of exile. When Arendt thus writes that 
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‘worldlessness as a political phenomenon is possible only on the assumption that the world will not 
last,’ she describes a state of affairs in which the object of love in amor mundi has been lost.108 To 
love the world, a task that Arendt concedes as difficult, involves willed reconciliation with the events 
that undermine, challenge, and threaten precisely that love. It is only in this courageous embrace of 
the world, an act that echoes Adriana Cavarero’s celebration of inclination as the exposure of the self, 
that Arendt’s body politic retains meaning. To persevere in acts of dwelling that refuse to be made 
reducible to those events is the realisation of love itself. Moreover, to love the world in this way is not 
to dwell for the sake of love but in the very name of love. Arendt makes this distinction when she 
cautions against the perversion of love as itself a facet of instrumentality. And so, it is not her claim 
that ‘love can only become false and perverted when it is used for political purposes such as the 
change of salvation of the world,’ that I contest.109 The account of love that I am outlining here is one 
that is realisable not as a means towards end, but as an end itself. It is for this reason that I find a 
praxis of love in the sustained activity of dwelling in earth-world-history.  
 The refusal to subsume love either under the ‘what’ like qualities of the exilic condition, 
namely its instrumental imposition on politics, nor as its perversion of life into a means-end 
calculation, gives rise to an understanding of love as future-making. This temporal inflection of love 
is generated as love is refracted through the constellation earth-world-history, in which meaning 
necessarily assumes a temporal dimension as its unconcealment is woven into history. This forward 
propulsion of love thus becomes a latent rebuff to the nostalgic laments that refuse to acknowledge 
the presence and present conditioning of the climate crisis. Directed towards the future both as a 
temporality and as the evolved continuation of earth-world-history, to dwell in a praxis of love is to 
realise Arendt’s injunction on being in the world after the un-earthly events of totalitarianism: to take 
life as the ‘unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms with and 
reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world.’110 
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 As Arendt writes in ‘The Crisis in Culture,’ ‘to dwell…indicates an attitude of loving care 
and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the dominion of man.’111 Already 
anticipating the violence of humans against nature and their claim to dominion, Arendt sees in 
dwelling both the depth of love that will find meaning in the place of being and a challenge to such 
violence. It is here that love as a life-giving resource becomes apparent. Not only is dwelling a  
praxis of love, but love is itself the source that gives weight to dwelling. In contrast to the violence of 
desertification with which Arendt dealt specifically and the desertification that is the exilic condition 
today, love acts as a ‘life-giving oasis’ that replenishes the world. And so, against what Arendt 
describes as the specific threat of becoming accustomed to desert life, a danger that is reimagined here 
as the normalisation of the exilic condition and the realisation of the world’s becoming Black, is 
precisely this oasis. Reflecting on the condition of modern politics, I want to suggest that Arendt’s 
introduction of love be read as anticipating what is lacking in our own eroded sense of politics today. 
Against the dangers of the Future and the political institutions that bow to their appearance, I invoke 
her appeal to the life-giving oasis that is love. As she writes in the epilogue to her essay on the 
meaning of politics: 
 
What went wrong is politics, our plural existence, and not what we can do and create insofar 
as we exist in the singular: in the isolation of the artist, in the solitude of the philosopher, in 
the inherently worldless relationship between human beings as it exists in love and sometimes 
in friendship – when one heart reaches out directly to the other, as in friendship, or when the 
in-between, the world, goes up in flames, as in love. Without with intactness of these oases 
we would not know how to breathe, and political scientists should now this.112 
 
In an apparent echoing of Arendt’s words and enjoining the constellation of earth-world-history, 
Mbembe similarly concludes Critique of Black Reason on a cautionary yet hopeful claim: 
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The world will not survive unless humanity devotes itself to the task of sustaining what can 
be called the reservoirs of life. The refusal to perish may yet turn us into historical beings and 
make it possible for the world to be a world. But our vocation to survive depends on making 
the desire for life the cornerstone of a new way of thinking about politics and culture.113 
 
To dwell in the security of love, a security of incomplete and concealed forms, makes possible the 
world. Or, as Mbembe writes, to love makes possible the realisation of history, in this way, to love is 
to be at home in earth-world-history.   
 
 




When Hannah Arendt began her final work on the threefold faculties of the mind – thinking, willing, 
and judging – she returned to two key figures in her life.1 The first was Heidegger, her teacher at 
Marburg and one of the key influences in the development of her philosophical and political 
thinking.2 As she began the book, it was to Heidegger’s reflections on thinking that Arendt turned, 
affirming his provocation that thinking serves to produce neither knowledge, wisdom, resolutions to 
the universe nor to ‘endow us directly with the power to act’ as an epigraph to her own work on 
thinking.3 Heidegger’s investment in exposing the limits of thought in order to ignite the question of 
what it means to think assumes particular prescience in relation to the failure of thinking of the second 
figure Arendt cites Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann, the former Nazi official on whose trial she had 
reported in 1961, provided Arendt with an exemplar of thoughtlessness. Witness to his apparent 
refusal to think, Arendt’s attendance at the trial led her to coin the phrase ‘banality of evil,’ the 
polemical formulation that spoke to the potential ordinariness of those who commit evil.4  
Taking seriously what she saw as the complete absence of thinking in Eichmann’s testimony, 
Arendt was prompted to ask whether thinking might ‘make men abstain from evil-doing and even 
actually “condition” them against it?’5 Rather than forsake Heidegger’s earlier hesitation about the 
potential of thought and elevate thought to a superior status in the canon of ethics or morality, 
Arendt’s position evinces a similar hesitancy to position thinking in the realm of immanent wisdom or 
knowledge. And yet, where thinking cannot become a source of pure goodness, it can challenge the 
limits of what appears in such a way that it inclines towards what is not yet, what is not known, and 
what is not fixed. Viewed at this level thinking dwells in the domain of worldly unconcealment.  
 
1 Arendt only finished the first two sections of the book before she passed away. And though the second section 
on ‘Willing’ is fully written when she passed, Arendt had not revised much of its contents. What was to be 
written in the final section on ‘Judgement,’ can never be fully known although the lecture course that she gave 
on Kant’s political philosophy and published in 1982 is said to contain many of her ideas.  
2 Chapter One went some way to addressing the Heideggerian elements of Arendt’s writing, at the very least in 
their shared concern for the place of being. For a more sustained discussion on the way in which Heidegger’s 
ontology informed Arendt’s onto-politics see Villa, 1996: 113-143. 
3 LMT: 2.  
4 EJ.  
5 LMT: 5.  
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 In spite of this affinity between thinking and the pursuit of unconcealment, it was not to 
thinking that I turned in the previous chapter as a potential antidote to the evilness that inheres in the 
exilic violence of the climate crisis’s History and Future. Indeed, it was not even evil that I located in 
these spaces nor was it the practice of evil that I detected in the willed ignorance that supports those 
structures that underpin both exilic history and the more general exilic condition of the climate crisis. 
While evil undoubtedly has a role to play in the ordinariness of this violence, in its unfolding as the 
catastrophic ‘status quo’ of normativity and History’s unremitting progression, my concern has not 
been to locate evilness within the climate crisis but to challenge the very structure that precedes the 
division of subjects into oppressor and oppressed. 6  Returning to Heidegger’s reflections on thinking 
then, my concern here is not with the absence of thinking – the same absence that Arendt saw in the 
ordinary evilness of Eichmann – but with that which provokes thinking in the first place and, it might 
be added, that from which thinking, in times of willed ignorance, turns away.  
Heidegger developed this nuance between what it is to think and the object of thought in his 
first lecture of What is Called Thinking? Complicating the qualification of the human status as 
determined by the capacity to think, he begins the lecture as follows: 
 
Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, 
however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking. For we are capable of doing 
only what we are inclined to do. And again, we truly incline only toward something that in 
turn inclines toward us, toward our essential being, by appealing to our essential being as the 
keeper who holds us in our essential being.7    
 
Establishing an affinity between thought and its object, Heidegger is careful to resist reducing the 
latter to an object of pure or immanent consumption. Insofar as thinking is provoked, it remains bound 
to its object as a source of agonism rather than total disclosure. The valence of Adriana Cavarero’s 
account of inclination re-emerges here as the force that exposes the intersection and dependence of 
 
6 Here I am alluding to Benjamin’s description of historical catastrophe as the status quo, see SW4: 184-5.  
7 WCT: 3.  
 246 
the self on all that exceeds it, denying subject sovereignty as it inclines subjectivity towards a state of 
being that is always already and always will be marked by an irreducible relationality. In much the 
same way, Heidegger appeals towards an account of thinking that depends upon the resistance of 
ontology to immanence, the refusal to subsume thinking to knowledge and thought to its completion. 
And yet, what appears in this rejection of totalization is the threat posed to thinking by something like 
the exilic condition. Which is not to say that exile coincides with the loss of thinking, but that the 
normalization of exile is, understood in terms borrowed from Heidegger, the refusal to incline towards 
that space in which being appears. The loss of one’s claim to place, which appears in Arendtian terms 
as the inability to realise the potential of natality to be-in-place then coincides with the loss of 
thinking as an activity proper to the agonistic and thought-provoking constellation that is earth-world-
history. Under the normalised conditions of exile, a normalisation that Arendt and Benjamin describe 
as catastrophic, the loss of thought as the inclination towards the concealed conditions of place 
coincides with the loss of something like humanity’s essential being.8  
 For Arendt the status of thinking is somewhat different. While she holds onto Heidegger’s 
original provocation that thinking cannot be placed within a means-end framework of producing 
knowledge or wisdom, she nevertheless claims that ‘we must be able to “demand” [thought’s] 
exercise from every sane person, no matter how erudite or ignorant, intelligent or stupid, he may 
happen to be.’9  Indeed, if Heidegger were to insist on the capacity of each individual to assume the 
charge of being authentically, that is, to take up the position of Dasein, then he too would presumably 
share this demand. And yet, it is not thinking that I want to demand of each individual burdened with 
the task of witnessing the climate crisis, rather it is love. It was love that I enjoined in the previous 
chapter as a praxis of dwelling in earth-world-history, capable of recalling the Heideggerian strife 
first located in that constellation in Chapter One and later clarified through the futurity of natality to 
remake the world and give rise to messianic beginnings. Where thinking appears in Arendt’s writing 
in the context of justice, neither as the logic proscribing the violence of the law nor as handmaiden to 
 
8 For Arendt a crisis becomes a disaster when thought has atrophied and the integrity of reality forfeited, see PP: 
171. For Benjamin’s discussion of historical catastrophe see SW4: 184-5.   
9 LMT: 13.  
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the punitive force of retribution but as the pursuit of something transcendent of ends, it is love that 
serves as its underlying motivation. Indeed, Arendt writes in The Promise of Politics that ‘the motive 
for assuming the burden of earthly politics’ – a politics that has been shown to coincide with the right 
to be-in-place and the law of earthly plurality – ‘is love of one’s neighbour, not fear of him.’10 It is in 
this same text that Arendt identifies love as the ‘life-giving source’ that fuels life – even in the desert-
like conditions of exile.11 Rather than espouse a politics of thinking as distinct from love then, my aim 
in this conclusion is to demonstrate the political potential of love: firstly as an impetus to think and 
secondly to act. 
 If love provides the basis on which the meaning of earth-world-history is sought, then it is 
love that must be demanded of each individual. It is love, before its transformation in the activity of 
thinking that gives meaning to the search for worldly meaning. Martin Hägglund describes love as 
‘sense-making’ in precisely this way.12 Distinguishing love from its possessive ends, a 
misappropriation that resembles the equation of thinking with knowledge, Hägglund espouses an 
account of love that overlaps not only with Arendt and Heidegger but with all who appeal for a world 
of love not as a challenge to hatred and violence but as an original way of being in the world.13 Arendt 
dismissed the perversion of love into a means-end construct when she wrote that ‘love can only 
become false and perverted when it is used for political purposes such as the change of salvation of 
the world.’14 And yet, as I demonstrated in Chapter Six, love is not a mode of instrumental action but 
an affirmation of that which resists immanence as the as-yet concealed agonism of earth-world-
history itself. As a praxis of worldly being then, I want to contest the quarrel between James Baldwin 
and Arendt on the status of love, arguing that Baldwin’s description of love as a ‘state of being…in 
the tough and universal sense of quest and daring and growth’ in fact coincides with Arendt’s 
description of love as a life-giving oasis that give meaning to the project of worldliness.15 Rather than 
 
10 PP: 139.  
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12 Hägglund, 2019.  
13 I particularly think of Baldwin’s appeal to love in The Fire Next Time Here, see Baldwin, 1963.  
14 HC: 52.  
15 Baldwin, 1963: 103. 
 248 
introduce a new claim, what I aim to show here recalls the arguments advanced throughout this 
project and highlights their common goal in realising the condition of placedness.  
 And so, where I want to begin is with a return to the original discussion of the earth-world-
history constellation from Part I. What figured initially as a complication of Heidegger’s discussion 
on the origin of the artwork evolved into a concise reflection on the movement between earth, world, 
and history, those three spaces that coalesced to form the constellation earth-world-history.16 Brought 
into productive proximity with one another, my original aim was to show a common affinity between 
the status of art and the earth. Namely, that whilst each lays claim to an ontological primordiality as 
the object which gives meaning to artwork and artists on the one hand, and world and history on the 
other, this primacy is ultimately untenable. What I drew out through Heidegger’s discussion of the 
origin of art was precisely the impossibility of ascribing its ontological primacy, assumed greater 
clarity still in Heidegger’s discussion of the fourfold [das Geviert]. The development of ‘strife’ 
central to the fourfold which exists in the interplay of earth, sky, mortal, and divinities made patent 
the inextricability of being from a plurality of relational forces.  
If artwork and the artists are neither prerequisite nor subsequent to the notion of art, what the 
fourfold made apparent was similar force of this ‘co-being’ of conditions that coordinate meaning 
inherent to the fact of being-in-place. What it meant to ‘dwell’ within this agonal sphere of the 
fourfold thus arose insofar as ‘dwelling [preserved] the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the 
fourfold into things.’17 This understanding of space as suspended between the move away from 
immanent unconcealment towards concealment can now be understood as precisely that irreducible or 
unfixable origin that figures both as the locus of dwelling and as the objectless object proper to love. 
This force of love to affirm without totalising the space of dwelling is illuminated by Arendt’s own 
discussion of place as exerting a conditioning – though not reductive – force over being.  
 I began my discussion of the role of place in Arendt’s writing by noting the reappearance of 
an organising agonism or strife around which notions of earth, world, and history each appear. While 
for Heidegger the central problematic here was the status of an original and organising origin, for 
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Arendt elements of the agonistic arise in the necessary meeting of opposites. What thus appears in her 
writings as the central political condition of plurality is defined as the initially paradoxical fact that 
‘we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who 
ever lived, lives, or will live.’18 Yet it is plurality’s inextricability from the earth, a connection that she 
captures in the claim that ‘plurality is the law of the earth’ paired simultaneously with the fact 
plurality appears in the disclosure of worlds and hence the production of history that reveals the 
agonism with which earth, world, and history appear in the context of her work.19 If the detection of 
something like earth-world-history in Heidegger’s writing thus played on the impossibility of 
reducing ontology to a series of causative beginnings, and hence a form of ontological linearity, the 
reappearance of earth-world-history in Arendt’s writing assumes a far more political quality as the 
locus of political action. As such, it is the emergence of plurality – and with it the second political 
condition of natality – in the context earth-world-history that advances Heidegger’s discussion of 
place into a far more political realm.  
This transformation of what it means to engage the placedness of being as the condition for 
Heideggerian dwelling into a discussion of Arendtian politics as such allows for a renewed discussion 
about the intersection of politics and place. The original contours of this connection between place 
and politics are discernible in Arendt’s maxim that ‘plurality is the law of the earth’ and hence the 
need to think politics as bound in some way to the earth. Yet the meaning of this connection becomes 
more concise insofar as what is recognised in the connection between the earth and politics is 
something like the impossibility of ‘completing’ politics or identifying a single political end. What the 
inextricability of politics from the law of the earth makes clear is that the political institution cannot 
instrumentalise action without losing something inherent to the condition for politics itself. The 
discussion in Part II about the intersection of natality, Arendt’s second political condition, and earth-
world-history established a paradigm in which the anti-political force of the exilic condition could be 
made apparent. While this argument hinged in Chapter Three on recovering the ‘earthliness’ of 
natality, an exegesis that paralleled Adriana Cavarero’s recovery of the maternal dimension of 
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natality, it went on to progress a reading of Arendt’s account of rights in connection to earth-world-
history.20 Invoking the agonism with which earth-world-history first emerged out of Heidegger’s 
writing on the origin, the connection between the ‘fore-right’ that structurally proceeds the logic of 
rights with the right-to-placedness, the redemption of natality’s earthliness established the inextricable 
connection between rights and place. Each disclosed via the affirmative realisation of natality in 
action, the right-to-placedness created space in which to think the historical redemption of previous 
transgressions against rights in Chapter Four. Attaining to a messianic understanding of natality, here 
my project returned to the anachronistic appearance of earth-world-history which rejects the primacy 
of an origin, a resistance that was elaborated via a reading of Walter Benjamin’s political theology.   
Benjamin’s political theology provided a rich point of entry into thinking the revolutionary 
potential of natality to reorient earth-world-history and challenge the limited frames of reference that 
threaten to govern its appearance. Similarly refusing to totalise either origin or ending, political 
theology functioned as a methodological apparatus that would guide the realisation of natality towards 
the renewed unconcealment of earth-world-history. Allowing for both the messianic redemption of 
earth-world-history as inhering in actions that act ‘into’ history and renew the past, filling it with what 
Benjamin calls Jetztzeit and for the original spontaneity of natality which inaugurates new and 
unpredictable beginnings, I developed a reading of natality that would allow for the realisation of that 
preeminent right-to-placedness.21 Effectively ‘operationalising’ what emerged in dialogue with 
Benjamin as a form of messianic or revolutionary historiography, in Part III I dealt directly with the 
violence of history, identified in Chapter Five as the exilic violence of History. Complicating the 
status of history, History was introduced to identify precisely those forms that restrict the 
unconcealment of earth-world-history and impose oppressive ends over those claims to place that are 
so central to natality, plurality and the realisation of politics more generally. Locating the specific 
origins of History as it pertains to the climate crisis, I argued for the twofold recognition of this exilic 
violence in the histories of settler-colonialism and racialised capitalism. Seeing within these moments 
the conditions inaugural to the climate crisis and naming them created space in which to think an 
 
20 see ICR.  
21 SW4, 395.  
 251 
alternate history, one that I named history, its diminutive form testament to it openness to be reread 
and ultimately reoriented.  
While the revolutionary potential of history appeared principally in the form of decolonial 
struggles to recognise the histories of the oppressed, in Chapter Six I encountered the further exilic 
space of Future. Extending the exilic violence of History, Future negates the radical politics that first 
emerged in Benjamin’s critical historiography of political theology, manifesting instead the 
ineliminable necessity to engage the irreversible facticity of the climate crisis. Drawing out the 
distinct nuances of this violence in a threefold reading of Future as Future-Clotho, Future-Lachesis, 
and Future-Atropos, it was this totalising claim to earth-world-history that ultimately led to an appeal 
to engage love as a praxis of revolutionary future-making. At this juncture, the Future was thus 
counterposed through a narrative of affirmative world-making, of recognising the ineliminable aegis 
of the climate crisis – what I described in terms of the ‘what’ qualities of earth-world-history – and 
nevertheless remaining invested in the concealed ‘whoness’ of an open future. Whilst simplistic, this 
division of earth-world-history into the metaphorical spheres of ‘what’ and ‘who,’ allows me to 
address here the intersection of thinking and love as it first arose in this conclusion.  
Part of Arendt’s discussion of thinking hinges on its appearance within a similar triadic 
construction, which like earth-world-history ‘cannot be derived from each other and though they have 
certain common characteristics they cannot be reduced to a common denominator.’22 Here thinking is 
cast alongside willing and judging; what can thus be said to motivate thought to think, the will to will 
and judgment to judge by necessity invokes the others. In the same way then, that the ‘oneness’ of 
Heidegger’s fourfold appears in each instance of dwelling or the ‘oneness’ of earth-world-history in 
the realisation of natality, the oneness of the mental faculties depends ‘on a certain stillness of the 
soul’s passion, on that “dispassionate quiet” (leidenschaftslose Stille) which Hegel ascribed to 
“merely thinking cognition.”’23 In further contrast to her polemical remarks on the antipolitical force 
 
22 LMT: 69.  
23 LMT: 70.  
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of love, it is love that Arendt identifies as the ‘weight of the soul’ stilling its passions and allowing the 
mental activities to come together and disclose the world anew.24  
Restricted neither to the specificity of the lover nor the beloved, Arendt identifies love as 
irreducible to objecthood; rather her concern is with love as love itself, the ‘footprint’ of experience.25 
Unbounded by either objective end or subjective origin, it is this love that stills the passions of the 
soul and brings world into being anew, whether through the reframing of the present through memory 
or the expression of judgment. Disclosed neither in the pursuit of ends nor as the rough extraction of 
possession, love allows the world to come into being as a space of appearance. What is transformed in 
love thus pertains to the world itself, insofar as the world brings together all those who live within it 
and remain touched by something that exists outside of them, untenable and yet forever within a 
semblance of reach. To love the world is not to love the world as a locus of not-yet or no-longer but as 
it is. As Arendt writes, ‘there is no greater assertion of something or somebody than to love it, that is, 
to say: I will that you be – Amo: vol out sis.’26 With this turning around from love as evidence of the 
passions to love as the willing affirmation of what is, a clarification can be made once again as 
regarding what it means to love the world. Namely, neither to love blindly nor in nostalgia but open to 
something that cannot be known except in its concealment. To love the world as it is exposed under 
the violence of the climate crisis is to stand in fear and trembling and recognise that what guides 
meaning and what appeals to justice is never simply ready to hand but fractured, concealed and 
awaiting unconcealment.27  
If this project began with the aim of thinking the status of the climate crisis and the potential 
to read within Arendt an environmental politics, it ends by concluding that insofar as Arendt is a 
theorist of place, she is an environmental thinker. Arendt’s writing is thus not simply applicable to 
this crisis, it was always already implicated in the questions to which the crisis gives rise. At the 
outset Arendt’s politics are a politics of the earth, her ‘central political category’ a provocation 
regarding the earthly placedness of humans, and her project of maintaining a love for the body politic 
 
24 LMW: 95.  
25 LMW: 103.  
26 LMW: 104.  
27 Here I invoke Arendt’s response to the world after the violence of totalitarianism, see EU: 132.  
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an attempt to instil a love for the world – an amor mundi – that will persist in spite of the persistent 
concealment of that place. The imperative that first emerged in The Human Condition, to think what 
we are doing, thus re-emerges with even greater clarity here. Not only to think what we are doing in 
an age of planetary instability and ongoing transgressions of the natal right-to-placedness but, insofar 
as to think is to love, to persist in loving the unknowable place of the human condition: earth-world-
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